The Court found that none of the remedies relied upon by the Government could have
addressed Mr Mosley’s specific complaint about the absence of a UK law requiring pre-
notification of the publication of the article which had interfered with his right to respect
for his private life.
Private life
The Court noted that the UK courts had found no Nazi element in Mr Mosley’s sexual
activities and had therefore concluded that there had been no public interest in, and
therefore justification for, the publication of the articles and images. In addition, the
newspaper had not appealed against the judgment. The Court therefore considered that
the publications in question had resulted in a flagrant and unjustified invasion of Mr
Mosley’s private life. Given that Mr Mosley had achieved a finding in his favour before the
domestic court, the Court’s own assessment concerned the balancing act to be
conducted between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression not in the
circumstances of the applicant’s particular case but in relation to the UK legal system.
It was clear that the UK authorities had been obliged under the Convention not only to
refrain from interfering with Mr Mosley’s private life, but also to take measures to ensure
his effective enjoyment of that right. The question which remained to be answered was
whether a legally binding pre-notification rule was required.
The Court observed that it had implicitly accepted in its earlier case law that damages
obtained following a defamatory publication provided an adequate remedy for right-to-
private-life breaches arising out of newspaper publications of private information.
It then recalled that States enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation in respect of the
measures they put in place to protect people’s right to private life. Notwithstanding the
potential merits of Mr Mosley’s individual case, given that a pre-notification requirement
would inevitably affect political reporting and serious journalism, in addition to the
sensationalist reporting at issue in Mr Mosley’s case, the Court stressed that any
restriction on journalism required careful scrutiny.
In the United Kingdom, the right to private life had been protected with a number of
measures: there was a system of self-regulation of the press; people could claim
damages in civil court proceedings; and, if individuals were aware of an intended
publication touching upon their private life, they could seek an interim injunction
preventing publication of the material. In addition, in the context of private life and
freedom of expression, a parliamentary inquiry on privacy issues had been recently held
in the UK with the participation of various interested parties, including Mr Mosley
himself, and the ensuing report had rejected the need for a pre-notification requirement.
The Court further noted that Mr Mosley had not referred to a single jurisdiction in which
a pre-notification requirement as such existed, nor had he indicated any international
legal texts requiring States to adopt such a requirement. Last and not least, the current
UK system fully corresponded to the resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe on media and privacy.
As to the clarity of any pre-notification requirement, the Court was of the view that the
concept of “private life” was sufficiently well understood for newspapers and reporters to
be able to identify when a publication could infringe the right to respect for private life. It
further considered that a satisfactory definition of those subject to the obligation could
be found. However, any pre-notification obligation would have to allow for an exception
if public interest was at stake. Thus, a newspaper could opt not to notify an individual if
it believed that it could subsequently defend its decision on the basis of the public
interest in the information published. The Court observed in that regard that a narrowly
defined public interest exception would increase the chilling effect of any pre-notification
3