arising out of the exemption from property tax of premises that were in fact designated for use by
“fictitious” religious denominations. It observed that there was nothing in the case submitted to the
Court to suggest that the applicant associations had committed, or been suspected of committing,
any fraud in benefiting in the past from the exemption from property tax in respect of their places of
worship. Nevertheless, the prevention of tax fraud was an aim whose legitimacy per se could not be
called into question by the Court.
As to whether the means used had been proportionate to the aim pursued, the Court considered
that in using the recognition of a religious faith as the basis for distinguishing between claims for
exemption from property tax, the authorities had opted for an objective criterion that was
potentially relevant with regard to the aim pursued. In itself, the choice of such a criterion fell within
the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities in the sphere under consideration.
The Government argued that it was open to the applicant associations to apply for recognition of
their faith at federal level in order to continue to claim exemption in the Brussels-Capital Region. The
applicant associations countered that it would be pointless to apply, given the serious shortcomings
in the procedure for claiming recognition.
The Court noted in that connection that neither the criteria for recognition nor the procedure
leading to recognition of a faith by the federal authority were laid down in an instrument satisfying
the requirements of accessibility and foreseeability, which were inherent in the notion of the rule of
law governing all the provisions of the Convention.
It observed, firstly, that recognition of a faith was based on criteria that had been identified by the
Minister of Justice only in reply to questions put by members of parliament. Moreover, as they were
couched in particularly vague terms they could not, in the Court’s view, be said to provide a
sufficient degree of legal certainty.
Secondly, the Court noted that the procedure for the recognition of faiths was likewise not laid
down in any legislative or even regulatory instrument. This meant, in particular, that the
examination of applications for recognition was not attended by any safeguards, with regard either
to the actual adoption of the decision on such applications or to the process leading to the decision
and the possibility of appealing against it subsequently. In particular, no time-limits were laid down
for the recognition procedure, and no decision had yet been taken on the applications for
recognition lodged by the Belgian Buddhist Union and the Belgian Hindu Forum in 2006 and 2013
respectively.
Lastly, recognition was only possible on the initiative of the Minister of Justice and depended
thereafter on the purely discretionary decision of the legislature. A system of this kind entailed an
inherent risk of arbitrariness, and religious communities could not reasonably be expected, in order
to claim entitlement to the tax exemption in issue, to submit to a process that was not based on
minimum guarantees of fairness and did not guarantee an objective assessment of their claims.
In sum, since the tax exemption in question was contingent on prior recognition, governed by rules
that did not afford sufficient safeguards against discrimination, the difference in treatment to which
the applicant associations were subjected had no objective and reasonable justification. There had
therefore been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 9 of the
Convention and with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
Just satisfaction (Article 41)
The Court held, by a majority (6 votes to 1), that the finding of a violation constituted in itself
sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant associations. It
also held, unanimously, that Belgium was to pay the applicant associations 5,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of costs and expenses.
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