to the discovery of an offence during or immediately after its commission. However, according to
the case-law of the Court of Cassation, a suspicion of membership of a criminal organisation could
be sufficient to characterise the element of in flagrante delicto without the need to establish any
current factual element or any other indication of an ongoing criminal act. In the Court’s view, this
amounted to an extensive interpretation of the concept of in flagrante delicto, expanding the scope
of that concept so that judges suspected of belonging to a criminal association could be deprived of
the judicial protection afforded by Turkish law to members of the judiciary. Furthermore, the Court
could not see how the Court of Cassation’s settled case-law concerning the concept of a continuing
offence could have justified extending the scope of the concept of in flagrante delicto, which related
to the existence of a current criminal act, as provided in Article 2 of the CCP.
The Court found that the national courts’ extension of the scope of the concept of in flagrante
delicto and their application of domestic law, namely section 94 of Law no. 2802, in the present case
were not only problematic in terms of legal certainty, but also appeared manifestly unreasonable.
It considered that the mere application of the concept of in flagrante delicto and the reference to
section 94 of Law no. 2802 in the order of 20 July 2016 for the applicant’s detention had not fulfilled
the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
In the Court’s view, an extensive interpretation of the concept of in flagrante delicto could clearly
not be regarded as an appropriate response to the state of emergency. Such an interpretation,
which, moreover, had not been adopted in response to the exigencies of the state of emergency,
was not only problematic in terms of the principle of legal certainty, but also negated the procedural
safeguards which members of the judiciary were afforded in order to protect them from
interference by the executive. It had legal consequences reaching far beyond the legal framework of
the state of emergency. It was in no way justified by the special circumstances of the state of
emergency. The Court concluded that the decision to place the applicant in pre-trial detention,
which had not been taken “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”, could not be said to
have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.
There had therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the
unlawfulness of the applicant’s initial pre-trial detention.
Alleged lack of reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence
The Court observed that the Constitutional Court had referred to Mr Baş’s use of the ByLock
messaging application. It had to be noted that the relevant evidence had not been adduced until
long after the applicant’s initial detention. The Constitutional Court had not explained how evidence
obtained several months after Mr Baş’s initial pre-trial detention could have formed a basis for a
reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence of which he had been accused.
In the present case, the Court observed that it appeared from the order for the applicant’s pre-trial
detention that the Kocaeli magistrate’s court had based its finding of a reasonable suspicion that the
applicant had committed the alleged offence on the decision taken by the HSK on 16 July 2016 and
on the request by the Ankara public prosecutor’s office to initiate an investigation in respect of him.
In its decision, the HSK had suspended 2,735 judges and public prosecutors, including the applicant,
on the basis of strong suspicion that they were members of the terrorist organisation that had
instigated the attempted coup. The HSK had referred to a number of disciplinary and criminal
investigations that had been initiated in respect of a number of judges and prosecutors prior to the
coup attempt. However, its decision did not contain any facts or information relating to the
applicant personally. He did not feature among the individuals mentioned as being the subject of
disciplinary and criminal investigations. Accordingly, the disciplinary and criminal investigations
mentioned in the HSK’s decision could not have formed the basis for the suspicion giving rise to the
order for the applicant’s detention. The Court further noted that in its decision, the HSK had made a
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