Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court
Relying on Article 6 § 1 (right of access to a court) and Article 6 § 2 (presumption of
innocence), the applicants complained that there had been a violation of their right to
the determination of a criminal charge against them by an independent and impartial
tribunal and a breach of their right to be presumed innocent.
The applications were lodged with the European Court of Human Rights respectively on
29 February 2008 and 26 February 2009.
The judgments were given by a Chamber of seven, composed as follows:
Dean Spielmann (Luxembourg), President,
Elisabet Fura (Sweden),
Karel Jungwiert (the Czech Republic),
Mark Villiger (Liechtenstein),
Ann Power-Forde (Ireland),
Ganna Yudkivska (Ukraine),
André Potocki (France), Judges,
and also Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
Article 6 § 1
The Government had argued that the two applications were inadmissible on account of a
failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as the applicants could have appealed against the
enforcement of the penalty in a community court (juridiction de proximité). In the Célice
case, the Government further argued that the applicant could also have brought
proceedings to establish State liability for shortcomings in the justice system.
The Court reiterated that only remedies capable of providing effective redress for an
alleged violation had to be exhausted. It first observed that the applicants had not had
access to the community court procedure, as that could only be used to appeal against
enforceable fines after addition of the surcharge. As to a claim of State liability, such
proceedings did not entail any judicial review of the “charge” capable of providing
redress for the alleged violation. The Court thus dismissed the Government’s arguments
on this point and declared the applications admissible.
On the merits, the Court pointed out that the right to a court, of which the right of
access was one aspect, was not absolute; it was subject to limitations permitted by
implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal were
concerned. However, these limitations could not restrict or reduce a person’s access in
such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right was impaired. They
must pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.
In the applicant’s case the Court observed, firstly, that the official from the public
prosecutor’s office, a police superintendent, had declared inadmissible the applicants’
applications for exemption on erroneous grounds, namely, because Mr Cadène’s
application had not given reasons and that of Mr Célice had not explicitly denied
responsibility for the offence. On the appropriate application form, the applicants had, in
fact, clearly indicated that they denied having committed the offence and, in a
supporting letter, had duly explained their reasons. In addition, the Government had not
disputed the fact that the police superintendant, whose discretionary power was confined
to examining the formal admissibility of the application, had misused his authority.
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