The Court considered that the reaffirmation of the principle of marital duties and the fact that the
divorce had been granted on the grounds that the applicant had ceased all sexual relations with her
husband amounted to interferences with her right to respect for private life, her sexual freedom and
her right to bodily autonomy.
In the present case, the Court noted that the legal basis for the divorce had been Articles 229 and
242 et seq. of the Civil Code, which provided that a fault-based divorce could be granted where
evidence of a serious and repeated breach of marital duties and obligations was attributable to one
of the spouses and led to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
It noted that under the Court of Cassation’s long-standing but consistent case-law, spouses were
subject to marital duties and failure to fulfil them could constitute a fault justifying divorce. In that
connection, the Court of Cassation had confirmed, in a judgment of 17 December 1997, that “a
wife’s prolonged failure to have sexual relations” could justify the granting of a fault-based divorce
where this “was not justified on sufficient medical grounds”. Although the Court of Cassation had
not reaffirmed this case-law in the meantime, there had been no departure from it, and it continued
to be applied by the lower courts. The Court concluded that the interferences complained of had
been based on well-established domestic case-law.
As to the legitimacy of the aim pursued, the Court recognised that the purpose of the interferences
complained of, which related to the right of each spouse to terminate the marriage, was linked to
the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” within the meaning of the Convention.
The Court’s task was to determine whether the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between
the competing interests at stake.
In the first place, the Court did not exclude the possibility that obliging a spouse to remain married
despite the finding that there had been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage could, in certain
circumstances, amount to an excessive interference with his or her rights. The Court noted,
however, that, in so far as the interferences in question affected one of the most intimate aspects of
private life, the margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting States in this area was narrow.
Only particularly serious reasons could justify interferences on the part of the public authorities in
the area of sexuality.
In the present case, the Court noted that the concept of “marital duties”, as set out in the domestic
legal order and reaffirmed in the present case, took no account whatsoever of consent to sexual
relations. In that connection, the Court reiterated that any non-consensual act of a sexual nature
constituted a form of sexual violence. The Court noted that failure to fulfil marital duties could, in
the conditions provided in Article 242 of the Civil Code, be considered a fault justifying the granting
of a divorce. It also noted that it could entail pecuniary consequences and, in certain circumstances,
serve as a basis for a claim for damages.
The Court concluded that the very existence of such a marital obligation ran counter both to sexual
freedom and the right to bodily autonomy, and to the Contracting States’ positive obligation of
prevention in the context of combating domestic and sexual violence.
In the Court’s view, consent to marriage could not imply consent to future sexual relations. Such an
interpretation would be tantamount to denying that marital rape was reprehensible in nature. On
the contrary, consent had to reflect a free willingness to engage in sexual relations at a given
moment and in the specific circumstances.
In any event, the Court could not identify any particularly serious reason capable of justifying an
interference in the area of sexuality. It noted that the applicant’s husband could have petitioned for
divorce, submitting the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage as the principal ground, and not, as
he had done, as an alternative ground.
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