FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF DAMIAN v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
(Application no. 32935/13)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 February 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Damian v. the Republic of Moldova,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Diana Sârcu,
Sébastien Biancheri, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 32935/13) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 April 2013 by a Moldovan national, Ms Livia Damian (“the applicant”), who was born in 1977, lives in Chișinău and was represented by Ms G. Gutium, lawyer practising in Chișinău;
the decision to give notice to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr D. Obadă, of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 15 January 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the proportionality of the domestic court’s decisions to annul a contract under which the applicant had become the owner of a building.
2. On 28 November 2002 the Chișinău local authorities allowed a private company (company L.) to erect a building. On an unspecified date company M., another private company, lodged court proceedings against the local authorities claiming that company L.’s building blocked access to its premises. It asked to obtain the property over similar real estate in Chișinău.
3. On 5 July 2005 the Economic District Court accepted company M.’s request and ordered the local authorities to transfer the property to company M. concerning a specific building in Chișinău (“the building”), which was non-residential. In the absence of an appeal, that judgment became final.
4. A political party was renting the building from the local authorities since 2002. On an unknown date the local authorities transferred ownership of the building to company M., which registered it in the real estate register.
5. On 10 May 2006 company M. sold the building to E.P., who had the purchase contract confirmed by a notary public and had her property right registered in the real estate register of the Cadastre Office. On 25 November 2006 E.P. sold the building to the applicant, who paid 321,000 Moldovan lei ((MDL), approximately 18,800 euros (EUR) at the time). On the same day the contract was authenticated by a notary public. At the time of the sale no limitation or condition on E.P.’s property right over the relevant building was noted in the real estate register.
6. The applicant registered her property right with the Cadastre Office on 27 November 2006. On an unspecified date after buying the building, the applicant learned that the political party occupied it. She asked it on a number of occasions to vacate the building, to no avail.
7. On an unknown date, the political party asked the local authorities to sell the building to them as part of the process of privatisation. On 21 December 2006 the Republican Commission of the Privatisation Agency decided to allow the privatisation of the building by the political party, which subsequently paid its price to the State (MDL 500,000 equivalent of EUR 29,000 at the time).
8. On 5 March 2007 the applicant lodged a court action against the political party, asking for a court order to vacate the building and for the annulment of the decision of 21 December 2006. The political party lodged a counteraction, seeking the annulment of the contracts between company M. and E.P. as well as between E.P. and the applicant. During the examination of the case, the political party asked for the reopening of the proceedings between company M. and the local authorities (see paragraph 33 above). On 26 August 2008 the Economic Court of Appeal accepted the request and annulled the final judgment of 5 July 2005, because a third party affected by the judgment (the political party) had not been involved in the proceedings. The political party participated in the proceedings, but the applicant was apparently unaware of them.
9. On 2 June 2007 E.P. died. In the main proceedings between the applicant and the political party, after several decisions sending the case for a retrial, on 19 April 2011 the first-instance court rejected the applicant’s action and accepted the one lodged by the political party. It found that the judgment of 5 July 2005 in company M.’s favour had been annulled on 26 August 2008. Accordingly, since the basis for company M.’s property right had disappeared, it could not sell the building to E.P., the contract being null and void. It also found that the contract between E.P. and the applicant had to be annulled as fictitiously concluded, because the applicant had not taken possession of the contract’s object.
10. On 13 March 2012 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. It essentially repeated the lower court’s reasons concerning the nullity of the contract between company M. and E.P. and between E.P. and the applicant, as fictitious. It noted that the applicant had not taken possession of the building. The court also noted that although the political party privatised the building on 21 December 2006, it had obtained the approval of the Republican Commission of the Privatisation Agency in 2003, for the price of MDL 204,000 (approximately EUR 12,800). As a renter of the building, the political party had priority in privatising it.
11. In a final judgment of 8 November 2012, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the lower courts’ judgments.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
12. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies. In particular, she did not request the domestic courts to be allowed to intervene in the proceedings concerning company M.’s property right over the building, which on 26 August 2008 had been sent for re-examination after the annulment of the judgment of 5 July 2005. In addition, she could have claimed compensation for any damage caused by E.P., who had sold her the building.
13. The applicant submitted that she had not been party to the proceedings between company M. and the authorities, and that the present case concerned her court action against the political party. Also, E.P. had died in 2007 with no heirs, meaning that she could not claim compensation from her in any case.
14. The Court notes that the proceedings leading to the judgment of 5 July 2005 in company M.’s favour concerned compensation to that company, in the form of a building, caused by an earlier decision of the authorities which had blocked the entrance to company M.’s building. The Government did not specify what the applicant could claim in those proceedings, which did not affect her rights in any manner. It is true that the final judgment in company M.’s favour was the legal basis for that company’s property right, which was transferred to E.P. when selling the building. While the annulment of that final judgment could in itself affect the applicant’s rights, she was not informed of the relevant proceedings and only found out about the quashing when the decision of 26 August 2008 had already been adopted.
15. The Court also notes that it was not E.P.’s actions which resulted in the applicant’s losing her property, but those of the political party and the resulting court decisions. Accordingly, requesting the political party to vacate her property and defending against their counteraction to annul her purchase contract constituted a proper manner for the applicant to raise the relevant issues before the domestic courts. Moreover, while any sums which the applicant could receive from E.P. could potentially be important for the purposes of assessing the proportionality of the interference and in the context of her claims for just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention (Gladysheva v. Russia, no. 7097/10, §§ 62, 6 December 2011), in the present case it is clear that since E.P. died without any heirs, this possibility was unavailable to the applicant.
16. The Government’s preliminary objection must thus be dismissed in respect of both counts of the alleged failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
17. The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
18. The general principles on ascertaining whether a balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights existed have been summarized in Beyeler v. Italy [GC] (no. 33202/96, §§ 114 and 120, ECHR 2000-I).
19. The Government referred to the domestic courts’ finding that, with the 5 July 2005 quashing of the judgment, company M.’s property right had been extinguished and that, accordingly, the subsequent sale of that property to E.P. and further on to the applicant had been annulled. The applicant thus had no “possession”, nor a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining one.
20. The Court observes that not only did the applicant conclude a contract for the purchase of the relevant building, which was confirmed by a notary public, but she also registered her property right with the Cadastre Office, which was the single office competent to register such transactions. Accordingly, the Court finds it established that the applicant had a “possession”, notwithstanding the fact that subsequently the transaction was invalidated (see, for instance, Belova v. Russia, no. 33955/08, § 32, 15 September 2020).
21. Moreover, it is clear that, as a result of the court decisions taken, the applicant was deprived of her property, which amounts to an interference with her right (Gladysheva, cited above, §§ 52-59). The parties did not dispute the fact that the interference was based on clear legal provisions.
22. As for the proportionality of the interference with the applicant’s right, the Court reiterates that in such cases a fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights, the search for such a fair balance being inherent throughout the Convention. This means that a measure must be both appropriate for achieving its aim and proportionate to it. The requisite balance will not be struck where the person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden (Belova, cited above, § 37).
23. Authorities should be able to correct their mistakes, but not in a situation where the individual concerned is required to bear an excessive burden (see Vukušić v. Croatia, no. 69735/11, § 64, 31 May 2016, with case-law cited therein). The Court finally reiterates that “the attenuation of past injustices [should] not create new wrongs” and “persons who acquired their possessions in good faith [should not be] made to bear the burden of responsibility which is rightfully that of the State” (see Pincová and Pinc v. the Czech Republic, no. 36548/97, § 58, ECHR 2002-VIII).
24. The Court notes that the entire sequence of events in the present case started from the authorities’ allowing a private company to erect a building in a manner blocking access to another company, company M. (see paragraph 2 above). As a result, the courts corrected the wrong caused by ordering the authorities to transfer another building to company M.
25. None of the subsequent proceedings found that, when company M. sold the building to E.P., and when E.P. sold it to the applicant, there had been any formal legal impediment for doing so.
26. It is noted that the domestic courts did not explain which social values had to be protected by annulling the contracts between company M. and E.P. and between E.P. and the applicant. Despite the Government suggesting that the price paid for the building had been low, the courts did not find, with reference to evidence, that the price of any of the transactions was manifestly unreasonable, or that the money had not been paid. They did not refer to any specific evidence that any of the transactions had been an attempt to commit fraud, evade taxes, avoid paying a debt or otherwise present to the authorities or third parties a legal situation which did not correspond to the actual one intended between the parties, in order to circumvent a legal obligation. Neither was it established that company M. or E.P. had any ulterior reasons for selling the building, such as knowing of a legal dispute concerning the building and the associated risk of losing that property, as there was no dispute at the relevant time.
27. The only reason on which the domestic courts relied in finding that the transactions had been fictitious and without a valid cause was that E.P. and subsequently the applicant never took actual possession of the building. However, it is noted that under the applicable law the steps required to transfer ownership over real estate was to conclude a written contract confirmed by a notary public and to register the property right with the Cadastre Office. In the case of both transactions these steps were followed.
28. Moreover, the applicant’s unrebutted submission was that after buying the building she found out about the presence of the political party and asked it to vacate the premisses. As a result of its refusal to do so she lodged a court action slightly more than three months after the purchase. In the Court’s opinion, this shows that the applicant tried in good faith to obtain the actual possession of the building. She cannot be penalised for unsuccessfully using the justice system as the only legal way of protecting her rights.
29. It is true that she could have checked the state of the building before buying it with the purpose of investigating its origin in order to avoid possible confiscation claims. However, given the absence of any inscription or restriction in the real estate register of the Cadastre Office concerning the building sold by E.P., the applicant had no reason to doubt that she would become the owner or that the building was the subject of a legal dispute. Importantly, since the building was already registered with the Cadastre Office as private property belonging to E.P., there was no reason for the applicant to believe that the renter of that building could have any claim to that property, such as the right to buy it from the State (privatisation). As the new owner, she could deal later with anyone renting the building, for instance by receiving herself the rental payments, asking to vacate the building or demolishing it to build something else. Accordingly, in the present case it could not be said that the applicant’s lack of due diligence caused the problem (Belova, cited above, § 41).
30. The Court notes that even when the initial title to a certain property was obtained by a third-party unlawfully and then transferred to a good-faith buyer, the new good-faith owner’s property right should be protected, especially when the authorities had validated the transfer and had had an opportunity to verify its lawfulness (see Gladysheva, cited above, §§ 78 et seq.). In the present case, the initial acquisition of the property right by company M. from the State was lawful at the relevant time as it had been based on a final court order. The applicant also acquired title to the building while following the procedures prescribed by law.
31. In view of all of the above, the Court finds that the applicant is a good-faith buyer. It also considers that in the present case the authorities rectified their error (of awarding the building to company M. without involving the political party) by making the applicant bear the burden of responsibility which is rightfully that of the State (see paragraph 23 above). Moreover, given E.P.’s death without leaving any heirs, it is clear that the applicant could not claim compensation from her (Belova, cited above, § 42).
32. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the conditions under which the applicant was stripped of the title to the building imposed an individual and excessive burden on her and that the authorities have failed to strike a fair balance between the demands of the public interest on the one hand and the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions on the other.
33. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
34. The applicant complained that the domestic courts accepted the political party’s late appeal when adopting the decision of 26 August 2008, that the courts were biased and changed several times their composition.
35. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal question raised by the case and that there is no need to examine those remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
36. The applicant claimed 579,765 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, consisting of EUR 147,096 representing the market value of the building, as proven by an estimation from a real estate dealer in Chișinău and EUR 432,669 in lost income from renting out the building. She also claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
37. The Government argued that since the applicant had not had a “possession” or a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining one, there had been no breach of her rights and thus no compensation was due. In any event, she could not claim the current market value of the building, which had increased a lot. Moreover, the lost profits were highly speculative.
38. The Court notes that it has found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in that the applicant was deprived of her property without any compensation. The Court reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes a legal obligation on the respondent State to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 32, ECHR 2000-XI, and Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC] (just satisfaction), no. 25701/94, § 72, 28 November 2002).
39. In the present case, the Court notes that on the one hand, the applicant has properly observed the procedure for registering the property right over real estate. On the other hand, she did not visit the building before buying it, which would have alerted her to the fact that it was occupied by the political party. She thus failed to fully carry out due diligence. Moreover, the building in question was non-residential (see paragraph 3 above), which implies that the applicant in fact made an investment, thereby taking a commercial risk. In the particular circumstances of the present case, and given E.P.’s death and the resulting impossibility of recovering anything from her, the Court finds it appropriate to award the applicant the sum of money which she had paid for the building, namely EUR 18,800. Judging on an equitable basis, it also awards her EUR 3,000 for non-pecuniary damage caused.
40. The applicant made no claims for costs and expenses and the Court does not make an award in this respect.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to return to the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the building taken from her, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that, failing restitution of the property as set out under (a) above, the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within the same period of three months as that referred to under (a) above, EUR 18,800 (eighteen thousand and eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage, to be converted into Moldovan lei at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(c) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within the same three-month period as that referred to under (a) above, EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Moldovan lei at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(d) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President