SECOND CHAMBER

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 13247/87
by Hans JÄDERGÅRD and Others
against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 8 July 1991, the following members being present:

MM. S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
H.G. SCHERMERS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Mr. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber.

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 1 December 1986 by Hans JÄDERGÅRD and Others against Sweden and registered on 29 September 1987 under file No. 13247/87;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having regard to the observations submitted by the Government on 6 November 1990 and 25 March 1991 as well as the observations submitted by the applicants on 12 December 1990, 19 February and 22 April 1991;

Having regard to the Commission's decision of 26 February 1991 to refer the application to the Second Chamber;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants are set out in the Annex. Applicants No. 11 and 12 are Austrian citizens, the others are Swedish citizens. The applicants are members of the Tyresö-Dyviksudds Tomtägareförening, a local association of property owners. They are represented before the Commission by the first applicant, Mr. Hans Jädergård, who is the Chairman of the said association.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

The applicants own properties in the area of Dyviksudde in the municipality of Tyresö. On the properties the applicants have erected buildings. (The surface of the respective main buildings is set out in the Annex.) The area is subject to a building plan adopted in

1954, providing that on each property only one dwelling house could be erected. The building surface could not exceed 150 m2, with the exception of the right to furnish an attic, the total building surface then amounting to 250 m2. An outhouse or a garage could not exceed 40 m2. Furthermore, no water closets could be installed.

On 18 March 1969 the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) of the County of Stockholm confirmed new regulations in the building plan for the area, to the effect that main houses could not exceed 70 m2. There was no longer a right to furnish an attic. Outhouses were limited to 30 m2. The purpose of the amendment to the regulations was to prevent permanent residence in the area.

Property owners in the area appealed to the Government which on 30 June 1972 upheld the decision.

On 4 May 1979 the County Administrative Board issued a building prohibition pursuant to Section 109 of the 1947 Building Act (byggnadslagen, hereinafter "the 1947 Act") pending the adoption of a new building plan with a further restriction on construction from 70 m2 to 50 m2 for a main building.

Upon appeal by the property owners, this decision was quashed by the Government (Ministry of Housing) on 30 April 1980.

On 18 January 1984 the County Administrative Board again issued a building prohibition pursuant to Section 109 of the 1947 Act. The applicants' appeals against this decision were rejected by the Government on 14 June 1984.

On 30 August 1984 the municipal assembly (kommunfullmäktige) of Tyresö adopted new regulations in the building plan covering the applicants' properties, to the effect that main houses could not exceed 50 m2 and outhouses were limited to 30 m2.

On 21 February 1985 the County Administrative Board under Section 108 of the 1947 Act confirmed these regulations.

Appeals were lodged with the Government, inter alia, by the above-mentioned property association and by applicants Nos. 2-4, 14, 17 and 24.

They alleged inter alia that the County Administrative Board's decision was based on incorrect information after an incorrect procedure, that it was contrary to previous case-law and relevant legal principles, and that the individuals would suffer serious financial damage without this being in the general interest.

On 5 June 1986 the Government rejected the appeals. They firstly stated that the property association had no right to appeal, but since this appeal had been signed by the first applicant, it was considered as lodged by him. On the merits of the appeals the Government stated, inter alia, that the aim of the new regulations was to prevent leisure houses from being transformed into permanent residences. As regards Dyviksudd, the Government noted that many existing houses already exceeded the 50 m2 limit and would thus be in conflict with the plan. Moreover, in the said area permanent residences had rather gone down than increased. Nevertheless, the municipality's interest of preventing the risk of permanent residences in that area outweighed the property owners' interest in keeping their previous building rights. The Government further noted certain transitional regulations, according to which construction on existing buildings was permitted, provided that it would not increase the building surface or the number of floors. Buildings which were destroyed or damaged by accident could be re-erected, irrespective of the new regulations. If an existing main house exceeded 50 m2 and provided that the erection of a smaller outhouse did not risk creating

a permanent residence, the Building Committee could grant an exemption from the building plan.

Relevant domestic law

Up to 1 July 1987 a property owner's right to erect buildings on his property was regulated in the 1947 Act and the 1959 Ordinance.

Section 1 of the 1947 Act provided that construction on a property required a building permit, insofar as this followed from rules laid down by the Government. Such rules were to be found in Section 54 of the 1959 Building Ordinance (byggnadsstadgan, hereinafter "the 1959 Ordinance"). A permit was required for all new constructions, except certain buildings for public use, or smaller additions to existing residences and farms or smaller houses on such estates.

Section 5 of the 1947 Act called for an examination of whether the property was suitable from a general point of view for building purposes. Such examination should be carried out by planning procedure in accordance with the 1947 Act, except for areas classified as "non-urban" (glesbebyggelse) or as "urban developments on a smaller scale" (tätbebyggelse av mindre omfattning). For the latter categories, the required examination could be made when an application for a building permit was examined.

Under Section 109 of the 1947 Act the County Administrative Board could, if the question of the establishment of a building plan or of an amendment to such a plan had arisen, on the municipality's request issue a building prohibition pertaining to that area for a period of one year. Such a prohibition could be prolonged at most for two years at a time. Exemptions could be granted by the County Administrative Board or by the Building Committee.

A decision by the County Administrative Board to issue a building prohibition or, as the first instance, to refuse an exemption from a building prohibition, could be appealed to the Government.

A person, who wished to erect a building, for which a permit was required, had to file an application with the local Building Committee. An application coming under any of the above building prohibitions was in practice considered as also including an application for exemption from the prohibition in question. The applicant could, on the other hand, choose to apply for an exemption only, in order to apply for a permit when the matter of exemption had been resolved.

The examination of an application for a building permit involved ascertaining that the intended building would not run counter to any confirmed plan, or, as the case might be, to the regulations of non-planned areas, or to a building prohibition, and that it satisfied technical demands on construction. In the absence of such obstacles, a permit was to be granted.

If the intended construction required an exemption of any kind, the Building Committee also had to take a decision on this matter. In case the Committee lacked legal competence to do so, it would normally refer the application, as regards the exemption, to the County Administrative Board, suspending its decision on the permit issue, pending the outcome of the exemption issue.

Decisions by the Building Committee to refuse building permits and to refuse exemptions from building prohibitions could be appealed to the County Administrative Board.

A decision by the County Administrative Board to reject an

appeal against the Building Committee's decision refusing exemption from a building prohibition could be appealed to the Government. However, an appeal against a decision of the County Administrative Board to reject an appeal regarding an application for a building permit was to be lodged with the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten). A decision by the Administrative Court of Appeal could be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten), which could refuse leave to appeal.

A decision by the County Administrative Board which resolved both issues (the building permit and the exemption from the building prohibition) could be appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. If the Court found that an exemption was not required, the matter was subsequently processed as a case relating only to the question of a building permit. Otherwise the case was referred to the Government together with an opinion on the permit issue.

There was no limitation of the number of times a property owner could apply for building permits or exemptions from a building prohibition. The authorities were obliged to examine the matter each time they were seized with an application.

The provisions concerning the adoption and the confirmation of a building plan, including the general guidelines for such a plan, were found in Section 107 and 108 of the 1947 Act. Section 107 also

provided for the possibility to include special regulations in a building plan. According to Section 108, in fine, these provisions were applicable also with regard to the amendment to an existing plan.

Under Section 150 of the 1947 Act appeals against the County Administrative Board's confirmation of an adopted plan could be lodged with the Government.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicants allege that the decisions taken, with the effect that their building rights were reduced, were contrary to Swedish law, notably Chapter 2 Section 18 of the Instrument of Government (regeringsformen), which protects the right to property. They submit inter alia that some applicants have in fact lost 80 % of their initial building rights, this situation being equivalent to a regulatory taking or a de facto expropriation. The applicants complain of violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

2. The applicants complain of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention because of the difference in treatment of those who constructed under the old regulations in the building plan, in comparison with those who wish to construct under the new regulations. Applicants Nos. 11 and 12 also allege discrimination on the ground of their Austrian nationality.

3. The applicants complain of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, since they could not obtain a court examination of the County Administrative Board's decision of 21 February 1985 to amend the regulations in the building plan.

4. The applicants complain of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

5. The applicants finally complain that under Swedish law they have no right to compensation for the alleged violations. They invoke Article 50 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 1 December 1986 and registered on 29 September 1987.

On 6 July 1989 the Commission decided to give notice of the application to the respondent Government without inviting them to submit written observations. It adjourned the further examination of the case until the European Court of Human Rights had delivered judgment in the Mats Jacobsson case.

On 28 June 1990, the Court delivered judgment in that case (Eur. Court H.R., Mats Jacobsson judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A No. 180-A).

On 13 July 1990 the Government were invited to submit their written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, limited to the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention.

The Government's observations were submitted on 6 November and the applicants' preliminary observations in reply on 12 December 1990. After an extension of the time-limit the applicants' further observations were submitted on 19 February 1991.

On 26 February 1991 the Commission referred the application to the Second Chamber.

Additional observations were submitted by the Government on 25 March and by the applicants on 22 April 1991.

THE LAW

1. The applicants complain that the decisions taken, with the effect that their building rights were reduced, were contrary to Swedish law. They allege inter alia that some applicants have lost 80% of their initial building rights, this amounting to a regulatory taking or a de facto expropriation. They invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, which reads:

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

(a) The Commission has first considered the applicants' complaint insofar as it pertains to the County Administrative Board's decisions of 18 March 1969 and of 18 January 1984 reducing the applicants' right to construction on their properties.

The Commission is not competent to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken". According to the Commission's established case-law the "final decision" within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) refers solely to the final decision involved in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of international law. In particular, only a remedy which is "effective and sufficient" can be considered for this purpose (see e.g. No. 654/59, Dec. 3.6.60,

Yearbook 4 pp. 276, 282; No. 9266/81, Dec. 28.1.83, D.R. 30 pp. 155, 187).

In the present case, for the reasons set out under para. 3 below, the respective final decisions are the Government's decisions of 30 June 1972 and 14 June 1984. The application was submitted to the Commission on 1 December 1986, that is, more than six months after the dates of those decisions. Furthermore, an examination of the application does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the six month period following those decisions.

It follows that the complaint has in this respect been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

(b) The Commission has secondly considered the complaint insofar as it pertains to the County Administrative Board's decision of 21 February 1985. It considers that it is not necessary to resolve the question whether applicants Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26 have exhausted domestic remedies with regard to their complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), as, in any case, the complaint is manifestly ill-founded for the reasons below.

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions; and the third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A No. 163, p. 16, para. 53).

The Commission considers that the amendment to the building plan may be regarded as an interference with the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). This interference falls to be considered under the second paragraph of Article 1 as being a measure of control of the use of the applicants' properties.

Under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose. However, there must exist a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. In striking the fair balance thereby required between the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights, the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (above- mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, p. 17, para. 55).

The Commission recalls that the Convention organs' power to review compliance with domestic law is limited: it is in the first place for the national authorities to interpret and apply that law (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Håkansson and Sturesson judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A No. 171-A, p. 16, para. 47).

The Commission observes that the amendment to the regulations in the building plan was made under Section 108 of the 1947 Act. The

measure thus had a basis in Swedish law. The Commission is therefore satisfied that the interference was lawful.

As regards the "general interest" served by the amendment, the Commission notes that the purpose of the amendment was to prevent transformation of leisure houses into permanent residences. It further recalls that, in the increasingly complex and ever developing

society of today, it is indispensable that the use of land be regulated by detailed and careful planning. It follows that States must have instruments at hand in order to plan or regulate building activities (Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Comm. Report 8.10.80, para. 111, Eur. Court H.R., Series B No. 46, p. 50). The 1947 Act and the planning procedure under it are in principle measures serving the general interest. The Commission concludes that the amendment to the regulations in the building plan served the general interest.

As regards the proportionality between the interference with the applicants' property rights and the aim pursued, the Commission notes that the new regulations in the building plan reduced the applicants' building rights from 70 m2 to 50 m2 for main houses, while the maximum building surface for outhouses remained unchanged. The new regulations did not prohibit construction on existing buildings, provided that it would not increase the existing building surface or the number of floors. Already existing buildings which were destroyed or damaged by accident could be re-erected in their original size, irrespective of the new regulations. Moreover, in certain circumstances exemptions from the regulations in the building plan could be granted. This procedure provided a possibility for weighing the public interest against that of the individual (cf. above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, pp. 18-19, para. 62).

As regards construction which was not permitted under any of the above terms, the Commission observes that under Section 1 of the 1947 Act and Section 54 of the 1959 Ordinance any person wishing to construct a building, with certain exceptions, had to apply for a permit from the Building Committee. It has not been shown that the Building Committee would have been obliged to grant the applicants building permits for further construction on their properties. Thus, the Commission does not find it established that the amendment to the regulations in the building plan deprived them of any unconditional right to further construction which they had enjoyed before (cf. above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, p. 18, para. 60).

In view of the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting State in this area the Commission considers that, in the circumstances of the case, the amendment to the regulations in the building plan was not disproportionate to its legitimate purpose.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. The applicants also complain of a difference in treatment of those who constructed under the old regulations in the building plan, in comparison with those who wish to construct under the new regulations. Applicants Nos. 11 and 12 further allege discrimination on the ground of their Austrian nationality. The applicants allege a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, which reads:

"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."

The Commission has examined this complaint in conjunction with

the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.

According to the Court's established case-law, Article 14 (Art. 14) complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to "the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not necessarily presuppose a breach of those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous -, there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Inze judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A No. 126, p. 17, para. 14 with further references).

The Commission has found above Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to be applicable in the present case. Although the complaint under that provision is manifestly ill-founded, the facts at issue fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Article 14 (P1-1, 14) of the Convention is therefore also applicable.

For the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14), a difference of treatment is dicriminatory if it "has no objective and reasonable justification", that is, if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" or if there is not a "reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised". The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law, but it is for the Convention organs to give the final ruling in this respect (see above-mentioned Inze judgment, p. 18, para. 41 with further references).

The Commission has found above that the purpose of the amendment to the building regulations, that is to prevent permanent residence in the area, was lawful and in the general interest. Furthermore, the amendment was not disproportionate to that purpose.

Assuming for the purpose of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention that the applicants can be said to be in a similar situation as compared with the other property owners referred to, the difference in treatment complained of must be considered objectively and reasonably justified.

Having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the domestic authorities and to the subject-matter, the Commission finds no appearance of discrimination, contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, in respect of the complaint made under this provision by all applicants.

Moreover, with regard to the additional complaint by applicants Nos. 11-12 there is no substantiation of their allegation of discrimination based on their Austrian nationality.

It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3. The applicants further complain that they could not obtain a court examination of the lawfulness of the County Administrative Board's decision of 21 February 1985 to amend the regulations in the building plan. They allege a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

The Commission has examined the complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which reads, in its relevant parts:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,

everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal..."

(a) Insofar as the complaint has been introduced by applicants Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26 the Government submit that it is inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as the appeal against the County Administrative Board's decision as lodged by the association of property owners on behalf of those applicants was dismissed, the association lacking locus standi.

The Commission notes that applicants Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26 did not appeal to the Government in their own names. However, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention only requires the exhaustion of remedies which can be regarded as "effective". In the present case, as admitted by the Government, the decision by the County Administrative Board of 21 February 1985 was not open to review as to its lawfulness by either ordinary or administrative courts or by any other body which could be considered to be a "tribunal" for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Consequently, the Commission concludes that the possibility to appeal to the Government was not a remedy which these applicants were required to exhaust in order to comply with the conditions in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

The final decision with regard to the complaint as lodged by applicants Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26 is the decision of the County Administrative Board of 21 February 1985, whereas the present application was submitted to the Commission on 1 December 1986, that is, more than six months after the date of that decision. Furthermore, an examination of the application does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.

It follows that the complaint, as lodged by applicants Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26, has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

(b) Insofar as the complaint has been introduced by applicants Nos. 1-4, 14, 17 and 24 the Government waive objections as to its admissibility and admit a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

The Commission considers that the complaint, as lodged by applicants Nos. 1-4, 14, 17 and 24, is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. It must be declared admissible no other ground for declaring it inadmissible having been established.

4. The applicants also allege a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2) to the Convention, which reads:

"1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject,

in particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic society."

An examination of this complaint as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2).

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5. The applicants finally complain that under Swedish law they have no right to compensation for the alleged violations. They invoke Article 50 (Art. 50) of the Convention, which reads:

"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."

The Commission observes that it has no competence to examine the applicants' complaint under Article 50 (Art. 50) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES ADMISSIBLE the complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as it has been lodged by applicants Nos. 1-4, 14, 17 and 24; and

DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the Second Chamber — President of the Second Chamber

(K. ROGGE) — (S. TRECHSEL)

ANNEX

Applicant	Property	Surface of main building erected on the property (m2)
1. Hans Jädergård	Dyvik 1:262	68
2. Conny Bennerson	Dyvik 1:190	34
3. Berndt Franking	Dyvik 1:255	48
4. Alice Widell	Dyvik 1:264	89
5. Birgit Denckert	Dyvik 1:211	58
6. Olof M Söderlind	Dyvik 1:297	69
7. Staffan Wetterling	Dyvik 1:180	70
8. Börje Eriksson	Dyvik 1:216	68
9. Torbjörn Lindgren	Dyvik 1:214	77
10. Yngve Sundberg	Dyvik 1:261	44
11. Heinz Jelovcan	Dyvik 1:237)	
12. Monica Jelovcan	Dyvik 1:237)	47
13. Hans Hedlund	Dyvik 1:258	67
14. Lars Horney	Dyvik 1:242	70
15. Bertil Åberg	Dyvik 1:182	42
16. Ulla-Britt Olausson	Dyvik 1:177	60
17. Åke Åsberg	Dyvik 1:207	70
18. Elisabeth Karlsson	Dyvik 1:235	71

19.	Astrid Ryderholm	Dyvik	1:234	50
20.	Bertil Nordqvist	Dyvik	1:236	63
21.	Gun Häggmark	Dyvik	1:256	63
22.	Rune Thysk	Dyvik	1:284	51
23.	Magnus Zetterqvist	Dyvik	1:259	70
24.	Åke Nyberg	Dyvik	1:228	150
25.	Karin Ericsson	Dyvik	1:285	61
26.	Hans Linder	Dyvik	1:191	53