alternative to detention was possible. The prefect had considered that the compulsory residence
orders initially in place were no longer feasible, in view of the risk of absconding that, in the prefect’s
view, could be inferred from the first applicant’s stated refusal to comply with the transfer
procedure. The order of 28 November 2018 indicated that the liberties and detention judge had
carried out similar checks and assessments before extending the applicants’ administrative
detention for a further 28 days.
Although it was not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment for that of the national
authorities, the evidence before it was sufficient to conclude that the domestic authorities had not
carried out a proper examination, while applying the legal rules now in force in France, to satisfy
themselves that the initial administrative detention of the first applicant, accompanied by her infant
daughter, and its subsequent extension were measures of last resort which could not be replaced by
a less restrictive alternative.
There had therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the second
applicant.
Article 5 § 4
First of all, the Court noted with satisfaction that French law gave a precise definition of the
conditions in which the liberties and detention judge reviewed the lawfulness of the initial detention
order (Article L. 512-1 III of the Entry and Residence of Aliens and Right of Asylum Code (CESEDA))
and then decided, where appropriate, to extend the duration of the detention (Article L. 552-1 of the
CESEDA).
Secondly, the Court found that the liberties and detention judge and subsequently the judge
delegated by the President of the Paris Court of Appeal had had regard, while performing their
function of judicial review, to the presence of the child in the assessments they were required to
make as to the lawfulness of the initial detention and the need for its extension. The Court observed,
however, that the liberties and detention judge had simply noted that the administrative detention
centre was authorised to admit families and had specially equipped facilities, and, when assessing
the lawfulness of the detention order and whether it could be extended beyond a brief period, had
also mentioned the limited duration of the detention without addressing the specific conditions in
which the baby had been deprived of her liberty.
Next, the Court noted that despite the fact that no flights to Italy had been scheduled in the short
term, the liberties and detention judge had held that no alternative solutions were available after
finding that the applicants had not put forward any alternative accommodation and did not satisfy
the conditions for a compulsory residence order as laid down in Article L. 552-4 of the CESEDA. The
Court observed, nevertheless, that no serious consideration had been given to the fact that until
they had been admitted to the detention centre, the applicants had been the subject of compulsory
residence orders, which they had complied with.
Lastly, the Court noted that neither the liberties and detention judge at the Meaux tribunal de
grande instance nor the judge delegated by the President of the Paris Court of Appeal had had
sufficient regard to the presence of the second applicant and her status as a minor before assessing
the lawfulness of the initial detention and ordering its extension for 28 days.
The Court found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on the grounds that the domestic authorities had not
carried out a proper examination to satisfy themselves that the initial administrative detention of
the first applicant, accompanied by her infant daughter, and its subsequent extension were
measures of last resort which could not be replaced by a less restrictive alternative. This failure to
conduct an effective review of compliance with the conditions relating both to the lawfulness of the
detention order and to the principle of legality for the purposes of the Convention was attributable
in particular to the domestic courts, which had been under an obligation to ensure that the child’s
initial and continued detention was in fact lawful. The minor applicant had therefore not had the
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