legislation, and the relevance of the politically sensitive context in a high-profile trial. It could not
overlook that once Sh. T. had been appointed as Prosecutor General, he had been answerable for
the ongoing activities of the prosecution service, including those in relation to the applicant’s high-
profile case as the appeal on points of law had been lodged by it just one month before. His inclusion
in the bench of judges which later heard the applicant’s case was, in such circumstances, sufficient
to cast doubt on the objective impartiality of the Supreme Court in its ruling. There had therefore
been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of lack of objective impartiality.
As to the reversal by the Supreme Court of the applicant’s acquittal by means of written
proceedings, the Court looked at the specific features of the proceedings and the way in which the
applicant’s interests had been presented and defended. It observed that the Supreme Court of
Georgia’s scope was limited to specific legal matters, and it did not carry out full reviews of cases in
general. The Supreme Court had justified its decision to overturn the lower courts’ judgments of
acquittal, stating that they had been unlawful, in particular because the decision not to convict
Mr Kezerashvili of the charge against him had been based on generic and vague conclusions of
insufficient proof. It had then determined, as a matter of principle, the type of evidence – specific
documents as opposed to witness statements – that was indispensable to establish a fact on which
the applicant relied in his defence.
Although the Supreme Court had examined the case only from that specific legal point of view, it
had still had to evaluate whether there was a sufficient basis for convicting Mr Kezerashvili, and
whether the sentence was appropriate. However, Mr Kezerashvili had chosen not to participate in
person in any of the oral hearings held by the lower courts and had explicitly mandated lawyers of
his choice to represent him, consenting to his trial in absentia. As a result, the Court considered that
the Supreme Court’s decision not to hold an oral hearing had not interfered with his right to be
present, as he claimed.
Nonetheless, it was also necessary to assess whether the Supreme Court, in dispensing with an oral
hearing, had given Mr Kezerashvili an adequate opportunity to react. In that respect, the Court
noted that he had been well aware of the prosecution’s position – which it had maintained
throughout the proceedings at all three levels of jurisdiction. His lawyers had responded during the
oral hearings at the trial and appellate stage, and he had been able to submit a detailed written
response to the appeal on points of law. He had also been duly informed that the Supreme Court
was going to consider his case by means of written proceedings, and his lawyers must have been
well aware of the Supreme Court’s apparently common practice of overturning judgments of
acquittal in written proceedings. He had, however, not raised any objections at the time, even
though he must have known that there was a possibility that the Supreme Court might convict and
sentence him.
As regards the applicant’s complaint regarding the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s judgment, the
Court took note of the fact that the key argument raised by him before that court had been
addressed, even if implicitly. Namely, the applicant had maintained throughout the proceedings that
he could not have been held accountable for embezzlement because some training had actually
been provided, as evidenced by witness statements. The Supreme Court addressed this but took the
view that the witness statements were irrelevant to determining whether the contract had been
implemented. In this respect, the Court emphasised that the absence of the relevant documents –
the final quarterly report and the delivery and acceptance certificate to be concluded with the
Ministry of Defence upon completion of the training programme – which the Supreme Court
considered to be the crucial element warranting the applicant’s conviction, had not been disputed
by the applicant at any stage of the proceedings against him. Although the Supreme Court’s
approach may have been open to some criticism on account of its relatively brief treatment of the
question of whether both elements of the crime of embezzlement had been made out in respect of
the applicant, having reviewed the judgment and the reasons contained within it, the Court did not
find that the findings had been arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable to the point of prejudicing the
3