resulted in the death of three children in a school. In view of the terrorist ideology behind those two
attacks, the passage of time could not be regarded as having diminished the significance of the
message at issue. The fact that the applicant had no links with any terrorist group and did not
espouse a terrorist ideology could not detract from the significance of that message either.
It further noted that, in addition to the general context of the present case, the national authorities
had assessed the specific context in which the slogans had been displayed. In this connection, it
particularly emphasised the findings of the Nîmes Court of Appeal regarding the instrumentalising of
a three-year-old child, who was the unwitting bearer of the offending message, without any possible
awareness of the fact, and the specific context in which the message had been disseminated, namely
not only in “a public place” but also “on the premises of a school” where young children were
present.
The T-shirt bearing the slogans at issue was not directly visible to third parties but was discovered
when the child was being dressed by adults. Nor was it accessible to the general public, since it was
worn only on school premises. The message could thus only be read by two adults. In this
connection, the Court had previously stressed the importance of a lack of publicity when examining
the proportionality of an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression. While it could not
speculate on the exact nature of the applicant’s intentions on this point, the Court observed that he
had not denied that he had specifically asked his nephew to wear the T-shirt in question to school or
that he had intended to share its message. On the contrary, he had presented it as a humorous
gesture.
In the Court’s view, Z.B. could not have been unaware of the particular connotation – over and
above the mere provocation or bad taste on which he relied – of such slogans on the premises of a
nursery school, shortly after attacks that had claimed the lives of children in another school and in
the context of a proven terrorist threat. In that connection, it noted the public prosecutor’s
arguments concerning the emotion and tensions aroused by the message and its impact on social
harmony. It reiterated that the national authorities were, in principle, by reason of their direct and
continuous contact with the realities of their countries, in a better position than an international
court to give an opinion on the “necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to fulfil the
legitimate aims that they pursued. They were also better able to understand and appreciate the
specific societal problems in particular communities and contexts. From this perspective, the Nîmes
Court of Appeal’s close knowledge of the regional context in which the facts of the case had taken
place placed it in a good position to assess the need for the conviction and sentence handed down.
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Court found that the Nîmes Court of Appeal, in
deciding on the applicant’s conviction, had been careful to assess his guilt on the basis of the
assessment criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, having regard to the requirements of Article
10 of the Convention, after weighing up the various interests involved. The Court of Cassation, ruling
in particular in the light of the advocate-general’s opinion, which also incorporated these
assessment criteria, had endorsed the decision. The Court saw no serious reason to substitute its
own assessment for that of the domestic courts in this case. It thus took the view that the grounds
on which the applicant’s conviction had been based, namely to prevent the glorification of mass
violence, appeared in the specific circumstances of the present case to be both “relevant” and
“sufficient” in order to justify the interference at issue, and in this sense it had met a pressing social
need.
Lastly, the Court reiterated that the nature and severity of the penalties imposed were factors to be
taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference with the right to freedom
of expression. It considered that in the specific circumstances of the present case the amount of the
fine imposed remained proportionate. Moreover, particularly taking into account the fact that a
suspended term had been decided for the custodial part of the sentence, the Court was able to
conclude that the sanction had not been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
3