could not depart from its judgment of 22 November 2013 in which it had ruled that new Article 426
of the Civil Code provided a sufficient legal basis for placement “for assistance purposes”.
On 18 August 2015, and after spending three years in security wing II, the applicant was transferred
to the prison’s general unit for the execution of sentences. The placement was extended several
times and, on 11 June 2018, the Family Court, in extending the placement until the end of
September 2018, decided that after that date T.B. would be placed in external accommodation,
which was the case as of 28 September 2018.
Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court
Relying on Article 5 § 1 (e) (right to liberty and security), the applicant alleged that his placement
“for assistance purposes” from April 2014 to April 2015 had no legal basis. He also complained that
he had not been held in a suitable institution.
The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 19 December 2014.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:
Vincent A. De Gaetano (Malta), President,
Branko Lubarda (Serbia),
Helen Keller (Switzerland),
Pere Pastor Vilanova (Andorra),
Alena Poláčková (Slovakia),
Georgios A. Serghides (Cyprus),
Jolien Schukking (the Netherlands),
and also Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
Article 5 § 1
The Court observed that T.B. had been placed “for assistance purposes”, namely psychiatric
treatment, in the security wing of the prison for the sole reason that he represented a danger for
others.
It noted that, according to the case-law of the Federal Court, the conditions of placement “for
assistance purposes” were governed by the Civil Code. Under Article 426 of that Code – as under
former Article 397a – such placement was pronounced when the person suffered from mental
disorders that required personal assistance or treatment that could only be provided in a specialised
institution.
The Court observed that the concerns about personal assistance and security considerations were
somehow intertwined in the second paragraph of Article 426 of the Civil Code, which required the
authority to take into account the burden that the person concerned represented for his or her
relatives or for third parties, while ensuring the protection of others. In this connection, the Court
noted that the Federal Council had clarified the scope of the relevant provision in that the protection
of third parties could now constitute an additional element in the assessment of the situation but
that it was “not decisive on its own”. The mere need to protect society from the person concerned
could not justify placement “for assistance purposes”. The Court also noted that the Federal Court
had expressly emphasised in its leading decision that deprivation of liberty “for assistance purposes”
solely on the grounds of endangering others was not prescribed by law and did not constitute a valid
reason for such placement. It followed that the second paragraph of Article 426 of the Civil Code
could not justify the applicant’s detention by way of legal basis.
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