involved and that disciplinary action had been taken against A.Ş.’s assailant. The prison authorities
had subsequently informed the public prosecutor of the incident and the latter had instituted an
investigation which had resulted in the prosecution of A.Ş.’s assailant, who had been tried and
sentenced to eight years and nine months’ imprisonment. The Court considered that the domestic
law had afforded A.Ş. effective and sufficient protection against the infringement of his physical
integrity linked to the sexual assault.
As to the physical assault, the Court noted that when questioned by the public prosecutor, A.Ş. had
stated that he did not wish to file a complaint. The prosecutor had therefore discontinued the
proceedings on the ground that if the acts complained of constituted an offence a prosecution could
only be brought on the basis of a formal complaint by the victim.
The Court observed that when the acts complained of were committed A.Ş. had been in detention
and hence under the supervision and responsibility of the prison authorities. The Court reiterated
that prisoners were in a vulnerable situation and that the authorities had a duty to protect them.
Moreover, A.Ş. had been a minor at the time of the events. The Court stressed that minors were
inherently more vulnerable than adults.
The Court also noted that, under Article 86 § 3 of the Criminal Code, the filing of a complaint was not
a requirement where the victim of an assault was a person not capable of defending him or herself.
The Court observed that this provision did not specifically cover minors in detention. In the present
case, as the report by the forensic medical institute had found that A.Ş. had been able to defend
himself both physical and mentally, the public prosecutor had taken the view that he did not fall into
the category of victims covered by Article 86 § 3.
By requiring the applicant to lodge a formal complaint as a prerequisite for the bringing of criminal
proceedings, without taking into account his particular vulnerability, Turkish criminal law had in the
present case rendered ineffective the legal enforcement measures designed to protect individuals
against treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. The Court therefore found a violation of
that provision.
As to the conduct of the prison authorities, it could not be said, in the Court’s view, that they should
have known that A.Ş. was at risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention by his fellow inmates. The Court also stressed that as soon as the prison authorities had
learned of the assaults on A.Ş., the prison guards had intervened and placed A.Ş. in a different
dormitory in order to prevent a repetition of the treatment complained of.
The Court concluded that the authorities had not failed in their positive obligation to protect the
applicant’s physical integrity in the context of their duty to supervise persons deprived of their
liberty and to prevent them from being subjected to bodily harm.
Article 5
In so far as A.Ş. complained of having been placed unfairly in pre-trial detention, the Court noted
that he had been remanded in custody on 18 February 2010. However, as A.Ş. had not appealed
against the decision in question, he had been required to submit his application within six months of
that decision. As the present application had been lodged on 21 September 2010, this complaint was
rejected by the Court as being out of time.
With regard to the allegedly excessive length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the Court noted
that at the time the application was lodged A.Ş. had not had an effective remedy by which to obtain
compensation for excessively lengthy pre-trial detention, as no such remedy had been available until
the proceedings had been concluded. However, the Court considered that, following a change in the
case-law in June 2015, a legal rule had existed allowing the applicant to give the national courts the
opportunity to redress the alleged breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. The Court considered
that A.Ş. should have applied to the domestic courts for compensation under Article 141 § 1 (d) of
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