Decision of the Court
Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial)
Mr Mamaldze essentially alleged that the key evidence – the cyanide found in his suitcase – had
been planted and that he could not challenge the use of that evidence in court against him.
The Court noted, however, that the seizure of his luggage, although not based on a judicial warrant,
had taken place in urgent circumstances – Mr Mamaladze had been about to take a plane – and had
been preceded by judicially-ordered covert investigative measures. Furthermore, a member of
airport security staff, considered by the courts as a neutral witness, had confirmed that the suitcase
could not have been tampered with and that the seal had been intact for the search.
In any case, the courts had addressed Mr Mamaladze’s arguments about the circumstances of the
search and seizure of his luggage and the reliability of the evidence obtained, and had dismissed
them in reasoned decisions in the course of the criminal trial.
Above all, the poison found in the suitcase had not been the only evidence on which
Mr Mamaladze’s conviction had been based.
In those circumstances, the Court found that the proceedings in the case, considered as a whole, had
not been contrary to Article 6 § 1.
On the other hand, the Court found that the trial court had not sufficiently addressed
Mr Mamaladze’s argument regarding the possibility of only partly closing the trial. His request would
have required an explicit reasoned reply, given the strong public interest in the case and the fact
that the holding of the trial in camera had been central to his complaints about the non-disclosure
obligation and a breach of his right to be presumed innocent. That failing had not been remedied in
the proceedings in the upper courts as the appeal hearing had also been held in camera and the
Supreme Court’s decision had been via a written procedure. There had therefore been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 as concerned the complaint with regard to the closure of the proceedings.
Article 6 § 2 (presumption of innocence)
The Court noted in particular that statements made by the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Justice had not explicitly claimed that Mr Mamaladze had committed a crime. By contrast, the
statement by the Deputy Prime Minister had been more explicit. Additionally, certain of the
prosecuting authorities’ statements, claiming for example that if “[that substance] had been used,
the criminal intent of the accused would have been implemented” had gone beyond merely
informing the public of the charge against Mr Mamaladze.
Furthermore, their disclosing material showing, among other things, Mr Mamaladze’s apparent
attempts to obtain cyanide, with a statement saying that “it had been established” that he had
googled kalium and natrium cyanide on the Internet “for the purposes of murdering [the victim]”
had not respected the discretion and circumspection necessary with regard to Mr Mamaladze’s right
to be presumed innocent.
Moreover, they had not apparently attempted to enforce the non-disclosure agreement in respect
of the main witness, who had been able to freely make accusations in the media.
Overall therefore the public had been encouraged to believe that Mr Mamaladze had been guilty
before the trial court had reached its verdict, in violation of Article 6 § 2.
Just satisfaction (Article 41)
The Court held that the finding of a violation was sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary
damage sustained and made an award of 9,418 Georgian laris in respect of costs and expenses.
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