As indicated by the Constitutional Council in its decision of 12 March 2021 in respect of section 1 of
the Law of 21 January 1995, the provisions conferring on the State the general duty of maintaining
public order “[did] not define the manner in which this duty should be carried out or, specifically, the
means permitted to achieve it”. The Court noted that at the time of the events complained of, no
other instrument or provision had expressly provided for recourse to the kettling technique used by
the police in the present case, nor, a fortiori, regulated it. In the light of that particular circumstance,
it was the Court’s task to examine, with regard to the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4,
the quality of the law, an aspect which, it noted, the domestic courts had not considered.
In the first place, the Court reiterated that, as a preventive technique likely to affect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of peaceful demonstrators, it was essential to establish rules on its
use, setting out precisely under what circumstances and conditions it could be implemented, how it
should be carried out and time-limits for its use.
Secondly, the Court noted that kettling was a practice that the police were likely to use to maintain
order when faced with a serious likelihood of disorder, but that, at the time of the disputed events,
it had not been regulated by any specific legal framework.
The Court considered that the general legal framework on maintaining order in force at the relevant
time could not be regarded as defining the rules on the use of the kettling technique with sufficient
precision to represent a safeguard against the risk of arbitrary interferences with the freedom of
movement of the individuals likely to be affected by it.
Having noted that in December 2021, that is, after the events of the present case, the Minister of
the Interior had issued a new national instruction on maintaining public order, the Court concluded
that the use by the police of the kettling technique, which had constituted an interference with the
applicants’ right to freedom of movement, had not, at the relevant time, been “in accordance with
law” within the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
There had therefore been a violation of that provision.
Articles 10 and 11
The Court noted that the applicants, who had been contained on Place Bellecour on the afternoon of
21 October 2010 as a result of the impugned kettling measure, had been unable to take part in the
demonstration against a pension reform bill, at which their sole aim had been to express their
opinion.
The Court concluded that the applicants’ containment on Place Bellecour, as a result of the police
action to cordon it off, had constituted an interference with the exercise of their freedom of
peaceful assembly and freedom of expression.
Reiterating that under both Article 11 and Article 10, any measure restricting those freedoms had
above all to be “prescribed by law”, the Court held, for the same reasons as those set out in its
examination of the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, that this condition had not been
fulfilled in the present case.
There had therefore been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention read in the light of Article 10.
Just satisfaction (Article 41)
The Court held that France was to pay the applicants, jointly, 1,714.28 euros in respect of costs and
expenses.
The judgment is available only in French.
4