Decision of the Court
Article 10
The Court observed that the applicant had been sanctioned for flying the Szekler flag and the flag of
the Partium territory without first applying for permission to advertise. According to the
minor-offence reports, which were subsequently upheld by the domestic courts, the applicant had
acted in breach of Law no. 185/2013. Under Article 49 § 1 (a) of that Law, the placing of advertising
materials without temporary permission to advertise constituted a minor offence. The Court did not
agree with the applicant’s view that the interference had lacked any legal basis, and proceeded to
examine whether the measure had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a
democratic society.
The Court noted that the aim referred to by the Government as justification for the measures in
question was that of ensuring public safety and respect for the rights of others. The purpose of
Law no. 185, as defined in Article 1, was to ensure that the built environment was coherent,
harmonious, safe and healthy, in order to protect natural and man-made assets, preserve the quality
of the landscape and conform to the required standards in terms of building quality. The Court
accepted that the interference of which the applicant complained had been aimed at protecting the
rights of others. The domestic courts had been called upon to strike a fair balance between the
applicant’s right to freedom of expression and the protection of the rights of others in the context of
Law no. 185/2013, which was applicable in the present case.
In examining whether the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, the Court
focused on the decisions handed down by the domestic courts. In that connection it observed that
the courts had omitted to take into consideration the context of the applicant’s complaints, namely
his argument that the sanctions imposed had interfered with his right to freedom of expression as
guaranteed both by the Constitution and by Article 10 of the Convention. The Court went on to note
that in seeking to determine what legislation was applicable, the domestic courts had focused on
their finding that the flags in question were to be equated with a form of advertising. They had not
explained why they had rejected the applicant’s claims that the flags had not been intended to
promote his activities but had merely been a means for him to express his own identity. The Court
noted that some of the definitions of the notion of advertising contained in Article 3 (o) of
Law no. 185/2013 were closely linked to commercial activities in general and that their purpose was
thus far removed from the message which the applicant was seeking to convey. Against that
background the authorities had been under a duty to provide reasons for dismissing the applicant’s
arguments, in so far as the notion of advertising in domestic law was defined in broad terms and the
national authorities had a degree of discretion in deciding which flags should be regarded as
advertising materials.
The Court pointed out that it had consistently drawn a distinction between commercial
advertisements and those aimed at contributing to a public debate on matters of general interest. In
the present case it noted that, in classifying the flags in question as advertising materials, the
domestic courts had not examined their content, nor had they furnished any example of the
activities or events which the flags had purportedly advertised. While they were better placed to
interpret the intention underlying a particular speech and to assess the way in which the public was
likely to perceive it and react to it, the domestic courts had not explained in sufficient detail in the
present case their decision to classify the flags in question as advertising materials.
The Court further observed that the domestic courts had not examined whether the use being made
of the building, which the local authorities had designated as the applicant’s parliamentary office,
should be an important factor in the case. Likewise, they had not taken into consideration the
applicant’s status as a member of the European Parliament or his rights flowing from that status. In
particular, they had not established with certainty whether the applicant was seeking to act in his
3