In consequence, the Court considered that the obligation on the applicant to ensure protection of
the personal data held by the public authorities had been foreseeable and that the withdrawal of
accreditation in the event of failure to comply with the instruction on strictly scientific use had been
provided for in the CNSAS Rules.
The Court concluded that the interference had been “prescribed by law”.
With regard to the aim of the interference, the Court noted that the applicant in the present case
had requested access to the Securitate archives in order to gather information for the purpose of
historical research. The documents studied contained information about individuals who had been
placed under surveillance by the political police or who had collaborated with it. The Court
considered it reasonable for a public authority with responsibility for managing files containing
information about private individuals to provide guarantees in its regulations, in order to protect the
fundamental rights of those individuals. Furthermore, Law no. 677/2001 protected individuals with
regard to the processing and free movement of personal data.
Accordingly, in view of the legal obligation on all public authorities to protect the personal data held
by them, the Court considered that the Government were entitled to invoke the legitimate aim of
the protection of the rights of others, although the persons concerned had not themselves lodged
complaints.
With regard to the necessity of the interference, the Court noted that the applicant had disclosed in
press articles material about individuals who had collaborated with the political police by providing
information about various sports figures. The material disclosed to the public described actions
relating to the private sphere or the moral integrity of those persons. Moreover, the applicant had
named the individuals in question. The information did not relate to athletic performance, had not
been made public by the persons concerned, and was not otherwise accessible to the public, who
had no means of verifying its accuracy. Those persons were entitled to expect, both from the
authorities and from the applicant who had been granted access to the information, protection of
their right to respect for their private life.
The Court reiterated that the freedom of expression secured by Article 10 was not unlimited. It could
be restricted in order to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
In the present case, the applicant had chosen not to carry out an academic study of the information
obtained from the Securitate archives, but to disclose it in “raw” form, without assessing its
relevance in the light of the declared aim of his research: sport in Romania under the communist
regime. Rather than filtering this information, he had revealed to the public aspects of the private
life of sports figures, information that could in no way contribute to a debate of public interest.
The applicant had been able to apply to the national courts to challenge the withdrawal of his
accreditation. Those courts had found that he had breached his obligation to protect the private life
of the persons persecuted by the Securitate and that he had departed from the aim of the research
for which accreditation had been granted. The consequence of the applicant’s failure to comply with
his legal obligations had been the withdrawal of his accreditation. The Court noted, however, that
this had not prevented him from continuing to work as a journalist.
Thus, the Court considered it reasonable and legitimate for the CNSAS to have ruled that the
applicant’s failure to comply with his legal obligations had irremediably compromised the
relationship of trust that ought to exist between that institution and the persons who were granted
authorisation to consult its files. In the Court’s view, the withdrawal of accreditation had not been
disproportionate.
The Court considered that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had
been supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and that the authorities had struck a fair balance
between the competing interests, thus acting within their margin of appreciation.
3