issued by the Registrar of the Court  
ECHR 120 (2012)  
22.03.2012  
German courts’ refusal to allow two presumed fathers to  
challenge other men’s paternity was legitimate  
In today’s Chamber judgments in the cases Ahrens v. Germany (application  
no. 45071/09) and Kautzor v. Germany (application no. 23338/09), which are not final1  
, the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:  
No violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and no  
violation of Article  
8
in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of  
discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights  
The case concerned the German courts’ refusal to allow two men to respectively  
challenge another man’s paternity, in one case of the applicant’s biological daughter, in  
the other case of the applicant’s presumed biological daughter.  
Principal facts  
The applicant in the first case, Denis Ahrens, was born in 1970 and lives in Berlin. The  
applicant in the second case, Heiko Kautzor, was born in 1971 and lives in Willich  
(Germany). Both are German nationals.  
Mr Ahrens assumed that he was the biological father of a girl born in August 2005, with  
whose mother, Ms P., he had had a relationship. At the time of conception, Ms P. lived  
with another man, Mr M., who acknowledged paternity of her child. The partners jointly  
exercise parental authority and bring up the child together. In October 2005, Mr Ahrens  
lodged an action to challenge Mr M.’s paternity, submitting a statutory declaration that  
he had had intimate relations with Ms P. during the period of conception. Mr M.  
submitted in reply that he assumed full parental responsibility for the child, even if he  
was not her biological father.  
In a judgment of April 2007, the district court, having heard the parties and considered  
an expert report and the result of a blood test of the two men, established that Mr  
Ahrens was the child’s biological father and found that he was not precluded from  
challenging Mr M.’s paternity. However, the court of appeal quashed the judgment in  
August 2007, holding that he did not have the right to challenge paternity, because of  
the social and family relationship between Mr M. and the child, which had continued  
even after it had been established that Mr M. was not the biological father. In May 2009,  
the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider Mr Ahrens’ constitutional complaint.  
Mr Kautzor assumed that he was the biological father of his former wife’s daughter,  
born in March 2005. His former wife, Ms D., lives with a new partner, Mr E., who  
acknowledged paternity of her daughter in May 2006. The couple subsequently had two  
more children together and got married. Mr Kautzor indicated to his former wife that he  
1 Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month  
period following its delivery, any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the  
Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges considers whether the case deserves further  
examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final judgment. If the referral  
request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.  
Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for  
supervision of its execution. Further information about the execution process can be found here:  
wished to have access to the child and to acknowledge paternity. In July 2006, he lodged  
an action to have his paternity established, and subsequently requested the court to  
establish that Mr E. was not the child’s father.  
In a judgment of June 2008, the district court, having heard the parties including a  
curator appointed to represent the child’s interest, rejected Mr Kautzor’s request. It held  
that he was precluded from contesting paternity, because a social and family relationship  
existed between the child and her legal father, Mr E. Since the child already had a legal  
father, Mr Kautzor did not have the right to have his paternity established by a genetic  
test. The court of appeal upheld the judgment in December 2008. Following Mr Kautzor’s  
complaint, the court of appeal further confirmed, in March 2009, that under the relevant  
provisions of the Civil Code, as interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court, he did  
not have the right to have his biological paternity established without establishing legal  
paternity. In June 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider his  
constitutional complaint.  
Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court  
Relying on Article 8 alone and in conjunction with Article 14, both applicants complained  
about the German courts’ refusal to allow them to challenge another man’s paternity and  
alleged that they had been discriminated against in comparison with the mother, the  
legal father and the child.  
Mr Ahrens’ application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 18  
August 2009 and Mr Kautzor’s application was lodged on 30 April 2009. In Mr Ahrens’  
case, Ms P. and Mr M., the legal parents of his biological daughter, were allowed to  
intervene as a third party.  
In both cases, judgment was given by a Chamber of seven, composed as follows:  
Dean Spielmann (Luxembourg), President,  
Elisabet Fura (Sweden),  
Boštjan M. Zupančič (Slovenia),  
Mark Villiger (Liechtenstein),  
Ganna Yudkivska (Ukraine),  
Angelika Nußberger (Germany),  
André Potocki (France), Judges,  
and also Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar.  
Decision of the Court  
Article 8  
In both cases, the Court found that the German courts’ decision to reject the applicants’  
request to legally establish paternity of their respective biological child and presumed  
biological child interfered with their right to respect for their private life under Article 8.  
At the same time, the Court found that those decisions did not amount to an interference  
with their family life for the purpose of Article 8, as there had never been any close  
personal relationship between the applicants and the respective children.  
In another case, Anayo v. Germany2, the Court had found a violation of Article 8 on  
account of the German courts’ refusal to grant a man access to his biological children on  
the ground that he had no social and family relationship with them. However, the  
2
Anayo v. Germany 20578/07 of 21 December 2010  
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proceedings brought by Mr Ahrens and Mr Kautzor had had a more far-reaching  
objective in that they sought to obtain full legal status as the respective child’s father  
and thus to challenge the paternity of the existing legal father. Mr Kautzor further  
complained of having no possibility to have his alleged paternity certified without  
changing the child’s legal status.  
The Court noted that, according to its comparative research, a majority of Council of  
Europe Member States allowed a presumed biological father to challenge the legal  
paternity of another man established by acknowledgment, even where the legal father  
lived with the child in a social and family relationship. However, in a significant minority  
of nine Member States the presumed biological father did not have the standing to  
contest the paternity of the legal father. There was accordingly no settled consensus and  
the States therefore enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation as regards the rules on  
determination of a child’s legal status.  
While it was in the applicants’ interest to establish an important aspect of their private  
lives and have it legally recognised, the German courts’ decisions had aimed to comply  
with the legislature’s will to give precedence to an existing family relationship between  
the respective child and her legal father, who provided parental care on a daily basis. It  
could be deducted from the judgment in Anayo v. Germany that, under Article 8, States  
had an obligation to examine whether it was in the child’s best interests to allow the  
biological father to establish a relationship with his child, for example by granting contact  
rights. However, this did not necessarily imply a duty under the Convention to allow the  
biological father to challenge the legal father’s status.  
As regards Mr Kautzor’s case, the Court observed that none of the 26 Member States it  
had examined provided a procedure to establish biological paternity without formally  
challenging the recognised father’s paternity. The decision whether or not to allow for  
such a separate examination therefore also fell within the State’s margin of appreciation.  
The Court was furthermore satisfied that, in both cases, the German courts had  
examined the respective situation with due diligence. There had accordingly been no  
violation of Article 8 in both cases.  
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14  
The Court noted that the main reason why the applicants had been treated differently  
from the mother, the legal father and the child with regard to the possibility of  
challenging paternity – and in Mr Kautzor’s case with regard to genetic testing - was the  
aim of protecting the respective child and her social family from external disturbances.  
Having regard to its findings under Article 8, the Court considered that the decision to  
give the existing family relationship between the child and her legal parents precedence  
over the relationship with her biological father fell, insofar as the legal status was  
concerned, within the State’s margin of appreciation. There had accordingly been no  
violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 in both cases.  
The judgments are available only in English.  
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The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of  
Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European  
Convention on Human Rights.  
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