receiving a pension from the State paid into a British bank account on which he paid tax
and had family members in the UK. He argued that the fifteen year time limit had the
effect of disenfranchising him completely and that it was not a proportionate limitation of
his right.
The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 26 March 2009.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:
Ineta Ziemele (Latvia), President,
David Thór Björgvinsson (Iceland),
George Nicolaou (Cyprus),
Ledi Bianku (Albania),
Zdravka Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria),
Vincent A. de Gaetano (Malta),
Paul Mahoney (the United Kingdom),
and also Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections)
Neither Mr Shindler nor the government had expressly identified the legitimate aim of
the restriction on non-resident voting in this case. However, the Court was satisfied that
it pursued the legitimate aim of confining the parliamentary franchise to those citizens
with a close connection to the United Kingdom and who would therefore be most directly
affected by its laws.
The Court noted that if Mr Shindler returned to live in the United Kingdom, his right to
vote as a resident would be restored. In those circumstances it could not be said that the
restriction impaired the very essence of Mr Shindler’s rights under Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1. Consequently, the Court considered that the central question in the case was
whether the election laws in question were a proportionate limitation on the right to vote
which struck a fair balance between the competing interests.
The Court reviewed the activities of Council of Europe bodies and found that they had
demonstrated a growing awareness at European level of the problems posed by
migration in terms of political participation in countries of origin and residence. However,
there was a disparity in approaches, and the Court therefore emphasised the importance
of leaving Governments room for manoeuvre (‘margin of appreciation’) in this area. It
also noted that Parliament had sought to weigh the competing interests in the case on
several occasions and had debated the question of non-residents’ voting rights in some
detail. The evolution of its views could be seen in amendments to the period on non-
residence since the introduction of overseas voting in 1985.
The Court found that allowing non-residents to vote for 15 years after leaving the
country was not an unsubstantial period of time. Having regard to the significant burden
which would be imposed if the United Kingdom were required to ascertain in every
application to vote by a non-resident whether the individual had a sufficiently close
connection to the country, the Court was satisfied that the general measure in this case
promoted legal certainty and avoided problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency
inherent in weighing interests on a case-by-case basis.
The Court concluded, having regard to the margin of appreciation available to the United
Kingdom in regulating its parliamentary elections, that the restriction imposed on
Mr Shindler’s right to vote was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Therefore
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