had not been raised and her questions had been limited to whether he had been convicted of any
offences in the past, to which he had replied that 25 years earlier he had been convicted of minor
violations, which did not affect his criminal record, his employment status or his fitness to exercise
his parental rights. Moreover, the court noted that no submission had been made to him of his
having committed specific offences which could make his criminal record “heavy”, as alleged by G.K.
As regards her argument that the return would be too hard for her son and would be psychologically
damaging, the Court noted that Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention stipulated that harm arising
solely from separation from the parent who was responsible for the wrongful removal or retention
was not a valid reason for non-return of the child.
The Court noted that, in reaching their decision, the domestic courts had taken into account the
child’s adaptability due to his young age, the father’s assurances as to being able to care for his son,
the assistance of the Centre for Missing and Exploited Children and the US authorities, as well as the
fact that G.K.’s claim that she was unable to return to the USA remained entirely unsubstantiated.
In response to G.K.’s criticism that the domestic courts had failed to request the child’s view on the
matter, the Court found that the Family Court of Paphos had given reasons for its decision not to
interview the child on account of his young age – three years old at the time – and G.K.’s wish for
him not to take part in the proceedings.
Regarding her complaint about the length of time it had taken for the domestic courts to come to a
decision, the Court noted that the lapse of time had, to a large extent, been caused by the delay of
the authorities in instigating the Hague Convention proceedings and the first-instance court’s
handling of the case. It also recognised that G.K. had contributed to the delay to some extent
because of her filing a supplementary affidavit at a very late stage when the case had already been
set for a hearing. That application had ultimately been dismissed because the court felt that it had
arrived late, was unjustified, and would simply drag the proceedings out further. The Court
emphasised that proceedings relating to the return of an abducted child required urgent handling as
the passage of time could have irremediable consequences on the relationship between the child
and the parent from whom he/she had been distanced. In this case, G.K., unlike the father, had
benefitted from the delay. In that respect, the Court underlined that the aim of the Hague
Convention was to prevent the abducting parent from succeeding in obtaining legal recognition
simply by a situation that he or she had unilaterally created, and the abducting parent should not be
allowed to benefit from his or her own wrongdoing.
The Court held that the domestic courts had not automatically ordered the return of the child. G.K.
had had the opportunity to cross-examine the father, and the domestic courts had considered all the
arguments of the parties and rendered detailed decisions which, in their view, had safeguarded the
best interests of the child and ruled out any serious risk to him. As a whole, the decision-making
process before the domestic authorities had not run contrary to the procedural requirements
inherent in Article 8 of the Convention, and the applicant had not suffered a disproportionate
interference with her right to respect for her family life.
The judgment is available only in English.
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