Right to free election (Article 3 of Protocol No 1)
The Court observed that the right to free elections was a fundamental principle of any
effective democracy. It was particularly important in the period preceding an election
that opinions and information of all kinds were permitted to circulate freely.
That said, the Court observed that there were many ways of organising and running
electoral systems, and Article 3 of Protocol No 1 had not been conceived as a code on
electoral matters. Thus, States enjoyed considerable discretion to adopt rules on
parliamentary elections in accordance with their specific historical or political factors.
It had been undisputed that the applicable Russian law had guaranteed neutrality of the
broadcasting companies making no distinction between pro-governmental and opposition
parties. The applicants had claimed, however, that the law had not been complied with
in practice. In particular, they argued that the TV coverage had been mostly hostile to
opposition parties and candidates, that United Russia had influenced the TV companies
so as to obtain favourable reporting, and that biased media coverage on TV had critically
affected public opinion and therefore the election had not been free.
The Court first addressed the applicants’ claim that the TV companies had been
manipulated by the government. It examined the findings of the Supreme Court in that
respect and concluded that they had been not been irrational. Thus, the applicants had
not presented any direct proof that there had been abuse by the Government of their
dominant position in the TV companies concerned. The TV journalists themselves had
not complained of undue pressure by the Government or their superiors during the
elections. Indeed, formally speaking, the journalists covering elections had been
independent and, under Article 10 of the Convention, had had wide discretion to
comment on political events. The Court accepted, referring to the Supreme Court’s
findings, as well as to the opinions of the OSCE and the CEC Working Group, that media
coverage had been unfavourable to the opposition. It noted, however, that in the
circumstances it was difficult to distinguish between Government-induced propaganda
and genuine political journalism or routine reporting on the activities of State officials.
The Court also agreed with the Supreme Court that it was very difficult, if not
impossible, to determine a causal link between “excessive” political publicity and the
number of votes obtained by a party or a candidate. The Court emphasised once again
its subsidiary role in assessing primary evidence and concluded that it did not have
sufficient reasons to discard the Supreme Court’s findings. It concluded that the
applicants’ allegation of political manipulation was not sufficiently proven.
Furthermore, it concluded that Russia had complied with its obligation to act in order to
ensure that elections were free both in procedural as well as in substantive terms. More
specifically, the applicants’ complaint about unequal media coverage had been examined
by an independent judicial body providing procedural guarantees and had resulted in a
reasoned judgment. Also, opposition parties had been able to convey their message on
TV by using the free and paid airtime provided without distinction to them and to the
other political forces. The OSCE reports had confirmed that while the main country-wide
State broadcasters had displayed favouritism towards United Russia, voters who sought
information had been able to obtain it from other available sources. Finally, the Court
recalled that imposing prior restraints on free speech of the journalists had to be
avoided, especially in the sphere of political debate. The Court stressed that the Russian
legislation proclaimed the vprinciples of neutrality and editorial independence of public
media and prohibited journalists from taking part in political campaigning, and the
applicants did not produce sufficient evidence that those principles were not complied
with in practice.
The Court concluded that Russia had taken measures which guaranteed some visibility of
opposition parties on Russian TV and ensured editorial independence and neutrality of
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