While the Court could not take the place of the domestic authorities to rule on the lawfulness of the
measure, it considered it disconcerting that over a period of nearly eight years the legality of the
matter and the applicant’s situation had not been examined thoroughly by the domestic courts. This
indicated a serious problem at the domestic level.
The Court considered that there had been sufficient evidence indicating that the proceedings in
Kazakhstan may have had a political motive, Thus, whether there had been a general interest
behind the freezing order which had been put and kept in place by the Maltese authorities in the
specific circumstances of the present case was something which deserved particular evaluation by
the domestic courts. The Court stressed the importance of mutual legal assistance under the United
Nations Convention, considering however that this should be carried out in compliance with
international human-rights standards.
Furthermore, the Court – noting that the applicant had not been charged in any European country
despite multiple investigations and in view of the situation in Kazakhstan in relation to any criminal
proceedings which could be pursued there against the applicant – doubted whether the fight against
crime had been the general interest pursued in this case.
Concerning the freezing order itself, the Court found it to have been a harsh and restrictive measure
– it concerned the entirety of the applicant’s property in Malta and no domestic court had made an
assessment concerning its extent in relation to the “charges” neither at the time it had been issued
nor in subsequent renewals. Nor had there been any assessment as to whether it would have been
legitimate and proportionate to apply such a measure, given the circumstances of the case. The
Court also noted that the extensions of the order had been automatic, without the applicant being
given a hearing.
Ultimately, it had not been until notification of the complaint to the Government by the Court that
the Criminal Court had intervened and the order had been lifted.
Overall, the Court found that the procedures for issuing and extending the freezing order had not
allowed the applicant to protect herself against arbitrariness, and that the courts of constitutional
competence had not fixed that deficiency.
There had thus been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
Given those findings, the Court considered that it was not necessary to examine the ordinary
proceedings in the light of Article 6 § 1.
Article 6 § 1 concerning the length of the constitutional proceedings
The constitutional proceedings as a whole had lasted almost four years and ten months over two
levels of jurisdiction. The Government asserted that the case had been complex, with voluminous
evidence, and the legal questions novel. The courts had acted with diligence. Furthermore, they
stated that the requirements in terms of expedition were not the same for the Constitutional Court
as for the ordinary courts.
The Court found that there had been no periods of inactivity or deficient conduct on the part of the
authorities. It noted in particular the lack of argument from the applicant. Overall, it considered the
length of the proceedings, although long, not to have been excessive in the circumstances.
There had been no violation of the Convention with regard to the length of the constitutional
proceedings.
Just satisfaction (Article 41)
The Court held that Malta was to pay the applicant 2,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage and EUR 586 in respect of costs and expenses.
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