COUNCIL OF EUROPE

EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

DECISION OF THE COMMISSION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY

IN RESPECT OF APPLICATION NO. 343/57

submitted by Bjørn Schouw NIELSEN
against the Government of Denmark

The European Commission of Human Rights, sitting in private on 6th July, 1959, under the Presidency of Mr. C.H.M. WALDOCK, the following members being present:

M. C.Th. EUSTATHIADES, Vice-President
M. P. BERG
M. P. FABER
M. L.J.C. BEAUFORT
M. A. SUSTERHENN
M. S. PETREN
M. M. SØRENSEN
M. N. ERIM
M. F. ERMACORA

M. P. MODINOS, Director of Human Rights,
Secretary to the Commission

A 24912

A 48.502

HAVING REGARD to the Application lodged on 23rd December, 1957, by Bjørn Schouw Nielsen, represented by Mr. Poul Christiansen, barrister at the High Court, against the Government of Denmark and registered on 30th December, 1957, under file No. 343/57.

HAVING REGARD to the report provided for in Rule 45, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, dated 20th November, 1958;

HAVING REGARD to the Decision whereby the Commission on 9th January, 1959, ordered the Application to be communicated to the Government of Denmark which was invited to submit to the Commission, within a period of six weeks from the date of giving such notice, its observations in writing as to the admissibility of the Application, in particular with regard to the allegations of the Applicant that violations of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention had occurred in several instances in the proceedings before the Danish Courts;

HAVING REGARD to the written observations of the Government of Denmark of 3rd March, 1959;

HAVING REGARD to the report provided for in Rule 45, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, dated 12th March, 1959;

HAVING REGARD to the Decision whereby the Commission, on 20th March, 1959, invited the Government of Denmark to submit detailed observations with respect to:

(1) the period which elapsed before the Applicant was brought to trial, cf. Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention;

(2) the alleged omission from the indictment of a detailed statement of the charges against which the Applicant was to defend himself, cf. Article 6, paragraph 3a, of the Convention;

(3) the statements made out of court and before the conviction by persons officially connected with the case as to the guilt of the Applicant, cf. Article 6, paragraph 2;

(4) the statements made by the expert psychiatrists during the trial as to the guilt of the Applicant, cf. Article 6, paragraph 2,

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and to submit, within a period of 8 weeks, any further observations which the Danish Government deemed appropriate with respect to the admissibility of the Application having regard to Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention;

HAVING REGARD to the Memorandum of the Government of Denmark of 15th May, 1959;

HAVING REGARD to the Applicant's Reply to the above Memorandum of 22nd June, 1959;

THE COMMISSION, having deliberated,

The facts of the case

WHEREAS the facts of the case as submitted by the Applicant may be summarised as follows:

On 29th March, 1951, a certain Palle Wischmann Hardrup killed two bank clerks in an attempted robbery of a bank in Copenhagen. He was arrested shortly afterwards and declared at the police enquiry that he had wanted to commit the robbery in order to procure funds for a political party, the "National Communist Party of Denmark," to be founded by himself. He stated that he had acted alone and on his own initiative.

On 30th March, 1951 the Applicant was arrested. The grounds for his arrest appear to be the following: Both Hardrup and the Applicant had been previously convicted. Hardrup had been sentenced in September 1946 to 14 years' imprisonment for collaboration with the German police during the second World War. The Applicant had been sentenced, in January, 1947, to 12 years' imprisonment for having served in the German army, for having been an informer and for having blackmailed various people during the German occupation of Denmark. Hardrup and the Applicant became acquainted in the spring of 1947 when they shared a cell in the State prison of Horsens and had continued seeing each other after their release on probation in 1949. Having heard of the attempted robbery, certain former fellow prisoners informed the police that the Applicant was in all probability the instigator of the robbery in view of the close relationship which had existed at the time when the Applicant and Hardrup were in prison at Horsens. Hardrup, however, denied that the Applicant was in any way connected with the robbery but later confessed in a written statement of December 1951, that the Applicant had planned and instigated by hypnotic suggestions (a) the robbery of the Huidovre branch of the Folkebank in Copenhagen in August 1950 and (b) the attempted robbery of 29th March 1951 and that he (Hardrup) had not acted of his own free will.

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On 2nd April, 1951, the Copenhagen Town Court (København Byret) ruled that no sufficient basis for charging the Applicant existed. This ruling was, however, on 3rd April, 1951, reversed by the High Court which ordered the remand of the Applicant in custody.

On 1st May, 1951, the Applicant was released from custody although he was still formally charged with being accessory to the attempted robbery.

During the year 1951, Hardrup had been submitted to a mental observation by the chief psychiatrist of police, Dr. Max Schmidt, and the result of this examination was produced on 17th December, 1951, in the form of a report. The gist of this report was that the Applicant had no doubt possessed a "decisive and fateful" influence over Hardrup and that the latter was to be considered as a dangerous lunatic who should be detained in a remand home for psychopaths.

A few days after his arrest, Hardrup had already declared that he believed that he had a "guardian spirit" who had ordered him to commit the robbery for the above political purposes and that this spirit had guided his life and determined his actions since the time he first became aware of it, viz. in the prison of Horsens. In a statement(1) which he wrote in December 1951, Hardrup identified the Applicant with the guardian spirit and admitted that the Applicant had planned and induced him to commit two robberies and to kill the two bank clerks.

In January 1952, the chief psychiatrist made another statement according to which Hardrup, after having admitted the part played by the Applicant in the commission of the robberies, had been cured of his former delusions and could, therefore, no longer be regarded as insane.

On 7th January 1952, the Applicant was re-arrested and from December 1952 to February 1953 submitted to mental observation in the mental home for criminals at Nykøbing. Hardrup was transferred to the municipal hospital of Copenhagen where for the next 15 months he was observed by Dr. Paul Reiter, Chief of the Psychiatric Department of that hospital. In June 1953, the latter issued a report which, inter alia, stated that Hardrup had been subjected to intensive hypnotic influence on the part of the Applicant and, when committing the crimes, had been acting without a will of his own. ./.

(1) Referred to by the Applicant's Counsel as the "exercise book confession."

On the basis of the above reports of Dr. Schmidt and Dr. Reiter, the Medico-Legal Council (Retslaegerad) to which the case had been submitted, declared that it did not consider itself entitled to decide whether there was proof of the Applicant's influence on Hardrup, as described in the reports, and that it did not find any basis for the presumption that the crimes had, properly speaking, been committed under hypnosis.

By indictment (Anklageskrift) of 19th March, 1954, the Applicant was charged:

(i) for robbery of a particularly dangerous nature, according to the Penal Code, section 288, sub-section 1, cf. sub-section 2, in that he had instigated and planned the robbery committed by the accused Hardrup in the Hvidovre branch of Folkebanken, and that immediately thereafter to have received from Hardrup the stolen amount of kr. 21,520 which he used for his own benefit.

(ii) for attempt at robbery of a particularly dangerous nature, according to the Penal Code, section 288, subsection 1, cf. subsection 2, cf. section 21, and for homicide according to the Penal Code, section 237, in that he had instigated and planned the attempted robbery and homicide committed by the accused Hardrup in the branch of Landmandsbanken in Nørrebrogade.

The trial commenced before the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret) on 16th June and lasted till 17th July 1954. On 17th July 1954, the Applicant's Counsel requested the Court that the Public Prosecutor should be asked to state whether the Applicant was called upon to defend himself on the particular charge of hypnosis. The request was founded on Article 831 of the Administration of Justice which prescribes that an indictment must, inter alia, contain a statement of the manner in which the crime was alleged to have been committed.

By an Order of 22nd June, 1954, the High Court ruled that the formulation of the indictment was found to be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Administration of Justice Act and dismissed the Applicant's request.

On 17th July, 1954, the jury returned a verdict by which the Applicant was found guilty of having planned and instigated by influence of various kinds including suggestions of a hypnotic nature, the commission of the two robberies and homicide by Hardrup. By the same verdict the Court ordered that Hardrup be detained in an asylum.

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The Applicant appealed from this judgment to the Supreme Court (Højesteret), submitting inter alia:

(a) that the High Court had disregarded the fundamental rule of procedure that the accused was entitled to know exactly whether or not he was called upon to defend himself on a particular charge, in this case, hypnosis; that the Public Prosecutor had refused to make this clear in the written particulars of the offence, but had nevertheless, during the hearing, dealt in detail with that question; that, on this point, the Court had found for the prosecution; that the presiding judge, when summing up, had admittedly tried to diminish the effect of the presecution's attitude but that the jury had already been influenced, as was apparent from their alleged incorrect verdict;

(b) that, notwithstanding continuous objections on the part of the Counsel for the defence, Dr. Reiter was allowed to address the jury during two days for seven hours, in the course of which he repeatedly dealt with the question of guilt of the Applicant; that it followed from Articles 872, 874 and 875 of the Administration of Justice Act that witnesses and experts in giving their evidence should not deal with the question of guilt of the accused; that Dr. Reiter's statements had, by obvious presumption of guilt, seriously influenced the jury and that the attempt of the presiding judge to reduce the effect of the physician's statement had again been too late and was otherwise inadequate.

On 18th November 1955, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court.

On 2nd December 1955, the Applicant filed a petition with the Special Court of Revision (Den saerlige Klageret) for the re-opening of the case (Genoptagelse), relying on Article 977 of the Administration of Justice Act. It was submitted by the Applicant that fresh evidence had come to light, in particular a letter from Hardrup to the Applicant's Counsel and to the police solicitor (Politiadvokat), dated 18th December, in which Hardrup stated, inter alia, that his former accusation against the Applicant was untrue and that the Applicant had not in any way directly planned or contributed to the two robberies or homicide. It was further submitted that special circumstances existed which made it very probable that the available pieces of evidence had not been properly appreciated.

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At several hearings in the course of 1956, Hardrup adhered to the contents of the aforementioned letter.

On 29th June 1957, the Special Court which had before it a new report of the Medico-Legal Council, dismissed the Applicant's petition. It held the charge of hypnosis to be unfounded but retained that part of the High Court's decision which held that the Applicant had planned the crimes and had influenced Hardrup to commit them.

The relevant portion of the judgment read as follows:

"Apart from the evidence given by Hardrup, practically no direct evidence has been obtained with respect to the hypnotic experiments of Schouw Nielsen with Hardrup.

The contents of the medical opinions given in this case and the other statements do not enable the Court to accept the opinion advanced by Dr. Reiter that Schouw Nielsen, through suggestions of a hypnotic nature has instigated Hardrup to commit the crimes.

The Court does not, however, find it overwhelmingly probable that the available evidence on which the jury based its verdict, namely that Schouw Nielsen, by influencing Hardrup, has instigated the commission of the crimes, has been judged incorrectly."

THE APPLICANT'S ALLEGED GROUNDS OF COMPLAINT

As regards Article 5, paragraph 1(c) (Reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence)

WHEREAS the Applicant alleges that his arrest and detention were the result of the so-called "exercise-book confession," written by Hardrup in December 1951, in which the latter had stated that he had been influenced and hypnotised by the Applicant; that in view of the finding of the Special Court of Revision that the accusations of hypnotism could not be held well-founded, there had therefore not been "any sufficiently well-founded suspicion" against the Applicant to justify his arrest and detention at the time; and that this constituted a breach of Article 5, paragraph 1(c);

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As regards Article 6, paragraph 2 (Presumption of innocence)

WHEREAS the Applicant alleges that while the matter was being dealt with by the Courts, statements concerning the Applicant's guilt and character had been made by the Police; that, in particular, the chief psychiatrist of police, Dr. Max Schmidt, had referred, on 5th January, 1952, during an examination of Hardrup, to the Applicant as "a scoundrel," and that, on 8th January, 1952, the police solicitor had stated to a Copenhagen newspaper that the Applicant was the instigator of the crimes committed by Hardrup;

WHEREAS the Applicant further alleges that at his trial in June - July 1954, the above-mentioned Dr. Max Schmidt again stated in evidence before the jury of the High Court that he would "not mind saying three times that the Applicant was a scoundrel";

WHEREAS these statements of Dr. Max Schmidt and of the police solicitor are contended by the Applicant to have contravened Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention under which everyone charged with a criminal offence is to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law:

As regards Article 5, paragraph 2 and Article 6, paragraph 3

(Right to be informed promptly of any charge and of its nature)

WHEREAS the Applicant complains that he was not informed whether he would be called upon to defend himself against the charge of instigating the robberies and murder by the use of hypnotic influence; and whereas in this connection he states: that he was arrested and imprisoned as a result of the accusations brought against him by Hardrup; that these accusations as well as the medical reports of Dr. Schmidt and, in particular, of Dr. Reiter referred to the alleged fact that the Applicant had influenced Hardrup by hypnotic suggestions; that the press, which had given much publicity to the case, had treated the case as being mainly one of robbery and murder by hypnosis; that the Applicant's Counsel, on 17th June, 1954, had requested the High Court to ask the Public Prosecutor to clarify this point and to change the terms of the indictment if he intended to deal with the question of hypnosis; that the Public Presecutor had declined to explain his intentions in this respect and that the High Court, by

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a decision of 22nd June, 1954, had found for the Prosecution; that, nevertheless, the question of hypnosis had been dealt with in detail by the Public Prosecutor and by Dr. Reiter and that the verdict of the jury mentioned the accusations with regard to hypnosis;

WHEREAS the Applicant contends that these facts establish a violation of Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Convention under which every arrested person must be informed promptly of any charge against him, and also of Article 6, paragraph 3(a) under which every person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;

As regards Article 5, paragraph 3, and Article 6, paragraph 1 (Right to trial within a reasonable time)

WHEREAS the Applicant alleges that, although arrested on 7th January, 1952, he was not brought to trial until 16th June, 1954, and that this period of nearly two and a half years was unreasonable and excessive;

WHEREAS, the Applicant contends that the failure to bring him to trial before the elapse of so long a period of time amounted to a breach of Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Convention under which every arrested person is entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, and also of Article 6, paragraph 1, under which everyone charged with a criminal charge is entitled to have it determined within a reasonable time;

As regards Article 6, paragraph 1 (Right to a fair hearing)

WHEREAS the Applicant alleges that the psychiatrists called by the prosecution had been allowed to dominate the proceedings and to state to the jury that it was a proven fact that the Applicant had instigated Hardrup by means of hypnosis to commit the crimes; that the finding of the jury was that there was instigation of Hardrup by the Applicant inter alia by means of hypnosis; that despite the fact that this finding was ultimately held by the Special Court of Revision to have been unfounded, the maximum penalty imposed on the Applicant had been maintained;

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WHEREAS the Applicant contends that these facts constitute a violation of his right to a fair hearing under Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention;

The Danish Government's Objections to the Admissibility of the Application

As regards Article 26 (The Six Months rule)

WHEREAS the Danish Government, in its Memorandum of 15th May, 1959, submits that the Application should be rejected in toto in accordance with Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Convention because the Applicant had not ledged his Application within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken, as provided for in Article 26, and whereas the arguments of the Danish Government on this point may be summarised as follows:

The proceedings before the Special Court of Revision cannot be considered as a domestic remedy according to the generally recognised rules of international law because:

(i) A hearing before that Court is a "completely extraordinary legal resort which could not be described as an appeal."

(ii) A convicted person can file a petition with the Special Court for the re-opening of his case long after the ordinary courts have given their decision. If the Commission were to consider that the procedure before the Special Court was an ordinary remedy, the consequence would be that most persons convicted in Denmark would be able to have their cases taken up by the Commission after having petitioned the Special Court. This would necessarily result in the filing of many ill-founded petitions with the Special Court "and the time-limit in Article 26 of the Convention would not apply to most Danish criminal cases";

(iii) A further consequence would be that, before lodging a complaint with the Commission, applicants would have to submit their case to the Special Court. This would be unacceptable since the Special Court would not normally be able to decide whether the rights guaranteed by the Convention had been infringed.

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Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of 18th November, 1955 must be considered as the final judgment in the case, and in consequence the Application which was only brought on 23rd December, 1957, cannot be regarded as having been lodged "within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken" as required by Article 26 of the Convention;

WHEREAS the Applicant, in his Reply of 22nd June, 1959, submits that the petition to the Special Court is a domestic remedy and that, accordingly, the decision of the Special Court constitutes the final decision in the present case within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention; that the petition to the Special Court was made immediately after the Supreme Court had given its judgment, and that it was a matter of course to await the decision of the Special Court before lodging an application with the European Commission of Human Rights;

WHEREAS the Danish Government alternatively submits that, if contrary to its principal submission, the Commission should consider the petition to the Special Court of Revision to be a domestic remedy according to the generally recognised rules of international law, then it is necessary to distinguish between those matters of complaint alleged by the Applicant in regard to which there was a right of recourse to the Special Court and those matters in regard to which there was no such right of recourse to the Special Court and in regard to which therefore the final tribunal of appeal was the Supreme Court; and whereas the Danish Government contends that the Application is inadmissible with respect to any matters falling in the latter category by reason of the Applicant's failure to lodge his complaint within a period of six months from the date of the Supreme Court's decision;

Objection to Certain Matters Ratione Temporis

WHEREAS, with reference to the Applicant's complaint of an alleged violation of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention (presumption of innocence), the Danish Government observes that the statement of Dr. Schmidt on 5th January, 1952, was on a date prior to the entry into force of the Convention; whereas the same observation also applies to the statement alleged by the Applicant to have been made on 8th January, 1952 by the police solicitor; and whereas the Danish Government contends that the Applicant's complaints with regard to matters occurring prior to the entry into force of the Convention are inadmissible ratione temporis;

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As regards Article 27, paragraph 2 (manifestly ill-founded)

WHEREAS, with reference to the Applicant's complaint of an alleged violation of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention (presumption of innocence), the Danish Government contends that the allegations of the Applicant with respect to the statements of Dr. Schmidt and the police solicitor are not of such a character as to justify the conclusion that the Applicant did not have a fair trial;

WHEREAS, with reference to the Applicant's complaint of alleged violations of Article 5, paragraph 2 and Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Convention (right to be informed promptly of any charge and of its nature), the Danish Government submits that the provisions of Section 831 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act concerning the contents of an indictment satisfy the requirements of Article 6, paragraph 3 (a), of the Convention; whereas it also submits that the High Court in its decision of 22nd June, 1954, and the Supreme Court in its judgment of 7th December, 1955, both held that the indictment in the present case complied with the terms of Section 831 of the said Act; and whereas the Danish Government contends that this part of the Application should in consequence be rejected as manifestly ill-founded;

WHEREAS, with reference of the Applicant's complaint of alleged violations of Article 5, paragraph 3, and Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention (Right to trial within a reasonable time), the Danish Government submits that the Applicant's complaint regarding the period of time which elapsed before he was brought to trial was not pleaded before the Special Court; that in consideration of the extensive investigations in the case, the Applicant's complaint has no basis; that it was the Courts which had decided that it was necessary to have a psychiatric examination of Hardrup and of the Applicant; that the duration of the preliminary examination was at all times within the control of the Courts; and that it was the Courts which had decided on the period of the Applicant's detention before he was brought to trial; and whereas the Danish Government, relying upon these decisions of the Courts, contends that this part of the Application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded;

WHEREAS, with reference to the Applicant's complaint of an alleged violation of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention (right to a fair hearing), the Danish Government

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submits that the Applicant, at no time during the proceedings in the case prior to the trial before the High Court, had made any objection to Hardrup's examination by the psychiatrists; that on the basis of that examination the psychiatrists arrived at the conclusion that the Applicant had hypnotised Hardrup to commit the crimes; that the Court was informed of this conclusion and it was therefore necessary for the psychiatrists to give evidence concerning the basis of their opinions on this point; that at the time no protest was made against calling the psychiatrists as witnesses for the prosecution; that on the other hand, Dr. Geert-Jørgensen who was of the opinion that the Applicant had not hypnotised Hardrup to commit the crimes, appeared as expert for the defence; that moreover, the Applicant's Counsel in his appeal to the Supreme Court, had alleged that Dr. Reiter had expressed himself in an inadmissible manner; that, on this point, the Supreme Court, in its judgment of 18th November, 1955, had found that Dr. Reiter's report of 15th June, 1955, and his statement in the High Court did not provide any basis for the annulment of the decision of the High Court; that the Supreme Court also referred to the facts that Dr. Geert-Jørgensen had had the opportunity of contraverting Dr. Reiter's statements during the trial and that the presiding judge had given sufficient guidance to the jury in his summing up; that the whole matter had been submitted to the Medico-Legal Council whose report, had been placed in evidence before the jury; and whereas, on the basis of these facts, the Danish Government contends that this part also of the Application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded;

Decision of the Commission

The Commission:

As regards Article 6, paragraph 2 (presumption of innocence)

WHEREAS the statements of Dr. Schmidt on 5th January, 1952 and of the police solicitor on 8th January, 1952, which the Applicant claims to have constituted a violation of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention were made at a time prior to 3rd September, 1953, date of the entry into force of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with regard to Denmark; and whereas in accordance with the generally recognised rules of international law the said Convention only governs, for each Contracting Party, the facts subsequent to its entry into force with regard to that Party; and whereas it follows that any complaint by the Applicant founded upon the aforementioned statements of Dr. Schmidt and of the police-solicitor must be rejected as inadmissible ratione temporis;

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DECIDES to reject as inadmissible ratione temporis that part of the Application which relates to an alleged violation of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention by reason of the statements of Dr. Schmidt on 5th January, 1952 and of the police solicitor on 8th January, 1952;

As regards Article 5, paragraph 1 (c) (reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence)

WHEREAS the Applicant's complaint that he was arrested and detained without any sufficiently well-founded suspicion against him in violation of Article 5, paragraph 1 (c) of the Convention is based upon the contentions: (1) that he was arrested and detained on the strength of Hardrup's statements that he had been influenced and hypnotised by the Applicant; (2) that the Special Court of Revision had afterwards held the accusation of hypnotism not to be well-founded; and (3) that his arrest and detention must therefore be considered not to have been effected on a "reasonable suspicion" within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1 (c);

Whereas, however, in determining what is "a reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence" permitting the arrest or detention of a person under Article 5, paragraph 1 (c), regard must be had to the circumstances of the case as they appeared at the time of the arrest and detention and not as they may appear at some later date;

Whereas it follows that the Applicant's complaint of an alleged violation of Article 5, paragraph 1 (c) not being based on the circumstances as they appeared at the time of his arrest and detention but on findings of fact by the Special Court of Revision some five and a half years later, rests upon an incorrect view of the applicable provision of the Convention and must therefore be considered to be manifestly ill-founded; and whereas, even when a respondent government has not specifically taken the objection, the Commission itself is bound ex officio to reject a complaint that is manifestly ill-founded;

DECIDES, in conformity with Article 27, paragraph 2, to reject as manifestly ill-founded that part of the Application which relates to an alleged violation of Article 5, paragraph 1 (c) of the Convention;

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As regards the remainder of the Application

WHEREAS the Commission considers it necessary, before deciding upon the admissibility of the remaining parts of the Application, to obtain further explanations from the Parties in regard to the relevant considerations of fact and of law;

DECIDES, under Rule 46, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure, without in any way prejudging its ultimate decision on the admissibility or otherwise of the present Application, to invite the Applicant's Counsel and the representatives of the Danish Government to appear before the Commission on Monday, 31st August, 1959, at 10 a.m. at Strasbourg and to submit orally their further explanations and arguments on the question of the admissibility of the remaining parts of the Application.

Done at Strasbourg, 6th July, 1959

The Director of Human Rights,
Secretary to the Commission

(P. Modinos)

The President of the
Commission.

(C.H.M. Waldock)