The judgments were given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:
Erik Møse (Norway), President,
Angelika Nußberger (Germany),
André Potocki (France),
Yonko Grozev (Bulgaria),
Síofra O’Leary (Ireland),
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer (Austria),
Lәtif Hüseynov (Azerbaijan),
and also Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
Length of the proceedings
The Court rejected as inadmissible the Tlapak and Pingen parents’ complaint that the main custody
proceedings had been excessively long. The proceedings had taken one year and 11 months, during
which time the Family Court could not be held responsible for any particular delays. On the contrary,
the court had been active: it had commissioned a psychologist’s opinion, heard the applicants, their
children and further witnesses and led negotiations for a settlement between the applicants and the
youth office.
In view of the Government’s declaration recognising that there had been a violation of Article 8
concerning the length of the interim proceedings, namely from September 2013 to May 2014, in the
Wetjen and Schott families’ cases and proposing compensation, the Court decided to strike out of its
list of cases those parts of the applications.
Withdrawal of parental authority
First the Court found that the decisions to withdraw some parental rights had constituted an
interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life. The decisions, based in national
law and on the likelihood that the children would be caned, had aimed at protecting the “rights and
freedoms” of the children.
Furthermore, the Court was satisfied that the decision-making process in the cases had been
reasonable. The applicants, assisted by counsel, had been able to put forward all their arguments
against withdrawal of parental authority. The courts had had the benefit of direct contact with all
those concerned and had diligently established the facts. Even though the Tlapaks and Pingens had
withdrawn their consent for the psychologists’ opinion to be used as evidence in the proceedings,
the Court considered that it had been justified for the German courts to use the opinion given the
general interest at stake, namely the effective protection of children in family court proceedings. It
also found it acceptable that the family courts had not awaited the conclusions of the psychologist
concerning the Wetjens and the Schotts in the interim proceedings, given the need for particular
speediness in such proceedings.
Although taking children into care and splitting up a family constituted a very serious interference
with the right to respect for family life and should only be used as a last resort, the domestic courts’
decisions had been based on a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, which is prohibited in
absolute terms under the European Convention. The courts had taken an individualised approach,
taking into account whether each child was of an age where they were at risk of corporal
punishment. The courts had also given detailed reasons why there had been no other options
available to protect the children and the Court agreed with those conclusions. Moreover, the
proceedings had concerned a form of institutionalised violence against minors, considered by the
applicant parents as an element of the children’s upbringing. Consequently, any assistance by the
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