her solicitor had asked the police to investigate her case and during the interview by the
Human Trafficking Team, Ms C.N. had set out her domestic servitude complaints. The
Court observed that the circumstances of her case had been remarkably similar to the
facts of the Siliadin v. France3 case, in which the Court confirmed that Article 4 entailed
a specific positive obligation on member States to penalise and prosecute effectively any
act aimed at maintaining a person in a situation of slavery, servitude or forced or
compulsory labour.
The Court therefore considered that the applicant’s complaints had given rise to a
credible suspicion of domestic servitude, which in turn had placed the British authorities
under an obligation to investigate those complaints. The Court noted in that connection
that the authorities’ investigation into the applicant’s complaints had strongly indicated
that her allegations had not been inherently implausible.
In view of its findings in the Siliadin judgment - that the provisions of the French
Criminal Code were too restrictive to protect the applicant’s rights under Article 4 - the
Court could only conclude that the legislative provisions in force in the United Kingdom
at the time had been inadequate to afford practical and effective protection against
treatment contrary to Article 4. Indeed, the authorities had been limited to investigating
and penalising criminal offences which often – but not necessarily – accompanied the
offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. Victims of domestic
servitude who had not also been victims of one of these related offences had been left
without any remedy.
The Court then examined whether this lack of specific legislation criminalising domestic
servitude had prevented the domestic authorities from properly investigating the
applicant’s complaints. It was concerned by the fact that the investigation had been
carried out by a specialist trafficking unit who nearly exclusively focused on the offence
of trafficking for exploitation as set out in the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004, when
domestic servitude was, as indicated in the third party interventions4, a specific offence,
distinct from trafficking and exploitation.
Consequently, as domestic servitude involved a complex set of dynamics, due weight
had to be given to subtle ways an individual could fall under the control of another,
which the domestic authorities had been unable to do in Ms C.N.’s case, in the absence
of a specific offence of domestic servitude. In particular, no attempt had been made to
interview S. and no apparent weight had been attributed to the applicant’s allegations
that her passport had been taken from her, that S. had not kept her wages for her as
agreed and that she had been threatened with denunciation to the immigration
authorities, even though these factors had been identified by the International Labour
Organization as indicators of forced labour.
The Court concluded that the investigation into Ms C.N.’s allegations of domestic
servitude had been ineffective due to the absence of specific legislation criminalising
such treatment in the United Kingdom at the relevant time, in breach of Article 4 of the
Convention.
Other articles
Having regard to its findings under Article 4, the Court considered that it was not
necessary to examine the applicant’s complains under Articles 8 and 13.
3
4
By the Aire Centre and the Equality and Human Rights Commission (§§ 61-64 of the judgment)
3