which was authorised, and membership of occupational groups, which was forbidden. In addition,
the Conseil d’État had ruled that an association which existed to defend the pecuniary and non-
pecuniary interests of military personnel belonged to the second category.
Holding that this prohibition pursued a legitimate aim, namely preservation of the order and
discipline necessary in the armed forces, of which the gendarmerie formed a part, the Court then
examined whether this interference had been necessary in a democratic society. It noted at the
outset that the relevant provisions of the Defence Code, on the basis of which the order given to
Mr Matelly had been taken, prohibited military personnel, purely and simply, from joining any trade-
union-like group. While the Court noted that the French State had put in place special bodies and
procedures to take into account the concerns of military personnel, it nonetheless considered that
those institutions did not replace the granting of freedom of association to military personnel, a
freedom which included the right to form and join trade unions. The Court was aware that the
special nature of the armed forces’ mission required that trade-union activity – which, in fulfilling its
purpose, could bring to light the existence of critical views regarding certain decisions that affected
the non-pecuniary and pecuniary situation of military personnel – be adapted to those particular
circumstances. It therefore emphasised that, under Article 11, restrictions, even significant ones,
could be imposed on the forms of action and expression of an occupational association and of the
military personnel who joined it, provided that such restrictions did not deprive them of the general
right of association in defence of their occupational and non-pecuniary interests.
However, the Court noted that the order that Mr Matelly resign from the association had been taken
on the sole basis of its memorandum of association and the possible existence, in a relatively wide
interpretation of its purpose, of a trade-union dimension. Moreover, the authorities had not had
regard to Mr Matelly’s attitude and his willingness to comply with his obligations by amending the
association’s memorandum.
In conclusion, the Court considered that the grounds put forward by the authorities to justify the
interference in Mr Matelly’s rights had been neither relevant nor sufficient, given that their decision
amounted to an absolute prohibition on military personnel joining a trade-union-like occupational
group which had been set up to defend their occupational and non-pecuniary interests. This blanket
ban on forming or joining a trade union encroached on the very essence of freedom of association,
could not be considered proportionate and had not therefore been “necessary in a democratic
society”. It followed that there had been a violation of Article 11.
Other articles
The Court examined Mr Matelly’s complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention under
Article 6 alone. It found no appearance of a violation in this connection, and the complaint was
accordingly rejected as manifestly ill-founded.
Just satisfaction (Article 41)
The Court held that France was to pay Mr Matelly 1,400 euros (EUR) in respect of costs and
expenses.
Separate opinion
Judge De Gaetano, joined by Judge Power-Forde, expressed a separate opinion. This opinion is
annexed to the judgment.
The Court has today issued a Chamber judgment in the case of ADEFDROMIL v. France, which also
concerned the prohibition on trade unions within the French armed forces.
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