Decision of the Court
It was undisputed between the parties that the removal of the applicants’ children in
March 2009 had constituted an interference with their right to respect for their family
life. The Court found that that interference had been in accordance with the law, namely
the relevant provisions of the Russian Family Code, and that it had pursued a legitimate
aim, as it had aimed to protect the children’s “health and morals” for the purpose of
Article 8. Given that the boy had been injured in his parents’ house and that criminal
proceedings had been brought against them, the Court could accept that the authorities
had reasonably considered that placing the children in public care for some time was in
their best interest. Furthermore, the Russian courts, ruling at two levels of jurisdiction,
had reviewed the removal orders and had given consideration to all relevant
circumstances. The applicants had been represented by counsel and had been able to
contest any evidence against them. The Court therefore found that there had been no
violation of Article 8 on account of the initial removal of the children from their
parents.
The decision to revoke the adoption had been in accordance with Russian family law and,
as the initial removal of the children, had pursued a legitimate aim for the purpose of
Article 8. However, the Court observed that the Russian courts had made a superficial
assessment of the allegation that the applicants had failed to look after the children’s
health. The courts had simply enumerated the diseases with which the children had been
diagnosed after their removal, without giving explanations as to their origin or examining
the extent to which the parents were responsible for each health problem.
Furthermore, the Russian courts had not sufficiently taken into consideration that all
post-adoption reports from the relevant authorities had unanimously praised the
conditions in which the children lived with the family and had not mentioned any medical
supervision issues. The Russian courts had only mentioned the boy’s injuries and the fact
that a criminal investigation was pending without examining any evidence. While the
Court could accept that the suspicion of child abuse had justified the temporary removal
of the children, it could not find that that suspicion alone was sufficient for the far-
reaching and irreversible decision to revoke the adoption. There had been no assessment
of already established family bonds between the applicants and the children and the
potential emotional damage to them that might result from breaking those bonds.
Eventually, the criminal proceedings had ended with the acquittal of Mr Ageyev and a
conviction of Ms Ageyeva of non-fulfilment of duties only in respect of the incident of
March 2009, while all other charges had been dropped. In the light of those
considerations, the Court concluded that the court decisions revoking the adoption had
not been sufficiently justified for the purpose of Article 8. There had accordingly been a
violation of Article 8 on account of the revocation of the adoption.
The Court moreover found a violation of Article 8 on account of the applicants’
lack of access to the children for one year and two months. That situation had been
an automatic consequence of the decision to revoke the adoption, for which the
authorities had failed to advance sufficient reasons.
The Court found it established, based on the parties submissions and the evidence given
by the hospital’s doctors in the criminal proceedings against the applicants before the
Russian courts, that: doctors and officials of the hospital had taken photographs of the
applicants’ son for non-medical purposes; they had passed them on to the assistant of a
member of the Duma; they had informed several media crews about the boy’s identity;
and, they had given them direct access to him and to medical information concerning his
condition. All those actions had been taken without seeking the authorisation of, or
informing, the applicants. The relevant authorisations had been made by the head of the
hospital, who had acted in his capacity as an official under the authority of the
Department of Healthcare of the City of Moscow. The Court therefore found that the
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