objection to the psychologist who had drawn up the report, the Audiencia Provincial held
that it had not been raised in time.
The contact arrangements were extended in February 2006 to five hours every other
Sunday and subsequently, in November 2006, to every other Saturday and every other
Sunday, for approximately eight hours each time.
In December 2008 an amparo appeal by the applicant was dismissed. The Constitutional
Court held that the ground for restricting the contact arrangements had not been P.V.’s
transsexualism but her lack of emotional stability, which had entailed a real and
significant risk of disturbing her son’s emotional well-being and the development of his
personality, in view of his age – he had been six years old at the time of the expert
report – and the stage of his development at that time. The court held that in reaching
that decision, the judicial authorities had taken into account the child’s best interests,
weighed against those of the parents, and not P.V.’s status as a transsexual.
Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court
Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) taken in conjunction with
Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), the applicant complained about the restrictions
ordered by a judge on the arrangements for contact with her son, on the ground that her
lack of emotional stability following her gender reassignment was liable to upset the
child, who had been six years old at the time.
The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 18 June 2009.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:
Josep Casadevall (Andorra), President,
Elisabet Fura (Sweden),
Corneliu Bîrsan (Romania),
Boštjan M. Zupančič (Slovenia),
Alvina Gyulumyan (Armenia),
Egbert Myjer (the Netherlands),
Luis López Guerra (Spain), Judges,
and also Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
The Court agreed that once they had learned of P.V.’s gender emotional instability, the
Spanish courts had adopted contact arrangements that were less favourable to her than
those laid down in the separation agreement.
The Court emphasised that, although no issue of sexual orientation arose in the
applicant’s case, transsexualism was a notion covered by Article 14, which contained a
non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds for discrimination.
While emotional disturbance had not been considered a sufficient reason for restricting
contact, the decisive ground for the restriction had been the risk of jeopardising the
child’s psychological well-being and the development of his personality. In addition,
P.V.’s lack of emotional stability had been noted in a psychological expert report which
she had had the opportunity to challenge.
Rather than suspending contact entirely, the judge had made a gradual arrangement,
whereby he would review the situation on the basis of a report submitted every two
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