The Court considered that the legal protection currently available in Italy to same-sex couples – as
was shown by the applicants’ situation – not only failed to provide for the core needs relevant to a
couple in a stable committed relationship, but it was also not sufficiently reliable. Where registration
of same-sex unions with the local authorities was possible – only in a small share of municipalities in
Italy – this had merely symbolic value, as it did not confer any rights on same-sex couples.
As regards the possibility, since December 2013, to enter into “cohabitation agreements”, such
contracts were limited in scope. They failed to provide for some basic needs which were
fundamental to the regulation of a relationship between a couple in a stable and committed
relationship, such as mutual material support, maintenance obligations and inheritance rights. The
fact that cohabitation agreements were open to any set of people who were cohabiting, such as
friends, flatmates or carers, showed that those agreements did not primarily aim to protect couples.
Furthermore, such a contract required the couple concerned to be cohabiting, whereas the Court
had already accepted that the existence of a stable union between partners was independent of
cohabitation, given that many couples – whether married or in a registered partnership –
experienced periods during which they conducted their relationship at long distance, for example for
professional reasons.
Furthermore, the Italian Government had not proven that the national courts could issue a
statement of recognition of a partnership. Since the law explicitly provided for the recognition of a
same-sex partner only in very limited circumstances, even the most basic issues arising in a
relationship had to be determined judicially. The Court considered that the necessity to repeatedly
refer to the courts in these matters, especially in an overburdened justice system such as the one in
Italy, amounted to a significant hindrance to the applicants’ efforts to obtain respect for their private
and family life.
It followed from this situation that there was a conflict between the social reality of the applicants,
who for the most part lived their relationship openly in Italy, and the law, which gave them no
official recognition. In the Court’s view, an obligation to provide for the recognition and protection
of same-sex unions would not amount to any particular burden on the Italian State. In the absence
of marriage, the option of a civil union or registered partnership would be the most appropriate way
for same-sex couples like the applicants to have their relationship legally recognised.
The Court noted that there was a trend among Council of Europe member States towards legal
recognition of same-sex couples, 24 out of the 47 member States having legislated in favour of such
recognition.
The highest courts in Italy – notably the Constitutional Court in its April 2010 judgment in the case of
Mr Oliari and Mr A. – had repeatedly pointed out the need for legislation to recognise and protect
same-sex relationships. However, the Italian legislature had for a long time failed to take account of
those pronouncements. The Court observed that such calls by the Italian courts moreover reflected
the sentiments of a majority of the Italian population who, according to recent surveys, supported
legal recognition of homosexual couples. The Italian Government had not denied the need for legal
protection of such couples and had failed to point to any community interests justifying the current
situation.
Concluding that there was no prevailing community interest against which to balance the applicants’
interest to have their relationships legally recognised, the Court found that Italy had failed to fulfil its
obligation to ensure that the applicants had available a specific legal framework providing for the
recognition and protection of their union. To find otherwise, the Court would have had to be
unwilling to take note of the changing conditions in Italy and be reluctant to apply the Convention in
a way which was practical and effective.
There had accordingly been a violation of Article 8.
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