It was also not clear how the domestic courts had established or assessed the child’s best interests.
For instance, the courts had decided on a contact regime involving both parents, even though the
courts had acknowledged that the applicant and his former wife had tense relations. Nor was there
any indication in the decisions about the benefit of such arrangements for the child.
Furthermore, the courts had not looked properly into allegations by the child of abusive behaviour
by her father, although domestic law prohibited absolutely the physical punishment and humiliating
and degrading treatment of children. The lack of such an assessment cast doubt on the whole
decision-making process. No alternative contact arrangements had been considered, such as
meetings supervised by the child-protection authority.
The Court concluded that the decision-making process leading to the decision on Mr Cînța’s contact
rights had not been conducted so as to ensure that his state of health at the time had been properly
assessed and that all views and interests had been duly taken into account. It was not satisfied that
the procedure had been accompanied by the safeguards that were necessary given the seriousness
of the interference and the interests at stake.
There had thus been a violation of the applicant’s rights protected by Article 8.
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8
The Court found that the applicant had been treated differently from other parents seeking access
to a child owing to his mental health, a ground of possible discrimination which was covered by
“other status” in Article 14. It remained to be established whether the difference in treatment had
been justified.
While it was not the Court’s place to decide whether Mr Cînța’s mental condition impaired his ability
to care for his child, it had to examine whether the authorities had provided sufficient reasons for
taking that illness into account in their assessment of his case.
It noted that it had already found under Article 8 that the reliance on his mental health had not been
accompanied by a genuine domestic assessment of his situation. Indeed, no examination had been
made of any risk he might have posed to his daughter. The Court thus had to conclude that he had
been perceived as a threat to his child simply because of his mental health, without any
consideration of the concrete circumstances of the case and the family situation.
The Court took note of domestic legislation which recognised that people with mental disorders had
a right to a private life and the free exercise of all civil rights. Romania was, moreover, a party to the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the CRPD), while the
international community as a whole had strived for better and more coherent protection for the
rights of people with mental illness and mental disabilities. The Court’s own case-law had recognised
that mentally ill people were a vulnerable group whose rights required special consideration.
The Court reiterated its finding of a lack of a proper assessment of Mr Cînța’s mental health.
Moreover, it could not find any indication that his mental condition had even been a relevant issue
to be considered.
The Court concluded that the domestic courts had made a distinction between Mr Cînța and other
parents seeking contact with their children which had been based on his mental health but for which
they had not provided relevant and sufficient reasons. He had thus made out a prima facie case of
discrimination, which it was for the Government to reject or to provide a justification for.
However, the respondent State had not presented convincing reasons such as to rebut the
presumption of discrimination against the applicant on the grounds of his mental health. There had
accordingly been a breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.
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