During these criminal proceedings, Ms Kalucza also made two requests for a restraining
order to be brought against Gy.B.. Her first request, made in June 2008, was dismissed
by the courts in January 2010 on the ground that both parties were responsible for their
bad relationship. Her subsequent second request was dismissed for the same reason.
There are also three sets of civil proceedings, suspended since 2007 and 2008,
concerning the flat: one set was brought by Ms Kalucza requesting that Gy.B. be ordered
to leave the flat; and, two sets concern ownership of the flat.
Between October 2005 and August 2010, 13 medical reports were drawn up which
recorded contusions mostly to Ms Kalucza’s head, face, chest and neck with an expected
healing time of eight to ten days.
Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court
Relying on Articles 2 (right to a life), 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment),
8 (right to respect of private and family life) and 13 (right to an effective remedy),
Ms Kalucza alleged that the Hungarian authorities have failed to protect her from
constant physical and psychological abuse in her home.
The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 25 September
2010.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven, composed as follows:
Françoise Tulkens (Belgium), President,
Danutė Jočienė (Lithuania),
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre (Monaco),
András Sajó (Hungary),
Işıl Karakaş (Turkey),
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Portugal),
Helen Keller (Switzerland), Judges,
and also Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
Article 8 (private life)
The Court considered Ms Kalucza’s claims concerning Gy.B.’s threat to her physical
integrity in their shared flat, including the allegation that he had frequently attacked her,
to be credible. There was therefore no doubt that Ms Kalucza’s application fell within the
sphere of private life under Article 8 of the Convention. The Hungarian authorities were
therefore obliged under the Convention to take measures to protect Ms Kalucza from her
former partner’s violent behaviour in her home.
However, the Court was struck that it had taken the authorities more than one-and-half
years to decide on Ms Kalucza’s first request for a restraining order, despite the fact that
the fundamental reason behind such a measure was to provide immediate or at least
prompt protection to victims of violence. Nor had sufficient reasons been given for
dismissing the restraining order requests, the courts relying simply on the fact that both
parties were involved in the assaults. Indeed, if such a measure could not be ordered in
the event of a mutual assault, the possibility of a victim having acted in legitimate self-
defence would be ruled out and the aim of providing effective protection to victims would
be seriously undermined. Moreover, restraining orders could have been issued against
both parties.
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