SECOND SECTION

CASE OF ŞERAFETTİN CAN ATALAY v. TÜRKİYE

(Application no. 11503/24)

 

JUDGMENT
 

Art 5 § 1 • Deprivation of liberty • Art 5 § 1 (a) • Continued detention of a lawyer and human-rights defender after his election as a Member of Parliament and the Court of Cassation’s refusal to release him despite Constitutional Court judgments in his favour finding a violation of his rights to liberty and security • Continued detention neither “lawful” nor “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”

Art 5 § 4 • Failure to provide the applicant with a review of the lawfulness of his detention resulting from the non-implementation of the Constitutional Court’s judgments • Court’s finding that an individual application before the Constitutional Court did not provide the applicant with a review within the meaning of Art 5 § 4 strictly limited to the specific circumstances of the present case

Art 3 P1 • Free expression of the opinion of the people • Stand for election • Applicant’s inability to take his seat in Parliament and the eventual termination of his parliamentary mandate on account of his conviction and unlawful detention amounting to an unjustified interference

Art 18 ( Art 5 and Art 3 P1) • Restrictions for unauthorised purposes • Applicant’s continued detention in the absence of recognition of his parliamentary immunity – resulting from the Court of Cassation’s refusal to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments – pursued the ulterior purpose of silencing him and stifling pluralism • Continued detention liable to have a dissuasive effect on the work of human-rights defenders

Art 46 • Execution of judgment • Individual measures • Respondent State required to take all necessary measures to end the applicant’s detention and secure his immediate release, allowing him to take up his seat in the Parliament and perform his parliamentary functions • General measures • Respondent State required to take all measures to provide that Constitutional Court judgments are fully implemented and to prevent similar future violations

 

Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.

 

STRASBOURG

17 November 2026

 

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.


In the case of Şerafettin Can Atalay v. Türkiye,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

 Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
 Saadet Yüksel,
 Jovan Ilievski,
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
 Gediminas Sagatys,
 Stéphane Pisani,
 Hugh Mercer, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 11503/24) against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Şerafettin Can Atalay (“the applicant”), on 16 April 2024;

the decision by a Chamber of the Second Section to apply Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and to grant the applicant’s request for priority treatment of the application;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Turkish Government (“the Government”);

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 29 September 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The case concerns the applicant’s continued detention following his election as a Member of Parliament (“MP”) in the general elections of 14 May 2023 and the Court of Cassation’s refusal to release him despite the Constitutional Court’s judgments in his favour, in which the latter court found violations of his right to liberty and security and his right to stand for election and to engage in political activity. The applicant relied on Articles 5 § 1, 5 § 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 18 of the Convention, as well as Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Istanbul. He was represented by Mr F. İlkiz and Mr E. İşler, lawyers practising in Istanbul.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Abdullah Aydın, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye.

4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

  1.         The applicant’s profile

5.  The applicant is a lawyer and human-rights defender. During the widespread protest movements in 2013 referred to as “the Gezi Park events” (for more information, see Kavala (no. 2) v. Türkiye [GC], no. 2170/24, §§ 17-21, 25 August 2026, and Kavala v. Turkey, no. 28749/18, §§ 15-22, 10 December 2019), he was a member of the collective called “Taksim Solidarity” (Taksim Dayanışması) – a grouping of several associations, trade unions, professional organisations and political parties, set up to bring those bodies together and to coordinate and organise the protests.

  1.       criminal proceedings against the applicant and his election as mp
    1.    The prosecution of the applicant

6.  On 19 February 2019 the Istanbul public prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and fifteen other persons who had taken part in the Gezi Park events, including actors, NGO leaders and journalists (for detailed information about the indictment of 19 February 2019, see Kavala (no. 2), cited above, §§ 23-25, and Kavala, cited above, §§ 47-56). The public prosecutor accused the persons concerned, in particular, of having attempted to overthrow the government by force and violence within the meaning of Article 312 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237 – see paragraph 56 below), and of having committed numerous breaches of public order, such as damaging public property, the desecration of places of worship and of cemeteries, the unlawful possession of dangerous substances, and looting. He concluded as follows:

“... before the Gezi insurrection, known as the “Gezi Park events”, all the defendants had been in training with the aim of overthrowing the government; they began to implement their plan in May 2013; legal and illegal groups, as well as illegal groups that were ostensibly legal and seemingly independent of each other, began to act by converging around a single aim; all the defendants sought to incite the public to take to the streets by organising so-called “non-violent” actions that were intended to gain public sympathy; they made numerous appeals and tried to increase participation in collective demonstrations by claiming that the police had intervened violently in the demonstrations; their aim was to plunge the country and society into chaos, as had occurred during the 1960 and 1980 coups d’état, by providing left-wing terrorist organisations with a favourable environment and attempting to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Turkey or to prevent it from exercising its functions; they very probably wished to force the Government to resign and to hold early elections, as in certain foreign countries; should this attempt fail, they intended to lay the groundwork for a civil war and a coup d’état, as in Syria and Egypt; the armed terrorist organisation FETÖ/PDY made similar attempts; after the Gezi insurrection had ended ... the armed terrorist organisation FETÖ/PDY became involved with the aim of achieving the same goal; in the light of the evidence in the case file, it has been found that the suspects committed the offences with which they are charged.”

7.  In so far as his conclusions concerned the applicant, the public prosecutor relied on the applicant’s profile and his previous activities. In that regard, he found the applicant to be a spokesperson for the Taksim Solidarity collective (see paragraph 5 above) and affiliated with Mr Kavala, the applicant in Kavala and Kavala (no. 2) (both cited above), who was one of the other suspects on the indictment. Relying mainly on transcripts of telephone conversations, video footage of the Gezi Park events and social media posts, the public prosecutor referred to a number of actions carried out by the applicant. Those actions included the applicant’s telephone conversations with Mr Kavala and several other persons (which mainly related to organisational matters during the Gezi Park events such as arranging meetings); his presence at the Gezi Park events (in particular, the speeches he had made to the protesters) and other protests concerning the urbanisation of green areas; his social media posts, mainly on the developments in the administrative court proceedings regarding the cancellation of various urban plans; and a number of telephone conversations with various correspondents, including journalists, about those administrative proceedings.

  1.    The criminal proceedings in the Istanbul Assize Court and the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal

8.  On 25 April 2022 the Istanbul Assize Court found that the applicant was an important member of, and lawyer to, the Taksim Solidarity group, which had been inciting demonstrations through social media since 2012. On 27 May 2013 members of Taksim Solidarity had set up tents in Gezi Park and invited demonstrators to join them there. The ensuing protests had led to the occupation of the park and attacks on the security forces using sticks, stones and Molotov cocktails. As shown in a great deal of CCTV footage, the applicant had actively participated in the protest meetings; had shared provocative and misleading social media posts and press statements, encouraging the protesters to use violence against the security forces; and had made statements and chanted slogans during the protests by megaphone, leading to a riot. The Assize Court listed a number of telephone conversations and meetings between the applicant and some of the other accused, observing that he had been in contact with those individuals from 2011 onwards (see Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 51, with regard to the Assize Court’s findings that the applicant had been in contact with Mr Kavala). It concluded that the applicant had engaged in activities relating to the incitement of an attempted uprising which had been planned to intensify and to expand throughout the entire country. During the course of the attempted uprising, the applicant had incited the demonstrators to action and had thus laid the groundwork for the escalation of the violence.

9.  The Assize Court therefore convicted the applicant, together with seven of his co-defendants, of attempting to overthrow the government or to prevent it from performing its functions under Article 312 of the Criminal Code. It sentenced him to aggravated life imprisonment. Finding that the applicant had aided and abetted the commission of the offence by the main perpetrator, Mr Kavala, within the meaning of Article 39 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 56 below), the court reduced his sentence to 18 years’ imprisonment. Lastly, the court made a separate order for the applicant’s detention. The trial court decided that there was no need to give a judgment on the numerous other offences the applicant had been charged with, finding that the actions that had led to those charges were within the definition of the force and violence that were constituent elements of the offence of attempting to overthrow the government or to prevent it from performing its functions.

10.  On 28 December 2022 the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant, finding that the first-instance court had not erred in its assessment and findings. The Court of Appeal ordered the continued detention of the applicant and his co-defendants, given the severity of the sentences imposed and the fact that the charges were among those for which there was a statutory presumption of the existence of grounds for detention in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271). Finding that the evidence gave rise to a strong suspicion that the applicant and his co‑defendants had committed an offence, the Court of Appeal held that any other measure than detention would be insufficient.

11.  On 16 January 2023 the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation.

  1.    The applicant’s election as an MP and the proceedings in the Court of Cassation regarding his request to benefit from parliamentary immunity

12.  While his appeal was still pending in the Court of Cassation, the applicant was elected as an MP for Hatay in the parliamentary elections of 14 May 2023, having stood for the Workers Party of Türkiye.

13.  Subsequently, on 25 May 2023 the applicant applied to the Court of Cassation for his release and for the stay of the criminal proceedings against him under Article 83 of the Constitution, which deals with parliamentary immunity (see paragraph 53 below). He argued that he could not be detained and tried unless the Turkish Grand National Assembly (“the National Assembly”) had decided to lift his parliamentary immunity. According to him, while Article 83 § 2 referred to exceptions to parliamentary immunity listed in Article 14 of the Constitution, what those exceptions were could not be established in a clear and foreseeable manner. In that regard, he referred to previous judgments of the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 60-61 below). He also pointed to a decision of the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation (“the plenary criminal divisions”) regarding the interpretation of Articles 83 and 14 of the Constitution and the binding nature of the judgments delivered by the Constitutional Court in respect of individual applications (see paragraph 62 below). Referring to the Constitutional Court’s findings in similar cases of a violation of the right to stand for election and to engage in political activity under Article 67 of the Constitution (see paragraph 54 below), the applicant also argued that his continued detention constituted a violation of that right.

14.  On 13 July 2023 the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation found that the applicant’s request for his release and the suspension of the criminal proceedings against him required it to examine his claim to parliamentary immunity. In view of the nature of the offence, that examination would be carried out with reference to Articles 83 and 14 of the Constitution (see paragraph 53 below). Article 83 § 2 of the Constitution provided two exceptions to parliamentary immunity: situations where an MP was caught in the course of committing an offence punishable by a heavy penalty (in flagrante delicto) and the cases falling within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, provided that an investigation had begun before the election. The legislature had not specified the offences that would fall within the scope of Article 14 but had deliberately left the determination of its scope to the courts. In that regard, although the Constitutional Court had found in previous individual review cases that Article 14 did not establish the exceptions to parliamentary immunity in a clear and foreseeable manner, that court could not render a Constitutional provision unenforceable through decisions taken within the scope of the individual application mechanism. That mechanism was subsidiary to the court’s main function, namely, a judicial review of legal provisions. Legal certainty came not only from legislation but also from case-law, provided that the law was accessible and foreseeable.

15.  The Court of Cassation went on to analyse what offences would fall within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution. In that regard, it cited the definition of terrorism in Article 1 of Law no. 3713 on the Prevention of Terrorism Act (“Law no. 3713”), and the principal terrorist offences in Article 3 of the same Act. These included, among other things, Articles 309 and 312 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237 – see paragraph 56 below), which govern the offence of violation of the Constitution and offences against the Government respectively. The Court of Cassation further referred to the explanatory memoranda of Articles 309 and 312 of the Criminal Code, which stated that the legal interest protected by these provisions was the principle of the constitutional order and that attempts directed against one of the fundamental bodies of the constitutional order would be punished to the same extent as if the full offence had been carried out. The Court of Cassation concluded that the offences in Article 3 of Law no. 3713, including Article 312 of the Criminal Code, fell within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution.

16.  With respect to the applicant’s case, the Court of Cassation stated as follows:

“In the present case, which has not yet been decided on its merits, it appears from the findings of the first-instance court that – in the context of the events publicly known as the Gezi Park protests, which began as demonstrations against the Taksim Artillery Barracks Project that were planned as part of the Taksim Pedestrianisation Project and later spread nationwide and escalated into mass violent incidents, resulting in 746 unlawful meetings and demonstrations in 78 provinces, damage to 280 workplaces, 259 private vehicles, 103 police vehicles, one residence, one police station, five public buildings and twelve party buildings, as well as loss of life and numerous injuries – the accused Şerafettin Can Atalay engaged in activities aimed at initiating and intensifying an attempted uprising to be carried out according to a plan and to be spread throughout the country. It was found that he was an influential member of the Taksim Solidarity group and that his statements and calls had contributed to the escalation of the violence. It was also found that he had facilitated the offence by assisting [Mr Kavala], the principal perpetrator, before or during the commission of the offence. His actions were therefore regarded as constituting the offence of aiding an attempt to bring down the Government of the Republic of Türkiye or to prevent it from performing its function in whole or in part, and he was convicted and detained pursuant to Article 312(1) and Article 39 of Law no. 5237.

In view of the fact that the offence imputed to the accused – attempting, by use of force and violence, to bring down the Government of the Republic of Türkiye or to prevent it from performing its functions – falls within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, and that the investigation had begun before the election, it was concluded that, pursuant to the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Constitution, he did not benefit from parliamentary immunity, and that the proceedings should therefore continue under the usual procedural rules.”

17.  The Court of Cassation therefore unanimously rejected the applicant’s request for his release and for the suspension of the criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 13 above).

18.  On 14 July 2023 the applicant challenged that decision, arguing that the Court of Cassation did not have jurisdiction to interpret constitutional provisions and should implement the Constitutional Court’s binding judgments regarding the interpretation of the relevant provisions. There was no legislative clarification of the offences falling within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, which led the trial courts to interpret that Constitutional provision. That interpretation could not be considered clear and foreseeable. It would also render parliamentary immunity under Article 83 of the Constitution and the right to stand for election and to engage in political activity under Article 67 of the Constitution futile. The applicant further maintained that in deciding to detain him, the Istanbul Assize Court had failed to make an individualised assessment or to put forward any arguments regarding his risk of absconding.

19.  On 17 July 2023, by four votes to one, the Fourth Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s objection to the decision of 13 July 2023 (see paragraphs 14-17 above). The dissenting judge held that restrictions on the right to stand for election and to engage in political activity under Article 67 of the Constitution must remain an exception and any restrictions which were not legally certain would have to be interpreted narrowly. Article 14 of the Constitution did not refer to specific offences and any interpretation in that regard would breach the principle of legal certainty. Article 14 was neither clear nor foreseeable, which could also be observed from the discrepancy between the case-law of the Constitutional Court and that of the Court of Cassation. He therefore held that the applicant should benefit from parliamentary immunity and should be released.

  1.    The Court of Cassation’s decision on appeal

20.  On 28 September 2023 the Court of Cassation upheld the Istanbul Assize Court’s judgment of 25 April 2022 (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above) in so far as it concerned the applicant and five of his co-defendants. The Court of Cassation repeated the narrative of events described in the indictment of 19 February 2019 (see paragraph 6 above) and concluded that the Gezi Park events had not been a spontaneous and unpredictable reaction by the public but an insurrection (kalkışma), the result of a social engineering project planned by various activists over the course of the previous two years. The Court of Cassation found that the entities that supported and directed the events had included the Foundation for an Open Society, which was a branch of the Open Society Institute led by an international speculator, G.S.; the Anadolu Kültür limited company, which had been established by Mr Kavala; and three groups, namely, Taksim Group, Taksim Solidarity and Coordinated Forums.

21.  The Court of Cassation found that the applicant, who had set up Taksim Solidarity (see paragraph 5 above), had started an intensive campaign against the pedestrianisation of Taksim Square starting from 2012, had actively taken part in encouraging the Gezi Park events and had incited an uprising through his social media posts. He had had intensive contact with the other defendants prior to and during the events and had taken part in meetings of Coordinated Forums, in order to maintain the momentum of the events and to spread them around the country. The Court of Cassation again referred to the damage caused during the events and held that the applicant had provoked violence aimed at overthrowing the government.

22.  The Court of Cassation concluded that the acts committed by the applicant had constituted the offence of attempting to overthrow the Government within the meaning of Article 312 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 56 below), whereas he had been convicted by the Assize Court of aiding an attempt to overthrow the Government. Nevertheless, as no appeal had been lodged regarding the classification of the offence, it did not quash the judgment of the Assize Court on that ground and went on to uphold it.

23.  As regards the applicant’s specific situation following his election as an MP, the Court of Cassation repeated the findings in its decision of 13 July 2023 (see paragraphs 14-17 above), concluding that the applicant did not benefit from parliamentary immunity.

  1.     the first individual application to the constitutional court following the applicant’s election as MP and subsequent proceedings
    1.    The first individual application

24.  On 20 July 2023 – after the Court of Cassation’s rejection of his request for his release and for the suspension of the criminal proceedings because of his parliamentary immunity (see paragraphs 14-17 above), but before the decision of the Court of Cassation upholding the Assize Court’s judgment (see paragraphs 20-23 above) – the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court, complaining about violations of his right to liberty and security, his right to a fair trial and his rights to vote, to be elected and to engage in political activity. He argued, inter alia, that his continued detention was unlawful and that he should benefit from parliamentary immunity in line with Article 83 of the Constitution (see paragraph 53 below). In rejecting his application, the Court of Cassation had failed to follow the Constitutional Court’s earlier decisions on the issue. Moreover, his detention as a result of his conviction was not in accordance with the law and no reasons for his detention had been provided.

25.  On 28 September 2023 the Court of Cassation upheld the applicant’s conviction (see paragraphs 20-23 above).

26.  On 25 October 2023 in Şerafettin Can Atalay (2) (B. No. 2023/53898) the Constitutional Court found, by nine votes to five, that there had been a violation of the applicant’s right to liberty and security and his right to stand for election and to engage in political activity under Articles 19 and 67 of the Constitution, respectively (see paragraph 54 below). It found that neither the interference with the applicant’s right to stand for election nor his continued detention were prescribed by law.

27.  Reiterating its findings in previous cases lodged by other applicants (Ömer Gergerlioğlu, B. No. 2019/10634, 1 July 2021, and Leyla Güven, B. No. 2018/26689, 7/4/2022 – see paragraphs 60-61 below), the Constitutional Court stated that there were no clear and foreseeable constitutional or legal provisions from which the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution could be established. It stated that Articles 14 and 83 of the Constitution should be interpreted using a rights-based approach. However, not only had the domestic courts failed to take that approach but there existed no clear and foreseeable guidance requiring that to be done. Nor were there any substantive or procedural safeguards governing the application of the exception set out in those provisions. The Constitutional Court further emphasised the absence of legal safeguards which might otherwise prevent arbitrary or disproportionate interferences with the rights of elected parliamentarians. These included safeguards against politically motivated accusations or unnecessary restrictions impeding the exercise of parliamentary functions. Moreover, there was no legal basis for the finding of the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation that the legislature had deliberately left the determination of the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution to be developed by the courts (see paragraph 14 above). This was also demonstrated by an inconsistency in the Court of Cassation’s case-law regarding the offences which fell within the scope of that provision.

28.  The Constitutional Court stated that although in its judgment in Ömer Gergerlioğlu (see paragraph 60 above) it had pointed to the State authorities’ general regulatory obligations, in the present case the Court of Cassation had interpreted the scope of Article 14 so as to restrict the applicant’s constitutional rights, thereby breaching those rights and failing to implement the Constitutional Court’s decision. In finding a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 67 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court concluded that the interference with the applicant’s right to stand for election and to engage in political activity was not lawful because there had been no legal or constitutional framework making it legally certain or foreseeable. As regards his right to liberty and security under Article 19 of the Constitution (see paragraph 54 below), it reiterated its findings regarding Article 67 and held that even where the initial reason for detention was sentencing after conviction, when circumstances arose that undermined its lawfulness – such as a legal or constitutional obstacle preventing continued detention or a judicial decision requiring release – the connection between the conviction and the deprivation of liberty would no longer exist. In the present case, the question whether the applicant would benefit from parliamentary immunity under Article 83 of the Constitution was a factor directly affecting the lawfulness of his continued detention. Given that he should have benefited from parliamentary immunity, there was no legal basis for his continued detention.

29.  The Constitutional Court transmitted its judgment to the Istanbul Assize Court, stating that it was required to give the applicant redress by suspending the execution of his sentence, ordering his release from prison, and reopening and staying the criminal proceedings against him.

30.  The dissenting judges repeated the same submissions they had made in the two previous cases cited in the judgment (see paragraph 27 above). They considered that although the legislature had not specified the offences which fell within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, the courts were well placed to determine which offences were concerned.

  1.    The subsequent proceedings in the Assize Court and the Court of Cassation

31.  On 1 November 2023 the Assize Court referred the case to the Court of Cassation, stating that the violations found by the Constitutional Court arose from the decision of the Court of Cassation. It also observed that while the individual application was pending in the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation had upheld the applicant’s conviction (see paragraphs 20-23 above), and that it would therefore have to deal with the case taking into account the new legal situation.

32.  On 8 November 2023 the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation reiterated the findings in its decision of 13 July 2023 (see paragraphs 14-17 above). It held that the legislature had intentionally omitted to list the offences to which Article 14 of the Constitution would apply, allowing the first-instance and appeal courts to make their own assessments of any offence committed by an MP. In that respect, the Court of Cassation concluded once again that the offence of which the applicant had been convicted fell within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court had disregarded the Court of Cassation’s decision of 28 September 2023 upholding the applicant’s conviction (see paragraphs 20‑23 above), which predated the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 25 October 2023 finding that the applicant’s rights had been violated (see paragraphs 26-29 above). The Constitutional Court had in effect acted as a fourth-instance court and had gone so far as to threaten the members of the Court of Cassation. It had therefore exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its authority.

33.  In that regard, the Court of Cassation stated as follows:

“The Constitutional Court has not only interfered in the proper sphere of the legislature by rejecting specific legal provisions, but has also acted like a supervisory authority and a “super appeal court” over other appellate courts, despite the fact that there is no hierarchical relationship between itself and these courts under the Constitution.

The legislative, executive and judicial branches represent a distribution of functions. The position of the judiciary differs from that of the other two branches. When the judiciary adopts an activist approach, it tends to lose its legitimacy and become prone to a loss of public confidence. What is expected of the judiciary is that it should deliver decisions in accordance with the legal provisions, the Constitution and, above all, the principles of law.

By engaging in judicial activism, the Constitutional Court has, through decisions that are contrary to the Constitution – such as rendering constitutional provisions which it cannot formally review unenforceable, accepting individual applications without the exhaustion of all administrative and judicial remedies provided for by law, intervening in investigations and making prosecutions ineffective – considered its powers and functions to be superior to the Constitution and the law. In doing so, it has, in a sense, nullified the Constitution and so led to a loss of public confidence and to debates regarding its legitimacy.”

34.  The Court of Cassation therefore decided unanimously not to implement the Constitutional Court’s decision, which it found to have no legal significance, and to transmit its own decision to the National Assembly so as to have it remove the applicant’s mandate as an MP. It also decided to make a criminal complaint against the members of the Constitutional Court who had voted for a finding of a violation of the applicant’s rights, for unlawfully exceeding the limits of their authority. There is no information in the Court’s case file regarding the outcome of that criminal complaint.

35.  On 10 November 2023 the Court of Cassation issued a press statement, which it said was to address the public controversy surrounding the decisions of the two superior courts in the applicant’s case. It stated that it was the highest appellate authority in the judicial system and that the Constitution did not establish a hierarchy among superior courts. Given that the individual application mechanism constituted a subsidiary remedy, the Constitutional Court had no jurisdiction to rehear cases decided by the appellate courts. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court had sometimes acted as a “super appeal court”, exceeded the constitutional limits, and turned appeal courts’ decisions down, thereby leading the legal system to chaos. In the applicant’s case, the Constitutional Court had disregarded the will of the legislature and the effect of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court’s finding that, by interpreting Article 14 of the Constitution in a restrictive manner, the Court of Cassation had violated the Constitution (see paragraph 28 above) was legally unacceptable.

  1.    the second individual application to the constitutional court and subsequent proceedings
    1.    The second individual application

36.  On 24 November 2023 the applicant filed a further individual application with the Constitutional Court, making the same complaints as in his first individual application (see paragraph 24 above). This time, he also complained that the Assize Court and Court of Cassation had not implemented the Constitutional Court’s judgment in his favour.

37.  On 21 December 2023 the Constitutional Court, by eleven votes to three, found violations of the applicant’s right to liberty and security and of his right to stand for election and to engage in political activity (Şerafettin Can Atalay (3), B. No. 2023/99744). It also found, unanimously, a violation of the applicant’s right to individual application under Article 148 § 3 of the Constitution (see paragraph 54 below). The Constitutional Court stated that the violations found had resulted from the failure to implement its previous judgment of 25 October 2023 (see paragraphs 26-29 above).

38.  The Constitutional Court observed that on an individual application its powers and functions were not limited to assessing whether or not a constitutional right had been violated. It also had power to direct a remedy for the violation under section 50 § 1 of Law no. 6216 on the establishment and rules of procedure of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 55 below). When the Constitutional Court found a violation and stated what measures should be taken to put an end to the violation and redress its effects, the courts concerned – which had no discretion in the matter – must commence the procedures required. Moreover, the judgment was binding on those courts under Article 153 of the Constitution (see paragraph 54 below), which did not provide for any exceptions. A failure to implement the Constitutional Court’s decisions regarding individual applications would undermine the individual and societal confidence in the rule of law and would cause harm to the constitutional order.

39.  In that respect, the Constitutional Court referred to the Court’s decision in Uzun v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 10755/13, 30 April 2013); its judgment in Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey (no. 13237/17, 20 March 2018); a previous decision it had delivered in the case of Kadri Enis Berberoğlu (3) (see paragraphs 57-58 below); and a decision of the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation dated 26 October 2022, in which the latter court had emphasised that it was for the Constitutional Court to interpret Article 14 of the Constitution and to determine its scope and that the Constitutional Court’s decisions were binding (see paragraph 62 below). The Constitutional Court also referred to several previous decisions of the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation – which had decided not to implement its judgments in the applicant’s case – and a decision of a civil division of the Court of Cassation which had pointed out that Constitutional Court decisions were binding (see paragraphs 63-64 below).

Reiterating its previous order as to relief (see paragraph 29 above), the Constitutional Court referred its judgment to the Istanbul Assize Court.

40.  The dissenting judges of the Constitutional Court maintained that that court’s jurisdiction was limited to assessing whether acts and omissions complied with the provisions of the Constitution and did not extend to the review of a constitutional provision. They argued that while there was no provision setting out the offences to which Article 14 of the Constitution applied, the scope of that provision could be determined by the case-law of the ordinary courts and the Court of Cassation. Consistent decisions of those courts had made it clear that the offence in Article 312 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 56 below) fell within that scope. Article 14 of the Constitution was therefore not unforeseeable. The dissenting judges considered that if the Constitutional Court’s decisions were not implemented, the result would be a violation of the right to individual application under Article 148 of the Constitution and that it would not affect the right to liberty and security or the right to stand for election and to engage in political activity.

  1.    The subsequent proceedings in the Assize Court and the Court of Cassation

41.  On 27 December 2023 the Assize Court decided to refer the case to the Court of Cassation for the same reasons as those given in its decision of 1 November 2023 (see paragraph 31 above).

42.  On 3 January 2024 the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation decided not to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgment, mainly for the reasons given in its previous decision of 8 November 2023 (see paragraphs 32-33 above). It observed that the present case was not the first in which the Court of Cassation had declined to implement a judgment of the Constitutional Court on an individual application and that the Constitutional Court had no power to interpret constitutional provisions in a manner that would deprive them of all meaning. It again transmitted its decision to the National Assembly.

43.  On 9 January 2024, by three votes to two, the Fourth Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation found it unnecessary to decide on an objection made by the applicant to the decision of the Third Criminal Division.

The dissenting judges considered that the applicant’s objection should be upheld and the file referred to the Istanbul Assize Court for it to implement the order of the Constitutional Court.

  1.      The other individual applications

44.  On 27 October 2023 the applicant lodged an application with the Constitutional Court complaining about violations of the prohibition of ill‑treatment; of his right to a fair trial; of the principle of no punishment without law; of his rights to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association; and of his right to stand for election and to engage in political activity. He also relied on Article 18 of the Convention.

45.  On 12 January 2024 the applicant filed another application with the Constitutional Court, repeating the complaints in his first and second applications to that court (see paragraphs 24 and 36 above), and raising an additional complaint under Article 18 of the Convention.

46.  At the date of the latest information available to the Court (16 April 2025), these individual applications were still pending in the Constitutional Court.

  1.    termination OF the applicant’s parliamentary MANDATE

47.  On 30 January 2024 the Court of Cassation’s decision of 3 January 2024 (see paragraph 42 above) was read in the Plenary of the National Assembly and it was announced that the applicant’s parliamentary mandate had been terminated pursuant to Article 84 § 2 of the Constitution (see paragraph 53 below). According to the minutes of the Plenary, a number of MPs spoke to the announcement. Several opposition MPs criticised it, stating that the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation’s persistent refusal to implement the orders of the Constitutional Court, despite Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution (see paragraph 54 below), was a violation of the constitutional order and constituted a political statement rather than a judicial decision, and that it had put the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court at risk. MPs from the ruling party stated that the Constitution had not established a hierarchy of the superior courts and that the National Assembly could not discuss which court was correct; it could only comply with Article 84 § 2 of the Constitution.

48.  The applicant applied to the Constitutional Court for a declaration that the termination of his parliamentary mandate was void and should be annulled in line with the relevant provisions of the Constitution, and an order for its interim suspension.

49.  By a decision of 22 February 2024, which was published in the Official Gazette on 1 August 2024, the Constitutional Court declined to hear the applicant’s application, stating that in order for it to annul a declaration that a parliamentary mandate had been terminated, there needed to be a termination within the meaning of Article 84 § 2 of the Constitution. That required a finalised conviction. The Constitutional Court found, however, that following its finding on 25 October 2023 that the applicant’s rights had been violated (see paragraphs 26-29 above), the applicant could not be treated as having been finally convicted. A decision which had been definitively declared unconstitutional could not be considered as having any legal force. The Constitutional Court’s judgments were not advisory but binding and left the authorities no discretion as to whether or not to implement them.

The Constitutional Court stated that the Court of Cassation’s decision of 3 January 2024 (see paragraph 42 above), which had been read out in the National Assembly on 30 January 2024 (see paragraph 47 above), was a decision pertaining to that court’s refusal to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgment. There was no legal basis in Turkish law for that refusal. The de facto termination of the applicant’s mandate on the basis of that decision could not be considered as a legislative act. It was therefore not possible for the Constitutional Court to rule on the de facto situation arising from the reading out of that decision.

  1. other information provided by the applicant

50.  The applicant submitted several statements by the President of the Republic and M.U., the Chief Advisor to the President and the Vice-President of the Presidential Council for Legal Policies, regarding his continued detention and the Court of Cassation’s refusal to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments.

51.  According to press articles dated 10 November 2023, that is, two days after the Court of Cassation’s decision refusing to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgment in the applicant’s first individual application and filing a criminal complaint against certain Constitutional Court members (see paragraphs 32-34 above), the President made the following statements:

“In response to the Constitutional Court’s decision, the Court of Cassation has now said: ‘If you are a superior court, then we too are a superior court, and as a superior court we are now seeking to have a sanction imposed on you.’ It awaits the fulfilment of its request by whichever authority has the power to implement it. If that authority is the Parliament, it is seeking it from the Parliament.

Now set Can Atalay aside. Unfortunately, similar things have happened before. Our Parliament, too, moves slowly in these matters. That is to say, many terrorists have escaped and left the country because of delays in the process of lifting their parliamentary immunities. These matters should not be handled so sluggishly. They need to be concluded with very swift decisions. When these steps are not taken promptly, you then see one person in the United States, one in Germany, another in France who then threaten Türkiye from there. My country should not, and cannot, be faced with threats from deviants who have fled abroad.

If some friends from my own party are criticising the Court of Cassation and praising the Constitutional Court, they are doing wrong as well. We must act with the understanding that one of us is all of us, and all of us are one. There is no point in trying to please certain circles here. Finally, I would also like to emphasise that the power to amend the Constitution belongs to our Grand Assembly, and it cannot delegate this authority. Nor can anyone diminish this absolute power of the Assembly which has been formed by the will of the nation.”

During two meetings on 8 and 19 January 2024, the President criticised an opposition leader, making the following statements which the applicant claimed to refer to him:

“This mentality is preoccupied with digging a tunnel from the prison to Parliament in order to rescue a terrorist who has been sentenced to 18 years in prison.”

52.  The Chief Advisor to the President and the Vice-President of the Presidential Council for Legal Policies, M.U., stated the following in a social media post of 8 November 2023:

“In its decisions concerning the immunity of MPs who have been convicted, the Constitutional Court persistently fails to recognise the Constitution. It disregards Article 14 of the Constitution. Yet Article 83, concerning immunity, excludes the situations referred to in Article 14. Despite this mandatory provision of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court continues to deliver decisions contrary to the Constitution. It is not the Constitutional Court’s role to claim that Article 14 of the Constitution is unclear. It is the Criminal Codes and decisions of the criminal courts that clarify Article 14. The Constitutional Court is disregarding not only a clear provision of the Constitution but also the Criminal Codes and judicial decisions. Unfortunately, the decisions given by the Constitutional Court on this matter are a complete example of judicial activism.

The Court of Cassation’s decision not to implement the Constitutional Court’s finding of a violation is correct in its reasoning. Whether those who react to it have even read the Court of Cassation’s decision is a separate issue. As for the matter of filing a criminal complaint, it is a reactionary stance resulting from the substantial accumulation of attacks against the national judiciary. In a sense, it means ‘the emperor has no clothes.’ Whether this is the proper method may be debated, but its courage cannot be questioned. The Court of Cassation’s decision is also a litmus test; it makes clear who stands with the national judiciary and who does not. Türkiye will defend its national judiciary to the end against pro-Western and neo-liberal judicial approaches; let no one have any doubt about that.”

In a social media post of 4 January 2024, M.U. stated as follows:

“...After the individual application system was introduced, the Constitutional Court, contrary to the Constitution, positioned itself as if it were above the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court and committed countless violations of the law, and continues to do so. By intervening in court decisions in almost every field and exceeding its constitutional limits, the Constitutional Court has virtually become an instrument for creating legal chaos. All courts, including the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, have reached the point of rebelling against the Constitutional Court’s findings of violations, which are both unconstitutional and legally unsound. In certain individual applications with a political dimension, the Constitutional Court has not hesitated to harm Türkiye through unlawful findings of violations ...

The decision of the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation not to follow up on those findings exposes the Constitutional Court’s unlawful and arbitrary decisions, which disregard the Constitution and the retrial mechanism. Unless this arbitrariness of the Constitutional Court is curbed, these problems will continue. Through both of its decisions not to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments, the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation has put a stop to the Constitutional Court’s arbitrariness and defended the positive legal order. This is an extremely valuable legal stance. There is no ‘crisis.’ Rather, there is a ‘conflict’ produced by the Constitutional Court itself as a result of its decisions rendered in excess of its authority and contrary to the Constitution and to the retrial mechanism under the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

  1. domestic law
    1.    The Constitution

53.  The provisions of the Constitution relevant to the applicant’s status as an MP and his legal immunity read as follows:

 

Article 14

The prohibition of the abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms

“None of the rights and freedoms set out in the Constitution may be exercised in a manner intended to undermine the territorial integrity of the State and the unity of the nation or to extinguish the democratic and secular Republic founded on human rights.

None of the provisions of the Constitution may be interpreted in a manner that would enable the State or individuals to engage in activities intended to destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution or to restrict them beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution.

The penalties to be imposed on those who engage in activities that contravene these provisions shall be regulated by law.”

Article 83

Parliamentary immunity

“Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall not be liable for the votes they cast or statements they make in the course of the Assembly’s work or for the views they express in the Assembly, nor, unless the Assembly decides otherwise, at a session at which a proposal made by the Bureau is discussed, for repeating or disseminating such views outside the Assembly.

A member who is alleged to have committed an offence before or after being elected shall not be arrested, questioned, detained or tried unless the Assembly decides otherwise. This provision shall not apply where the member is caught in the course of committing an offence punishable by a heavy penalty, or, where an investigation was commenced before the member was elected, in cases under Article 14 of the Constitution. However, in such cases the appropriate authority shall notify the Turkish Grand National Assembly of the situation immediately and directly.

The implementation of a criminal sentence imposed on a member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly either before or after his or her election shall be suspended until he or she ceases to be a member; limitation does not run during a member’s term of office.

The investigation and prosecution of a re-elected member shall be subject to a fresh decision by the Assembly to lift immunity.

Political party groups in the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall not hold debates or take decisions regarding parliamentary immunity.”

Article 84

Termination of parliamentary mandate

...

The termination of a parliamentary mandate in the event of a final conviction or restriction shall take place on notification of the final court decision in the case to the Plenary [of the National Assembly].

54.  The other relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows:

 

Article 19

Personal liberty and security

“Everyone has the right to personal liberty and security.

No one may be deprived of his or her liberty except for the [following] situations, the forms and conditions [of which] are governed by law: where a penalty or security measure involving deprivation of liberty has been imposed by a court; ...

...

Everyone who is deprived of his or her liberty for any reason whatsoever shall be entitled to apply to an authorised judicial authority for a speedy decision on his or her case and for his or her immediate release if the detention is not lawful.

...”

 

Article 67

Rights to vote, to stand for election and to engage in political activity

“Citizens shall have the right to vote, to stand for election, to engage in political activities independently or as members of a political party and to take part in referendums, in accordance with the rules laid down by law.

...

The exercise of these rights shall be regulated by law.

...”

...

Article 90

Approval of international treaties

“...

International agreements duly brought into domestic law have the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court shall be made with regard to these agreements on the grounds that they are unconstitutional. In the case of a conflict between international agreements duly brought into domestic law and concerning fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws because of differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail.”

Article 148

Powers and Functions [of the Constitutional Court]

“...

Anyone claiming that a public authority has violated one of his or her fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution and secured under the European Convention on Human Rights may apply to the Constitutional Court. An application may be lodged only after all ordinary legal remedies have been exhausted.

In an individual application, no review may be carried out in respect of matters that should be examined within the scope of ordinary legal remedies.

The procedures and principles governing individual applications shall be laid down by law.

...”

Article 153

Decisions of the Constitutional Court

“The decisions of the Constitutional Court are final ...

...

Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be published immediately in the Official Gazette, and shall be binding on the legislative, executive and judicial bodies, administrative authorities, and natural and legal persons.

...”

  1.    Law no. 6216 on the establishment and rules of procedure of the Constitutional Court

55.  The relevant provisions of Law no. 6216 provide:

Section 45

“(1)  Anyone claiming that a public authority has violated one of his or her fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution and secured under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto that have been ratified by Türkiye may apply to the Constitutional Court.

(2)  An individual application may be lodged only after the exhaustion of all the administrative and judicial remedies provided for by law in relation to the measure, act or omission complained of.

...”

Section 50

“(1)  Following the examination of a case on its merits, a decision shall be given as to whether or not a right of the applicant has been violated. If a violation is found, the measures to be taken to put an end to the violation and redress its effects shall be determined. However, no review of the appropriateness of an administrative act may be carried out, and no decision amounting to an administrative act may be given.

(2)  If a violation is found which has arisen from a judicial decision, the file shall be transmitted to the relevant court for the proceedings to be reopened with a view to putting an end to the violation and redressing its effects. In cases where there is no legal interest in reopening the proceedings, the applicant may be awarded compensation or be invited to institute proceedings in the appropriate courts. The court responsible for reopening the proceedings shall decide, if possible, on the basis of the case file, with a view to putting an end to the violation found by the Constitutional Court in its decision and redressing the effects of the violation.

...”

Section 66

“(1) The [Constitutional] Court’s decisions are final. The [Constitutional] Court’s decisions shall be binding on the legislative, executive, and judicial bodies of the State, administrative authorities, and natural and legal persons.

...”

  1.    The Criminal Code (Law no. 5237)

56.  The provisions of the Criminal Code relevant to the present case read as follows:

 

Article 312 § 1

Offences against the Government

“Anyone who attempts to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Türkiye by force and violence or to prevent it, whether fully or in part, from discharging its functions shall be sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment.”

Article 39

Aiding

(1) A person who aids in the commission of an offence shall be sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen to twenty years if the offence committed requires aggravated life imprisonment, and to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment if it requires life imprisonment. In other cases, the penalty shall be reduced by one half. However, in such other cases, the sentence imposed may not exceed eight years.

(2) A person shall be held liable as an aider and abettor for an offence committed in the following circumstances:

a) Encouraging the commission of an offence, supporting the decision to commit an offence, or promising to provide assistance after the offence has been committed;

b) Giving guidance on how the offence is to be committed or providing the means used in the commission of the offence;

c) Facilitating the execution of the offence by providing assistance before or during its commission.”

  1.       domestic practice
    1.    Case-law of the Constitutional Court
      1.      Case of Kadri Enis Berberoğlu (no. 3)

57.  On 21 January 2021 in Kadri Enis Berberoğlu (no. 3), B. No. 2020/32949, the Constitutional Court assessed the consequences of a failure to implement a previous judgment it had given regarding the same applicant – an opposition MP – in which it had found a violation of that applicant’s rights to liberty and security, to stand for election and to engage in political activity under Articles 19 and 67 of the Constitution respectively (Kadri Enis Berberoğlu (no. 2), B. No. 2018/20030). Although the Constitutional Court had transmitted the file to the Istanbul Assize Court for the criminal proceedings against the applicant to be reopened and stayed, the Assize Court had refused to implement the judgment. The Constitutional Court stated that its decisions were final and binding on all judicial authorities under Article 153 of the Constitution and section 66 of Law no. 6216 (see paragraph 54 and 55 above), that its decisions were binding without exception and that lower courts had no discretion to review its decisions or to refuse to implement them. However, the Istanbul Assize Court had failed to implement its previous judgment, despite its clear obligation under section 50 of Law no. 6216 to put an end to the violation found by the Constitutional Court and to redress the effects of the violation. The Constitutional Court found that the failure to implement its previous judgment constituted a fresh violation of the applicant’s rights under Articles 19 and 67 of the Constitution.

58.  The Constitutional Court also stated that the obligation to implement its judgments flowed directly from the supremacy and binding force of the Constitution, and that permitting lower courts to disregard a judgment would make the individual application mechanism ineffective and would jeopardise legal certainty, the separation of powers, and the rule of law. The rule of law was not a matter of rhetoric. Any failure to implement the decisions of the Constitutional Court, for whatever reason, in the face of the clear provision of Article 153 of the Constitution, would amount to a grave violation of the principle of the rule of law and of the constitutional order founded upon that principle. No legal system could tolerate arbitrary decisions which, by means of various pretexts and law-defying attitudes and conduct, led to violations of individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms and to the continuation of existing violations, and which thereby amounted to defiance of the constitutional legal order. It was therefore evident that, in a State governed by the rule of law, failure to implement constitutional provisions gave rise, for those concerned, to criminal, administrative and civil liability.

59.  Subsequently, on an unspecified date, the Istanbul Assize Court reopened the criminal proceedings against the applicant and stayed them, in line with the Constitutional Court’s judgment.

  1.      Cases of Ömer Gergerlioğlu and Leyla Güven

60.  In Ömer Gergerlioğlu (B. No. 2019/10634, 1 July 2021), the Constitutional Court examined the conviction of an opposition MP for disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation contrary to section 7 § 2 of Law no. 3713, and the ensuing termination of his parliamentary mandate. The Constitutional Court found violations of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and his right to stand for election and to engage in political activity. It assessed, inter alia, the legality of Article 14 of the Constitution (see paragraph 53 above), noting that the trial court’s interpretation of that provision (by virtue of the reference in Article 83 § 2 to Article 14) had enabled the continuation of criminal proceedings. It noted that the activities which Article 14 was intended to prevent were not limited to criminal offences; the provision had a broad scope encompassing all activities carried out for certain purposes, whether or not they amounted to a criminal offence. In view of the general wording of Article 14, and in the absence of any constitutional or legal provisions clarifying the scope of the activities it covered, it was not possible for a court to interpret the exception to parliamentary immunity provided by Article 83 § 2. The Constitutional Court further held that both Articles 83 and 14 could fulfil their constitutional function only if interpreted so as to protect democracy and fundamental rights. However, not only had the domestic courts failed to take that approach, there had also been no substantive or procedural rules capable of guiding them to do so.

61.  In Leyla Güven (B. No. 2018/26689, 7 April 2022), which concerned the conviction of an opposition MP for membership of a terrorist organisation, the resulting lifting of her parliamentary immunity and her pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court found violations of her right to personal liberty and security as well as her right to stand for election and to engage in political activity. Reiterating its findings in Gergerlioğlu as regards the legality of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court held that the broadly worded and indeterminate nature of that provision, when read in conjunction with Article 83 § 2, did not satisfy the constitutional requirements of clarity and foreseeability.

  1.    Case-law of the Court of Cassation

62.  On 26 October 2022 (E. 2020/16-462, K. 2022/671) the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation examined whether the offence with which the accused was charged – aiding and abetting an armed terrorist organisation, which was later reclassified as supporting a terrorist organisation – fell within the exception to parliamentary immunity in Article 83 § 2 of the Constitution with reference to Article 14. Referring to the previous case-law of one of its criminal divisions, the Court of Cassation noted that disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation had consistently been regarded by the Court of Cassation as falling within the scope of Article 14 and thus being an exception to parliamentary immunity. Nevertheless, it then referred to the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Leyla Güven (B. No. 2018/26689 – see paragraph 61 above), in which, following Gergerlioğlu (see paragraph 60 above), the Constitutional Court had held that the exception to parliamentary immunity with reference to Article 14 lacked clarity and foreseeability. Referring to Article 153 of the Constitution (see paragraph 54 above), the plenary criminal divisions stated that it was indisputable that the Constitutional Court judgments – including those delivered in individual applications – were binding and gave guidance for future decision-making. The plenary criminal divisions therefore quashed the conviction on the ground that the lower court had failed to deal with the applicant’s application for the suspension of the proceedings on account of his parliamentary immunity.

63.  On 4 April 2023 (E.2023/3102, K.2023/966), the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation examined a prosecution for offences allegedly committed before the accused’s election as an MP. In line with its previous decisions (E.2021/7929, K.2021/9940, 4 November 2021; E. 2022/7608, K.2022/6526, 11 October 2022; and E. 2022/1232, K. 2022/8359, 22 November 2022), it acknowledged the binding nature of Constitutional Court judgments under Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution and referred to the Court’s recognition that the implementation of such judgments should not, in principle, be called into question in Türkiye. Decisions on individual applications given by the Constitutional Court during pending criminal proceedings may create a conflict of jurisdiction; however, findings of violations of fundamental rights could not be disregarded by trial courts, particularly where violations are grounds for retrial. Emphasising the importance of making restitution for violations of fundamental rights and the principle of the unity of the legal order, the Court of Cassation concluded that the scope of the phrase “situations referred to in Article 14” in Article 83 § 2 must be interpreted and determined in line with the Constitutional Court’s binding case-law.

64.  In a decision of 22 December 2016 (E.2016/19574, K.2016/16369), the Second Civil Division of the Court of Cassation held that where the Constitutional Court has found a violation arising from a judicial decision and has ordered the reopening of proceedings so that the violation and its consequences can be remedied, the lower courts had no discretion to decide otherwise. If the direction to reopen the proceedings was not implemented, that would result in further findings of violations. Emphasising that an individual application was a subsidiary action and it was the primary responsibility of ordinary courts to remedy violations of rights protected under the Constitution and the Convention, the Court of Cassation concluded that such decisions must be taken into account in pending proceedings and that, in order to avoid a further violation, the disputed judgment should be quashed.

  1.     Council of europe materials
    1.    Commissioner for Human Rights

65.  Following her visit to Türkiye between 1 and 5 July 2019, the then Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe published a report on 19 February 2020 (CommDH(2020)1). In it, she raised concerns about structural deficiencies in the judicial system which affected the independence of the judiciary. She observed that the composition of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors allowed all its members to be appointed by the President or Parliament, without safeguards ensuring pluralism or election by other judges, contrary to European standards. She further noted reports of arbitrary transfers of judges who had made rights-based decisions, the appointment of judges with known biases to politically sensitive cases, and case allocation practices suggesting interference, all of which reinforced concerns about the vulnerability of the judiciary to political influence. The Commissioner also emphasised that public statements by members of the executive and legislature criticising the courts and commenting on ongoing cases, often in disregard of the presumption of innocence, were liable to undermine judicial independence and to influence judicial decision-making. In this context, she referred to the Court’s judgments in Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) ([GC], no. 14305/17, 22 December 2020) and Kavala v. Turkey (no. 28749/18, 10 December 2019), in which it held that statements by high-ranking officials could corroborate allegations that orders for detention had been made for an ulterior purpose.

The Commissioner further stated that serious concerns had been raised about the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court individual application mechanism, particularly in sensitive detention cases. She noted that the failure of the lower courts to implement Constitutional Court judgments – most notably in the case of Mehmet Altan, who had remained in detention for some months despite the finding of a violation – had led the Court to question the effectiveness of the individual application to the Constitutional Court as a remedy. She further observed that prosecutors and lower court judges had continued to disregard the Constitutional Court’s clear case-law without facing any consequences. In her view, the lower courts’ resistance undermined the binding force of the Constitutional Court’s judgments and weakened the effectiveness of the individual application system within the constitutional order.

As regards the situation of human-rights defenders, the Commissioner stated that in Kavala, cited above, the Court had found for the first time that criminal proceedings against a human-rights defender had been pursued for an ulterior purpose, namely, not only to silence the applicant but also to discourage the work of human-rights defenders in general, and that the prosecution had relied on entirely lawful and legitimate activities. She further considered that the same concerns applied to Kavala’s co-defendants in the Gezi trial. She concluded that judicial proceedings conducted so as to target civil society actors formed part of a sustained and concerted pressure on human-rights defenders, aimed at silencing them and preventing them from reporting on ongoing human rights violations, and that those judicial actions had produced a palpable chilling effect in Türkiye.

66.  On 5 March 2024 the Commissioner for Human Rights published a memorandum on freedom of expression and of the media, human-rights defenders and civil society in Türkiye (CommHR(2024)16). The relevant parts of the memorandum read as follows (footnotes omitted):

“51. Consistent reports received by the Commissioner confirm strong partiality of the judiciary to political interests and a systemic lack of independence of the Turkish judiciary. In this connection, the Commissioner notes that in 2022, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) concluded as regard judges and prosecutors that “the current level of compliance with the recommendations remained globally unsatisfactory”. GRECO also noted that “[...] the executive has kept a strong hold over a number of key areas regarding the running of the judiciary, including: the process of selecting and recruiting candidate judges and prosecutors; reassignments of judicial officeholders against their will; disciplinary procedures; and training of judges and prosecutors.

52. In the same vein, in its resolution from 2023, the PACE called on the authorities to urgently improve the legal framework and conditions for respecting the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, the protection of human rights and compliance with the Court’s judgments within Türkiye, so that judges can act in accordance with their constitutional roles secure in the knowledge that their independence cannot be interfered with; that judges and prosecutors are not enabled or do not feel encouraged to misuse the law for ulterior motives; and to ensure that systemic failures are addressed, including through urgent reform of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, using the relevant expertise of the Council of Europe.

...

54. The Commissioner remains concerned about the resistance of Turkish courts to implement the case-law of the Constitutional Court. This problem has been compounded by repeated verbal attacks on the Constitutional Court by public officials. The President of the Republic recently publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with the recent rulings of the Constitutional Court on Article 9 of the Internet Law (No. 5651) and in the case of opposition MP Can Atalay, calling them “incomprehensible” and “unsettling”. This situation has been compounded by the refusal of the Court of Cassation to implement the latter judgement and by its request for the opening of a criminal investigation into the judges of the Constitutional Court who voted in favour of the judgment. The Commissioner considers this recent example of the systemic problem of non-implementation of the judgments of the Constitutional Court seriously damaging for the rule of law and public trust in the justice system and constitutional order.

...

56. The Commissioner considers that this situation represents a serious setback for the Turkish constitutional order and the rule of law and undermines the effectiveness of the Turkish Constitutional Court as a remedy for human rights violation in Türkiye, an issue she raised in her 2020 report...

57. The Commissioner considers that the findings of her 2020 report continue to be relevant today and reiterates that the situation regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary currently poses an existential risk to the rule of law in Türkiye and, by extension, to the respect for all human rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights. Numerous criminal investigations, proceedings, detentions, and sentences faced by Turkish human rights defenders and journalists point to a widespread pattern of misuse of the judicial process to silence human rights defenders and discourage civil society activism, as recognised explicitly by the Court.

58. In conclusion, to bring about meaningful change, it is essential for the Turkish authorities to engage constructively with civil society, review and revise restrictive laws, free human rights defenders, journalists, activists and others who are imprisoned for exercising their freedom of expression, respect and implement the judgements of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights and ensure impartiality and independence of the judiciary. Strengthening human rights protections, promoting dialogue and inclusivity, and fostering a culture of respect for diverse opinions are crucial steps towards enhancing human rights in Türkiye. It is the Commissioner’s sincere hope that the willingness to undertake the process to reverse the currently critical situation will materialise soon.”

67.  On 9 December 2025 the Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement following his visit to Türkiye between 1 and 5 December 2025. The relevant part of the statement reads as follows:

“...the Commissioner is concerned by the non-execution of key Constitutional Court judgments, including the Can Atalay and Tayfun Kahraman cases. He notes that the refusal of lower courts to implement Constitutional Court decisions undermines the rule of law and the principle of legal certainty.”

  1.    Venice Commission

68.  In 2017 the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) adopted its opinion on draft legislation to amend the Turkish Constitution, entailing a transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential one (CDL-AD(2017)005, Turkey - Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 2017, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 110th Plenary Session (Venice, 10‑11 March 2017)). The relevant part of the opinion reads as follows (footnotes omitted):

“119.  The Commission finds that the proposed composition of the CJP [Council of Judges and Prosecutors] is extremely problematic. Almost half of its members (4 2=6 out of 13) will be appointed by the President. It is important to stress once again in this respect that the President will no more be a pouvoir neutre, but will be engaged in party politics: his choice of the members of the CJP will not have to be politically neutral. The remaining 7 members would be appointed by the Grand National Assembly. If the party of the President has a three-fifths majority in the Assembly, it will be able to fill all positions in the Council. If it has, as is almost guaranteed under the system of simultaneous elections, at least two-fifths of the seats, it will be able to obtain several seats, forming a majority together with the presidential appointees. That would place the independence of the judiciary in serious jeopardy, because the CJP is the main self-governing body overseeing appointment, promotion, transfer, disciplining and dismissal of judges and public prosecutors. Getting control over this body thus means getting control over judges and public prosecutors, especially in a country where the dismissal of judges has become frequent and where transfers of judges are a common practice.

...”

These findings were reiterated by the Venice Commission in its opinion on the composition of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the procedure for the election of its members (CDL-AD(2024)041, Türkiye - Opinion on the composition of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the procedure for the election of its members, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 141st Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 December 2024)), which, in so far as relevant, states as follows (footnotes omitted):

“This evident objective politicisation of the CJP entails a strong lack of public trust in the judiciary and the climate of fear and submission reported among judges and prosecutors witnessing what is perceived to be strategic dismissal, transfer or promotion of their colleagues.

...”

69.  The relevant parts of the Updated Rule of Law Checklist (CDL-AD(2025)002) of the Venice Commission, adopted at its 145th plenary session on 12 and 13 December 2025, read as follows:

“149. The publication of constitutional court decisions should not be dependent on any intervention by the Prime Minister, the government or any other political body. Decisions of the Constitutional Court on the merits of a case must be binding on all public authorities, including state and local self-government bodies, their officials, as well as natural and legal persons, and implemented in good faith. Failure to execute such decisions constitutes a violation of the supremacy of the constitution. When other state authorities adopt new individual acts, they must take into account the legal reasoning set out in the Constitutional Court’s decisions...

...

151. Many national constitutions contain an obligation to respect international and supranational law. In those cases, national constitutional courts act not only as guardians of the national constitutional principles, but also as guardians of international and supranational law within the national legal order. In the European continent, many constitutional courts are required to implement human rights and other constitutional principles as protected by the ECHR as interpreted by the decisions of the ECtHR.”

THE LAW

  1.         ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

70.  The applicant complained that his continued detention following conviction, despite his election as an MP and the Constitutional Court’s findings of a violation of his right to liberty and security, was not lawful and amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. In that connection, he argued that the Court of Cassation had unlawfully interpreted Articles 14 and 83 of the Constitution (see paragraph 53 above), which could only be interpreted by the Constitutional Court, and that it had rejected his applications for release, disregarding his parliamentary immunity.

The applicant relied on Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention.

71.  The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 110-26, 20 March 2018) considers that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined only under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(a)  the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;

...”

  1.    Admissibility

72.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention was inadmissible. In that respect, they relied on their submissions with regard to the merits of that complaint (see paragraph 77 below).

73.  The applicant contested that argument.

74.  The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint regarding the lawfulness of his continued detention raises complex issues of fact and law, which cannot be determined without an examination of the merits of his case. It moreover finds that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

  1.    Merits
    1.      The parties’ submissions

75.  The applicant maintained that following his election as an MP (see paragraph 12 above), the Court of Cassation had failed to release him and to stay the criminal proceedings against him, although it should have done so in line with Article 83 of the Constitution. Moreover, the Court of Cassation had persisted with its failure to release him following the Constitutional Court’s findings of a violation of his rights and orders for his release, as well as the reopening and stay of the criminal proceedings against him. As a result of the unlawful and politically motivated decisions of the Court of Cassation, he remained in detention. His continued detention despite the Constitutional Court’s findings of a violation of his right to liberty and security was therefore unlawful and arbitrary.

76.  The applicant specified that the present application pertained solely to his continued detention following his election as an MP despite the Constitutional Court’s judgments ordering his release, and not to the criminal proceedings immediately before his election which resulted in his conviction.

77.  The Government pointed out that the applicant had been convicted and was being held in detention having been sentenced by the Istanbul Assize Court to eighteen years’ imprisonment (see paragraphs 8-9 above), and that the conviction and sentence had been upheld by the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 25 above). Although the Constitutional Court had decided that the criminal proceedings against the applicant should be reopened, in Turkish law the proceedings could only be reopened if the application to reopen them was approved by the court concerned. In the present case, the Court of Cassation had not granted that approval, and the applicant’s conviction remained in place. The Government concluded therefore that the applicant’s continued detention was lawful and did not raise an issue under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention.

  1.      The Court’s assessment
    1.    Scope of the case

78.  Given that the applicant specifically stated that the present case only concerned his continued detention following his election as an MP and the failure to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments in his favour (see paragraph 76 above; compare and contrast Kavala v. Türkiye (no. 2) [GC], no. 2170/24, § 227, 25 August 2026), the Court will confine its examination of the complaint under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention to that matter. It will therefore not deal with the question of whether or not the Istanbul Assize Court’s order to detain the applicant following his conviction of aiding an attempt to overthrow the government or to prevent it from performing its functions under Article 312 of the Criminal Code was lawful (see paragraph 9 above; contrast Kavala (no. 2), cited above, §§ 241-48).

  1.    General principles

79.  Article 5 of the Convention is, together with Articles 2, 3 and 4, in the first rank of the fundamental rights that protect the physical security of the individual, and as such its importance is paramount. Its key purpose is to prevent arbitrary or unjustified deprivations of liberty (see Denis and Irvine v. Belgium [GC], nos. 62819/17 and 63921/17, § 123, 1 June 2021, with further references).

80.  Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds for the deprivation of liberty, and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds. Only a narrow interpretation of the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for deprivation of liberty is consistent with the aim of Article 5, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty (ibid., § 124).

81.  The word “after” in sub-paragraph (a) does not simply mean that the detention must follow the “conviction” in point of time: in addition, the “detention” must result from, “follow and depend upon” or occur “by virtue of” the “conviction”. In short, there must be a sufficient causal connection between the two. However, with the passage of time the link between the initial conviction and the extension of the deprivation of liberty will gradually become less strong. The causal link required under sub-paragraph (a) might eventually be broken if a position were reached in which a decision not to release a person, or to re-detain a person, was based on grounds that were inconsistent with the objectives of the sentencing court, or on an assessment that was unreasonable in terms of those objectives. Where that was the case a detention that was lawful at the outset would be transformed into a deprivation of liberty that was arbitrary and therefore incompatible with Article 5 (see Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09, § 124, ECHR 2013).

82.  Any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1, be “lawful”. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question of whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to domestic law, but also, where appropriate, to other relevant legal standards, including those which have their source in international law (see Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 79, ECHR 2010, and Toniolo v. San Marino and Italy, no. 44853/10, § 44, 26 June 2012). In all cases, the Convention establishes an obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of the laws concerned, but also requires that any deprivation of liberty is compatible with the purpose of Article 5, namely, to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see Medvedyev and Others, cited above, § 79).

83.  The Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty is satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic and/or international law are clearly defined and that the law itself is foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law is sufficiently precise to avoid any risk of arbitrariness and to allow the citizen – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances of the case, the consequences which a given action may entail (see, among other authorities, Medvedyev and Others, cited above, § 80, with further references).

  1.    Application of those principles to the present case

84.  In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was deprived of his liberty after conviction by a competent court, namely, after the Istanbul Assize Court’s judgment of 25 April 2022, in which that court convicted him of aiding an attempt to overthrow the government or to prevent it from performing its functions under Articles 39 and 312 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to eighteen years’ imprisonment (see paragraphs 8-9 above). His detention was therefore explicitly covered by Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention (see Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, § 55, 24 January 2017). As noted above, for the purposes of the present case, the Court will not deal with whether the applicant’s detention was lawful at the outset, but will establish whether his continued detention following his election as an MP on 14 May 2023 (see paragraph 12 above) was lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention (see paragraph 78 above).

85.  The Court observes that following his election, the applicant requested the recognition of his parliamentary immunity and to be released, with reference to the Constitutional Court’s case-law on the matter and the Court of Cassation’s previous decisions regarding the binding nature of the Constitutional Court’s decisions (see paragraph 13 above). On 13 July 2023 the Court of Cassation rejected that request. It found that the applicant’s situation fell within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, which provided an exception to parliamentary immunity by virtue of Article 83 § 2 (see paragraph 53 above), and that the Constitutional Court’s previous finding that Article 14 was not foreseeable could not be followed as that court could not decide an individual application so as to render a constitutional provision unenforceable. The Court of Cassation therefore concluded that the applicant was not entitled to parliamentary immunity and that the Assize Court’s decision regarding his conviction remained valid (see paragraphs 14‑17 above). On 28 September 2023 the Court of Cassation upheld the Assize Court’s decision and finalised the applicant’s conviction (see paragraphs 20 and 25 above).

86.  The Constitutional Court heard the individual application made by the applicant following the Court of Cassation’s decision of 13 July 2023 and reiterated its findings from previous cases raising a similar issue (see paragraphs 60-61 above). Once again, it found that Article 14 of the Constitution was not foreseeable. It held that the applicant’s continued detention following his election as an MP was not prescribed by law and was in violation of his right to liberty and security (see paragraphs 26-29 above). Although the initial reason for his detention had been a sentence pronounced after conviction, given that he had subsequently been elected as an MP and should have benefited from parliamentary immunity, the connection between his conviction and his deprivation of liberty had been severed. The Constitutional Court concluded that there was therefore no legal basis for the applicant’s continued detention (see paragraph 28 above). The Court finds that this conclusion amounts in substance to an acknowledgment that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty was in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (compare Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, no. 13237/17, § 129, 20 March 2018, and Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, no. 16538/17, § 108, 20 March 2018).

87.  Although the Constitutional Court ordered that the applicant must be released and the criminal proceedings reopened and stayed in order to provide redress for the violation of his right to liberty and security (see paragraph 29 above), the Court of Cassation refused to implement that judgment, for the same reasons it had given in its decision of 13 July 2023. It found that the Constitutional Court had exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction by acting as a fourth-instance court, and went so far as to file a criminal complaint against the Constitutional Court judges who had voted in favour of finding a violation of the applicant’s rights (see paragraphs 32-34 above). The Constitutional Court’s finding of a violation of the applicant’s right to liberty and security in the second individual application and its repeated order for the applicant’s release and the reopening and suspension of the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 37-39 above) were equally not implemented by the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 42 above).

88.  The Court notes that in persistently refusing to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments, as well as in its press statement of 10 November 2023 (see paragraph 35 above), the Court of Cassation emphasised that there was no hierarchy among the superior courts in the Turkish legal system and that the Constitutional Court had no power to impose its own interpretation of legal provisions on appellate courts. In that connection, the Court observes that in a previous decision the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 62 above), as well as the Third Criminal and Second Civil Divisions in other decisions (see paragraphs 63-64 above), reached a completely different conclusion from that in the present case, both as regards whether the Constitutional Court decisions (including those made on individual applications) were binding and as regards the weight to be given to the Constitutional Court’s case-law on the interpretation of Articles 14 and 83 of the Constitution. The Court notes, however, that although the applicant had referred to the plenary criminal divisions’ decision in his initial request for release following his election (see paragraph 13 above) and all of those decisions had been referred to in the Constitutional Court’s decision of 21 December 2023 (see paragraph 39 above), the Court of Cassation did not make any reference to them. It therefore failed to clarify why it had departed from the principles previously set out by the plenary criminal divisions, which it had followed in its earlier decisions.

89.  The Court notes that the Government did not address the discrepancy between the superior courts’ interpretation of the constitutional provisions concerned and of the effect of the Constitutional Court decisions, and simply maintained that the applicant’s continued detention was lawful, as his conviction remained valid unless the Court of Cassation approved the Constitutional Court’s judgment that the proceedings should be reopened (see paragraph 77 above). The Court finds it difficult to follow that reasoning, which presupposes that the Constitutional Court’s decisions as to the remedy for the violations it had found would be subject to an approval by the courts concerned. This is not in keeping with either the Court’s case-law regarding the effects of the decisions delivered by the Constitutional Court (see Uzun v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 66-67, no. 10755/13, 30 April 2013, and Koçintar v. Turkey (dec.), no. 77429/12, §§ 40-44, 1 July 2014) or the Government’s observations in previous cases before the Court (see Mehmet Hasan Altan, cited above, § 136, and Şahin Alpay, cited above, § 115). Nor is it consistent with the Court of Cassation’s own case-law, referred to above (see paragraphs 62-64 above).

90.  The Court notes that, by virtue of Articles 148 and 153 of the Constitution and sections 45 and 66 of Law no. 6216 (see paragraphs 54-55 above), the Constitutional Court is the supreme judicial authority competent to give a binding interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of individual rights, such as the right to liberty and personal integrity (see Mehmet Hasan Altan, cited above, § 139, and compare Nasrulloyev v. Russia, no. 656/06, § 74, 11 October 2007). It conducts proceedings in a different legal context from that of the ordinary courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], nos. 10211/12 and 27505/14, § 270, 4 December 2018, and Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), no. 13609/20, § 153, 8 July 2025). In that regard, the Court has previously found that the Turkish legislature had demonstrated its intention to give the Constitutional Court jurisdiction to find violations of Convention provisions and appropriate powers to provide redress for those violations (see Uzun, cited above, § 64). In Uzun (cited above, § 66), and, with regard to complaints under Article 5 of the Convention, in Koçintar (cited above, § 43), the Court took account of Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution which provides that decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, administrative authorities, and natural and legal persons. It concluded that, in principle, no issues regarding the implementation of Constitutional Court judgments should arise in Türkiye (ibid.).

91.  In Mehmet Hasan Altan and Şahin Alpay (both cited above, § 139 and § 118, respectively) – both of which concerned the courts’ failures to release the applicants from pre-trial detention following the Constitutional Court’s findings of violations of their right to liberty and security – the Court found that the reasons given by the trial courts for rejecting the applicants’ release, following a “final” and “binding” judgment delivered by the supreme constitutional judicial authority, could not satisfy the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. It concluded that for another court to call into question the powers conferred on a constitutional court to give final and binding judgments on individual applications ran counter to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and legal certainty (see also Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 132), which were inherent in the protection afforded by Article 5 of the Convention and were the cornerstones of the guarantees against arbitrariness (for the relevant principles, see paragraphs 82-83 above).

92.  In that connection, the Court also reiterates that detention based on provisions which have been interpreted by the domestic authorities in an inconsistent and mutually exclusive manner would not have adequate safeguards against arbitrariness. Such provisions would not be either precise or foreseeable in their application and would fall short of the “quality of law” standard required under the Convention (compare Jėčius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 59, ECHR 2000-IX, and Nasrulloyev, cited above, § 77). The Court considers that – as pointed out by the dissenting judge at the Fourth Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 19 above) – as a result of the discrepancy between the superior courts’ interpretations of the legal provisions on which the applicant’s continued detention following his election was based, a question of foreseeability also arises in the present case. That question of foreseeability is further exacerbated by the discrepancy in the Court of Cassation’s own case-law (see paragraph 88 above), which resulted from the Third Criminal Division’s departure from the principles set out by the plenary criminal divisions to ensure consistency in case-law (contrast Beian v. Romania (no. 1), no. 30658/05, § 35, ECHR 2007-V (extracts)) and which was contrary to the principle of legal certainty (ibid., §§ 37-39).

93.  In view of the above, in particular the power of the Constitutional Court to review the lawfulness of detention (see paragraph 90 above) and its consistent interpretation of the lack of foreseeability of the legal provisions at issue (see paragraph 86 above), the Court sees no reason to depart from that court’s conclusions with regard to the unlawfulness of the applicant’s continued detention (compare Mehmet Hasan Altan, cited above, § 129, and Şahin Alpay, cited above, § 108).

94.  However, as noted above, following the Constitutional Court’s finding in two separate judgments that the applicant’s right to liberty and security had been violated – which has already been found by the Court to constitute an acknowledgement of a violation of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention (see paragraph 86 above) – the Court of Cassation refused to implement those judgments and to release the applicant. The violation found by the Constitutional Court was therefore not remedied (compare Mehmet Hasan Altan, cited above, § 139, and Şahin Alpay, cited above, § 118).

95.  Consequently, the Court finds that the applicant’s continued detention following his election as an MP – despite the Constitutional Court’s clear and unambiguous findings that this was in violation of Article 19 of the Constitution ­– was not “lawful” or “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” as required by the right to liberty and security (ibid.).

96.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

  1.       ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

97.  The applicant complained about the authorities’ failure to implement the Constitutional Court judgments in his favour. He argued that the decisions of the Istanbul Assize Court and the Court of Cassation declining to implement the Constitutional Court’s orders had demonstrated that an application to the Constitutional Court could no longer be considered an effective remedy. In that respect he relied on Articles 5 § 4 and 6 § 1 of the Convention.

98.  The Court reiterates that, in matters of deprivation of liberty, Article 5 § 4 lays down specific procedural guarantees which are distinct from those enshrined in Article 6 § 1. Even assuming that Article 6 § 1 is applicable under its civil limb, Article 5 § 4 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to that provision (see Manzano Diaz v. Belgium, no. 26402/17, § 26, 18 May 2021, with further references). Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, §§ 110-26), the Court holds that the applicant’s complaint should be examined only under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“4.  Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

  1.    Admissibility

99.  The Government referred to the Court’s case-law and argued that when detention was the result of a judgment delivered at the end of court proceedings – as was the case in the present application – no further review within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention was required. This was because the judgment already involved a review of the legality of the detention. They therefore considered that the complaint was inadmissible.

100.  The applicant argued that Article 5 § 4 was applicable to his case.

101.  The Court notes that while they relied on the case-law of the Court, the Government did not clearly raise any objection as regards the applicability of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in the present case. It finds, however, that the question concerns compatibility ratione materiae of the complaint which goes to the Court’s jurisdiction and which it must examine of its own motion (see, mutatis mutandis, Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, § 71, 13 December 2016).

102.  The Court reiterates that, as pointed out by the Government, Article 5 § 4 would in principle be redundant with respect to detention under Article 5 § 1 (a), since judicial control of the deprivation of liberty has already been incorporated into the original conviction and sentence (see, among others, Stoichkov v. Bulgaria, no. 9808/02, § 64, 24 March 2005; Gavril Yosifov v. Bulgaria, no. 74012/01, § 57, 6 November 2008; and Etute v. Luxembourg, no. 18233/16, § 25, 30 January 2018). However, whenever fresh issues affecting the lawfulness of such detention arise, Article 5 § 4 comes back into play (see Stoichkov, cited above, § 65). The Court has found that Article 5 § 4 was applicable even after a conviction when the legality of the detention depended on factors which were not incorporated in the original conviction and sentence (ibid., with further references; see also, Gavril Yosifov, cited above, § 59; Ivan Todorov v. Bulgaria, no. 71545/11, § 61, 19 January 2017; and Etute, cited above, § 33).

103.  In the present case, the applicant’s detention was indeed the result of his conviction in the Istanbul Assize Court for aiding an attempt to overthrow the government or to prevent it from performing its functions and his sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment (see paragraphs 8-9 and 84 above). As discussed above, following his conviction at first instance and while the proceedings were still pending appeal before the Court of Cassation, the applicant was elected as an MP in the parliamentary elections and then lodged a request with the Court of Cassation for recognition that he had the benefit of parliamentary immunity under Article 83 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 12-13 above). After the Court of Cassation had dismissed his applications for release and the suspension of the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 14-19 above), he lodged individual applications with the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 24 and 36 above). The Court observes that both the applicant’s request to the Court of Cassation and his subsequent individual applications to the Constitutional Court were only concerned with the lawfulness of his continued detention following his election as an MP and the question of whether he would benefit from parliamentary immunity. These issues were independent of and distinct from the issues dealt with by the Istanbul Assize Court when it ordered the applicant’s conviction and detention and, in any event, could not have been examined at that stage as the Assize Court’s judgment preceded the applicant’s election.

104.  It follows that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention is applicable in the present case, as the applicant was entitled to have the specific legal issue of his continued detention following his election resolved by a court which met the requirements of that provision (compare Stoichkov, cited above, § 66).

105.  The Court finds that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

  1.    Merits
    1.      The parties’ submissions

106.  The applicant submitted that both Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution and section 66 of Law no. 6216 provided that the Constitutional Court decisions were binding (see paragraphs 54-55 above). Moreover, the Court had previously concluded that an individual application to the Constitutional Court constituted an effective remedy. Nevertheless, by declining to implement those judgments, the Istanbul Assize Court and the Court of Cassation had rendered that remedy ineffective. He referred to the relevant case-law of the Court and argued that failures on the part of the judicial authorities to implement Constitutional Court judgments increased the doubts about the effectiveness of the remedy directed by that court. The Court had previously found such doubts to be serious.

107.  The Government submitted that, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, the introduction of the individual application mechanism to the Constitutional Court had marked a turning point in the protection of fundamental rights and has proved effective in practice, as demonstrated by the statistics on the number of decisions delivered by that court. They noted that the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court were two superior courts, the jurisdiction and functioning of which were regulated separately and which did not have a hierarchical relationship. Moreover, under the Constitution, judges were independent in the discharge of their functions and no body or authority could direct them how to exercise their judicial authority. As the individual application system was relatively new, it might give rise to complex issues of legal interpretation, as was the situation in the present case. According to the Government, the difference in the two superior courts’ interpretation of legal provisions, in particular Articles 14 and 83 of the Constitution, was legally defensible and reasonable and should be perceived as a means to develop case-law, which, in turn would contribute to the strengthening of the protection of fundamental rights. In the present case, the applicant had been able to challenge his continued detention in the two superior courts, which had examined his case in detail, providing sufficient reasons for their decisions. There had therefore been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

  1.      The Court’s assessment
    1.    General principles

108.  The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4 entitles detained persons to institute proceedings for a review of compliance with the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in Convention terms, of their deprivation of liberty. The notion of “lawfulness” under paragraph 4 of Article 5 has the same meaning as in paragraph 1, such that a detained person is entitled to a review of the “lawfulness” of his detention in the light not only of the requirements of domestic law but also of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 § 1. Article 5 § 4 does not guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to empower the court, on all aspects of the case including questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the “lawful” detention of a person according to Article 5 § 1 (see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 128, 15 December 2016).

109.  The reviewing “court” must not have merely advisory functions but must have the competence to “decide” the “lawfulness” of the detention and to order release if the detention is unlawful (ibid., with further references).

110.  By virtue of Article 5 § 4, a detainee is entitled to apply to a “court” which has jurisdiction to decide “speedily” whether or not his deprivation of liberty has become “unlawful” in the light of new factors which have emerged subsequently to the initial decision depriving him or her of his or her liberty (see Azimov v. Russia, no. 67474/11, § 152, 18 April 2013).

111.  Article 5 § 4 does not compel the Contracting Parties to set up more than one level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention and for hearing applications for release. Nevertheless, a State which offers a second level of jurisdiction must in principle accord to the detainees the same guarantees on appeal as at first instance, including as regards the speediness of the review by the appellate body of a detention order imposed by a lower court. The same applies to constitutional courts which decide on the legality of detention and order the release of the person concerned if the detention is not lawful (see Ilnseher, cited above, § 254, with further references).

112.  The existence of the remedy must be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which it will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Khlaifia and Others, cited above, § 130).

  1.     Application of those principles to the present case

113.  The Court has already recognised that the Constitutional Court is the supreme judicial authority with power to give a binding interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of individual rights (see paragraph 90 above). The Court has also observed that when the Constitutional Court gives a remedy for a violation, it should be able, if necessary, to prohibit the authority concerned from continuing to breach the right in question and to order it to restore, as far as possible, the previous situation (status quo ante) (see Uzun, cited above, §§ 63-64). With regard to complaints under Article 5 of the Convention, the Court has noted that where the Constitutional Court finds a violation of the right to liberty and security and the applicant remains in detention, it should transmit its judgment to the court concerned to take “the necessary action”. It has also considered that an individual application to the Constitutional Court is, in principle, capable of leading to the release of the detained person (see Koçintar, cited above, §§ 42-43).

114.  In sum, the Court finds that in its examination of the compliance of a detention with the fundamental right to liberty and security, the Constitutional Court reviews, as do the lower courts, the lawfulness of a complainant’s detention and has jurisdiction to order the release of the detained person if it concludes that the detention is unlawful (compare Ilnseher, cited above, § 270; also see Articles 148 and 153 of the Constitution and sections 45 and 50 of Law no. 6216, cited in paragraphs 54-55 above).

115.  In the present case, the Constitutional Court examined the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention in the applicant’s first and second individual applications in the light of a new factor which emerged after the Istanbul Assize Court’s decision to detain the applicant, namely, his election as an MP. As found above (see paragraph 86 above), the Constitutional Court carried out that examination in line with its case-law on parliamentary immunity (and the exceptions to it). It concluded that the applicant’s continued detention following his election was not lawful and that it constituted a violation of his right to liberty and security (see paragraphs 28 and 37 above).

116.  The Court has already endorsed that conclusion (see paragraph 93 above), which constitutes an acknowledgement of a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 86 above). It considers that no question arises either as to the Constitutional Court’s power to review the lawfulness of the disputed detention both under national law and from the standpoint of the Convention or as to the quality of that review in the applicant’s case. Moreover, in both the first and second individual applications, the Constitutional Court carried out its review in compliance with the requirement of “speediness” imposed by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, that is, within a period of three months (see paragraphs 24 and 26 above) and one month (see paragraphs 36-37 above) respectively (compare and contrast Kavala (no. 2), cited above, §§ 122-25 and 127).

117.  In both individual applications, after finding a violation of the applicant’s right to liberty and security, the Constitutional Court ordered his release, as well as the reopening and suspension of the criminal proceedings against him, in order to provide redress for the violation found. However, instead of complying with the Constitutional Court’s judgments, the Assize Court – to which the file was transmitted – went on to transfer the file to the Court of Cassation, which it considered to be the court competent to deal with the matter despite the clear reference to the Assize Court in the Constitutional Court’s decision (see paragraphs 29, 31, 39 and 41 above). The Court of Cassation declined to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments, concluding that the applicant’s detention fell within the scope of the exceptions to parliamentary immunity in Articles 83 § 2 and 14 of the Constitution, and that the Constitutional Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by finding that Article 14 was not foreseeable (see paragraphs 34 and 42 above).

118.  The Government argued that Turkish law did not provide for a hierarchy between the superior courts. They submitted that the fact that two superior courts had come to conflicting conclusions did not necessarily result in an issue under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as the applicant had been given an opportunity to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed by those courts (see paragraph 107 above). The Court finds however that those submissions fail to take account not only of the legally binding nature of the Constitutional Court’s judgments as provided by Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution and section 66 of Law no. 6216 (see paragraphs 54-55 above), but also of the ultimate purpose of the review foreseen by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, namely, to have an applicant’s release ordered when detention has been found to be unlawful (see Khlaifia and Others, cited above, § 128).

119.  In that regard, the Court refers back to its above-mentioned case-law regarding the effects of the Constitutional Court’s decisions in the context of the individual application mechanism (see paragraph 113 above). It notes that, despite the binding force of Constitutional Court judgments and that court’s power to order the release of the detained person if it concludes that a detention is unlawful, both the Assize Court and the Court of Cassation declined to implement its judgments in the applicant’s individual applications. As a result, the applicant remained in detention despite the Constitutional Court’s findings of a violation of his right to liberty and security and its orders for his release. The Court observes that this continues to be the case at the date of the present judgment, that is, approximately three years after the Constitutional Court delivered its first judgment in the applicant’s case on 25 October 2023 (see paragraph 26 above).

120.  In view of the above, the Court finds that, as a result of the failure to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments, the Turkish legal system failed to provide the applicant with a review of the lawfulness of his detention which could have led to his release as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The Court emphasises that this conclusion is without prejudice to the nature and the quality of the review carried out by the Constitutional Court, which it has endorsed (see paragraph 116 above). It is also strictly limited to the particular circumstances of the present case and must not be interpreted as calling into question, in general, the effectiveness of an individual application to the Constitutional Court within the domestic legal system (compare Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 128).

121.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

122.  In so far as the applicant argued that the remedy of an individual application to the Constitutional Court could no longer be considered effective (see paragraph 106 above), the Court has recently found in Kavala (no. 2) (cited above, § 130) that the deliberate non-implementation of the Constitutional Court’s judgments is liable to undermine the rule of law and the effectiveness of the individual appeal to that court in cases concerning human rights. As demonstrated by the non-implementation of the Constitutional Court’s judgments in the present case this situation does not result from intrinsic shortcomings relating to the functioning of the Constitutional Court or to its ability to find violations, but instead sheds light on a serious difficulty arising from the attitude of certain lower courts with regard to the binding force of that court’s judgments (ibid.). In that regard, as also noted in Kavala (no. 2) (cited above, § 131), the Court takes note of the Constitutional Court’s analysis that the non-implementation of its decisions was likely not only to undermine individual and societal confidence in the rule of law, but also to compromise the constitutional order (see paragraph 38 above) and the Commissioner for Human Rights’ finding that such a situation represents serious rule-of-law backsliding and weakens the effectiveness of the individual application in cases that concern human rights (see paragraphs 65-67 above).

123.  The Court reiterates that, since the Constitutional Court is the cornerstone of the national system for protecting the rights and freedoms enshrined in both the Constitution and the Convention, full compliance with that court’s binding judgments is essential (see Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 132). As noted in paragraph 91 above, for another domestic court to call into question the powers conferred on a constitutional court to deliver final and binding judgments on individual applications runs counter to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and legal certainty (see Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 132, with further references). The failure to enforce the Constitutional Court’s rulings is likely not only to compromise that court’s authority, but also to undermine, more generally, the judicial protection of fundamental rights (ibid.). This being said, for the purposes of the present case, the Court reiterates that its finding that the remedy of an individual application before the Constitutional Court did not provide the applicant with a review within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention remains strictly limited to the specific circumstances of the present case and does not call into question the general effectiveness of that remedy (see paragraph 120 above).

  1.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 of Protocol No. 1 to THE CONVENTION

124.  The applicant complained that as a result of his continued detention and the Court of Cassation’s failure to implement the judgments of the Constitutional Court in which it had found that his right to stand for election had been violated, he had not been able to take up his seat in Parliament. He relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, §§ 110-26), the Court considers that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined only under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”

  1.    Admissibility

125.  The Government considered that the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was inadmissible. In that respect, they relied on their submissions regarding the merits of that complaint (see paragraph 129 below).

126.  The applicant did not make any submissions with regard to the admissibility of this complaint.

127.  The Court considers that this complaint raises complex issues of fact and law which cannot be determined without an examination on the merits. It moreover finds that it is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

  1.    Merits
    1.      The parties’ submissions

128.  The applicant submitted that the right for an MP to take his or her seat in Parliament served a greater public interest which was inherent to a democratic political system and was therefore protected by constitutional safeguards, including parliamentary immunity. He argued that an unconstitutional interference with his ability to perform his parliamentary functions undermined political representation by the will of the people and prevented voters’ choices from being reflected in the National Assembly. As the Constitutional Court had concluded, the authorities’ failure to allow him to benefit from parliamentary immunity and his resulting continued detention in the absence of a clear and foreseeable legal framework violated his right to stand for election and to engage in political activity. Despite the Constitutional Court’s findings in that regard, the relevant courts had failed to release him and to stay the criminal proceedings against him, as a result of which failure he had not been able to take up his position as an MP.

129.  The Government maintained that the Court of Cassation had interpreted the exception to parliamentary immunity provided by Article 83 § 2 of the Constitution with the phrase “cases falling under Article 14” and had found, in line with its consistent case-law, that the offence the applicant had been convicted of – namely, attempting to overthrow the government by force and violence or to prevent it from discharging its functions – fell within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution. In that regard, the Court of Cassation had referred, in particular, to the explanatory memoranda of Articles 309 and 312 of the Criminal Code and the terrorist offences listed in Law no. 3713 (see paragraph 15 above). In the Government’s opinion, the fact that the legislature had deliberately refrained from making a list of which offences fell within the scope of Article 14 did not render that provision systematically unforeseeable. Moreover, Article 148 § 4 of the Constitution and section 50 § 1 of Law no. 6216 provided, respectively, that the Constitutional Court could not review matters that must be taken into account by courts within the scope of ordinary legal remedies or the appropriateness of an administrative act (see paragraphs 54‑55 above). Referring to the Court’s case-law, the Government stated that many laws were inevitably couched in vague terms and that there was often an inherent element of judicial interpretation. The rule of law required the judicial authorities to identify which offences fell within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, having regard to the wording and spirit of the Constitution, as had been done by the Court of Cassation in the present case. They concluded that the offence at issue indeed fell within the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and that the applicant could not benefit from parliamentary immunity. His detention had been based on a final judicial decision and his parliamentary duty had been terminated when that judicial decision had been read out at the National Assembly (see paragraph 47 above). There had therefore been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

  1.      The Court’s assessment
    1.    General principles

130.  The Court reiterates that democracy constitutes a fundamental element of the “European public order”, and that the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (see Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), cited above, § 382, with further references). The Court has established that, besides the obligation for the High Contracting Party to hold elections under conditions which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 also guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 102, ECHR 2006‑IV), and, once elected, to sit as a member of parliament (see Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), cited above, § 386, with further references). The rule of parliamentary immunity, present in most of the Contracting States including Türkiye, is crucial to this guarantee (ibid.).

131.  The Court reaffirms that the object and purpose of the Convention require its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, for example, Grosaru v. Romania, no. 78039/01, § 47, ECHR 2010, with further references). However, the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which are inherent in the concept of a truly democratic system, would be merely illusory if elected representatives or their voters could be arbitrarily deprived of them at any moment (see Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), cited above, § 386, with further references).

132.  The rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations”, and the Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere. However, it is for the Court to finally determine whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that any limitations of the exercise of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 do not curtail those rights to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (ibid., § 387, with further references).

133.  In the light of the principle that conditions imposed on the exercise of individual rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 may not curtail these rights to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness, as well as the general Convention requirement that rights must be effective and not illusory, the Court has considered that where restrictions on eligibility to stand for election are provided for by law, the law should satisfy certain minimum requirements as to its quality, such as the requirement of accessibility and foreseeability (see Seyidzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 37700/05, § 33, 3 December 2009, and Kokëdhima v. Albania, no. 55159/16, § 51, 11 June 2024). Furthermore, a disputed measure must have some basis in domestic law and must also be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention and is inherent in all its Articles (see Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), cited above, § 249).

134.  Many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague, and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (ibid., § 250). No matter how clearly drafted a legal provision may be, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances (see Kokëdhima, cited above, § 54). The mere fact that a legal provision is capable of more than one construction does not mean that it fails to meet the requirement of “foreseeability” for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication vested in the courts is precisely to dissipate such doubts as remain as to interpretation, taking into account changes in everyday practice (see Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), § 253, and Kokëdhima, § 55, both cited above).

135.  The Court also reiterates that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention “incorporates” the rules of that law, since the domestic authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection (see Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), cited above, § 249). This is particularly true when, as in this instance, the case turns on questions of interpretation of national constitutional law. Unless the interpretation is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of that interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see Radomilja and Others, § 149, and Kokëdhima, § 57, both cited above).

  1.    Application of those principles to the present case

136.  In the present case, it is not disputed that the applicant’s inability to take his seat in Parliament and perform his parliamentary functions because of his continued detention, and the eventual termination of his mandate as an MP on account of his final conviction, constituted an interference with his rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. What is in dispute is the foreseeability of the constitutional provisions in question, relating to parliamentary immunity (compare Tomenko v. Ukraine, no. 79340/16, § 106, 10 July 2025) and whether the Court of Cassation was bound to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments in that regard.

137.  The Court takes note of the Government’s submissions regarding the domestic courts’ judicial interpretation of legal provisions and their reference to the Court’s relevant case-law (see paragraph 129 above; for the relevant principles, see paragraphs 134-135 above). However, it observes that, in doing so, the Government referred only to the Court of Cassation’s interpretation of the relevant constitutional provision, namely Article 14 of the Constitution, and not to that of the Constitutional Court. The only reference made by the Government to the Constitutional Court’s assessment of the case was to the provisions of the Constitution setting forth that that court could not examine matters that must be taken into account by courts within the scope of ordinary legal remedies or review the appropriateness of an administrative act. The Court does not consider that reference, which implies that the Constitutional Court went beyond its jurisdiction, to be relevant in the present case. It observes that when it assessed the restrictions caused to the applicant’s right to stand for elections on account of his continued detention and conviction, the Constitutional Court did not act as a fourth-instance body but determined whether those restrictions complied with Article 67 of the Constitution which provided for the right to stand for election and to engage in political activity (see, mutatis mutandis, Mehmet Hasan Altan, cited above, § 163).

138.  The Court has already stated that the Constitutional Court was the supreme judicial authority with power to give a binding interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of individual rights (see paragraphs 90, 113, and 123 above; also see, mutatis mutandis, Mehmet Hasan Altan, cited above, § 139). Accordingly, it sees no reason to depart from the Constitutional Court’s findings regarding the unlawfulness of the interference with the applicant’s rights to stand for election and engage in political activities (see paragraphs 26-28 above; compare Paunović and Milivojević v. Serbia, no. 41683/06, § 63, 24 May 2016). In that regard, the Court also notes that the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the constitutional provision in question was consistent with its previous case-law (see paragraph 86 above) and was based on an assessment from the standpoint of the right to stand for election as provided by both Article 67 of the Constitution and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Moreover, it finds that the discrepancy between the two superior courts’ interpretations of the provision in question and of the exceptions to parliamentary immunity exacerbates the doubts surrounding the foreseeability of the provision (see a similar conclusion reached by the Court in paragraph 92 above with regard to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention).

139.  The Constitutional Court’s power to give a binding interpretation was also acknowledged by both the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation and by the Third Criminal Division, which examined the applicant’s case, itself (see paragraphs 62-63 above). Nevertheless, neither in its examination of the applicant’s request for his release and the suspension of the criminal proceedings following his election (see paragraph 14 above) nor in its decisions declining to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments with respect to the applicant (see paragraphs 32-34 and 42 above) did the Third Criminal Division clarify the reasons for its departure from its previous decisions (compare Vujović and Lipa D.O.O. v. Montenegro (no. 2), no. 43050/22, § 107, 27 November 2025, in which the Court examined, in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court of Appeal’s repeated failure to implement the Constitutional Court’s decisions, despite their being binding).

140.  In the present case, the Constitutional Court’s binding judgments, in which it found a violation of the applicant’s right to stand for election, required the Court of Cassation to release the applicant and to stay the criminal proceedings against him. As a result of the Court of Cassation’s refusal to implement those judgments, the applicant could not take his seat in Parliament, and his mandate as an MP was eventually terminated on the basis of his conviction (see paragraph 47 above): a conviction resulting from decisions which had previously been found by the Constitutional Court to be unlawful and a violation of the rule of law (see paragraphs 26-28 and 38-39 above). The Constitutional Court later characterised the termination of the applicant’s mandate as an MP as a de facto situation arising from a decision which had previously been found to be devoid of any legal force (see paragraph 49 above).

141.  The Court has found, albeit in contexts that are distinguishable from the present one, that the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, entails a duty on the part of the State and the public authorities to implement judicial orders or decisions against them (compare Petkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 77568/01 and 2 others, §§ 62 and 65, 11 June 2009). It has also found, in relation to the lawfulness of applicants’ continued detention under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, that for another court to call into question the powers conferred on a constitutional court to give final and binding judgments on individual applications ran counter to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and legal certainty (see Mehmet Hasan Altan, § 139, and Şahin Alpay, § 118, both cited above – paragraph 91 above; also see Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 132).

142.  In view of the above, the Court concludes that the applicant’s inability to take his seat in Parliament and the eventual termination of his parliamentary mandate on account of his conviction and continued detention were incompatible with the rule of law, and therefore unlawful, constituting an unjustified interference not only with his own right to stand for election and to sit in Parliament, but also with the free expression of the will of the people (see, mutatis mutandis, Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), § 397, and Tomenko, cited above, § 119).

143.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

  1.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18 of THE CONVENTION

144.  The applicant complained under Article 18 of the Convention that his continued detention and resulting inability to take his seat as an MP had been caused by politically motivated decisions, which had pursued the ulterior purpose of silencing him and preventing him from exercising his parliamentary activities. In that regard, he argued that the Court of Cassation’s decisions declining to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments had been encouraged by the President of the Republic and other public officials.

145.  The Court notes that this complaint relates to a fundamental aspect of the case that has not been addressed above and which merits a separate examination (see, mutatis mutandis, Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), cited above, § 401, and Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 266). It therefore considers that it should be examined under Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Article 18 provides:

“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”

  1.    Admissibility
    1.      The parties’ submissions

146.  The Government considered that Article 18 of the Convention did not have an autonomous role and could only be applied in conjunction with other provisions of the Convention. In their view, given that there was no violation of Article 5 of the Convention or Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, a complaint under Article 18 was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In that regard, they also argued that there were no explicit or implicit limitations in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 that could lead to an examination of the applicant’s complaint under Article 18. The Government further submitted that the applicant’s complaint under this provision was still pending before the Constitutional Court and must therefore be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Lastly, they argued that the applicant had failed to submit arguments and evidence to substantiate his complaint that the domestic authorities had pursued aims other than those stated in the Convention.

147.  The applicant contested those arguments.

  1.      The Court’s assessment
    1.    Compatibility ratione materiae

148.  While the Government argued that no examination of a complaint under Article 18 of the Convention could be carried out in the absence of a violation under the substantive provision, the Court reiterates that there can be a breach of Article 18 even if there is no breach of the Article in conjunction with which it applies (see Merabishvili v. Georgia, [GC], no. 72508/13, § 288, 28 November 2017). In any event, it notes that it has already found a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see paragraphs 96, 121 and 143 above). In so far as the Government argued that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 had no limitations that would allow the Court to carry out an examination of Article 18 in conjunction with that provision, the Court reiterates that the rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute; there is room for “implied limitations” (see Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), cited above, § 387). Given that the complaint under Article 18 is closely linked to the complaints under Article 5 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection of incompatibility ratione materiae (compare Kavala, cited above, § 201, and Tuğluk v. Türkiye, no. 71757/17, § 159, 14 October 2025).

  1.    Exhaustion of domestic remedies

149.  The general principles with regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies may be found in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014), Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 21881/20, §§ 138-145, 27 November 2023), and Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others ((dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, § 215, 9 April 2024). The Court reiterates, in particular, that applicants are required to make normal use of any remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of their Convention grievances. The remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. To be effective, a remedy must be capable of remedying the disputed state of affairs directly and must offer reasonable prospects of success. The rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; in reviewing whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case. As regards the burden of proof, it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time (see Gherghina v. Romania, (dec.) [GC] no. 42219/07, §§ 85-88, 9 July 2015, with further references).

150.  The applicant did not raise a separate complaint under Article 18 of the Convention in the first two individual applications he made to the Constitutional Court following his election. He did so only in his subsequent applications, which, at the date of the latest information available to the Court (16 April 2025), were still pending before that court (see paragraphs 44-46 above) and relied solely on Article 18 of the Convention, without raising any corresponding provisions of the Constitution. In that regard, the Court notes that, by virtue of Article 148 of the Constitution and section 45 of Law no. 6216, an individual application may be made to the Constitutional Court for alleged violations of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Convention in so far as they are also protected by the Constitution (see paragraphs 54-55 above, also see Uzun, cited above, § 62). Although the complaint under Article 18 has not yet been considered by the Constitutional Court, in the absence of any corresponding constitutional provisions relied on by the applicant before that court or pointed out by the Government, a question arises both as to that court’s authority to give a binding judgment on Article 18 and as to whether the applicant’s submissions under that Article have already been addressed – at least in substance – in his previous individual applications to the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 27 above for the Constitutional Court’s assessment with regard to the lack of safeguards against politically motivated or unnecessary restrictions on the exercise of parliamentary functions).

151.  Nevertheless, in the present case, the Court will not address these questions as it considers in any event that the Government’s objection regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies should be dismissed for the following reasons. The Court takes note of the reasons given by the Court of Cassation for refusing to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments on the applicant’s individual applications. It notes in particular that the Court of Cassation challenged the principle that the Constitutional Court’s judgments on individual applications were binding on the other superior courts (see paragraphs 32-35 above). The Court of Cassation further emphasised that reasoning in its decision of 3 January 2024, in which it declined to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the applicant’s second constitutional complaint despite the finding of a violation of the applicant’s right to individual application (see paragraph 42 above). In view of the overt refusal by the Court of Cassation to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments in the applicant’s case, the Court finds that, in the circumstances of the present case, the remedy provided by the Constitutional Court cannot be considered to offer reasonable prospects of success with regard to the applicant’s complaint under Article 18, which, at the date of the latest available information, was still pending before that court. The applicant therefore cannot be criticised for bringing the Article 18 complaint before the Court without waiting for the judgment of the Constitutional Court. It follows that the Government’s objection under this head must also be dismissed. The Court reaches this conclusion in the specific circumstances of the present case and without prejudice to the effectiveness of the remedy provided by the system of individual applications to the Constitutional Court (for a similar conclusion, see paragraphs 120 and 123 above).

  1.    Manifestly ill-founded

152.  As regards the Government’s claim that the applicant had not put forward arguments and evidence to substantiate his complaint, the Court finds that the applicant raised sufficiently detailed arguments (see paragraph 155 below) and notes that he provided it with press articles and other documents reporting the statements made by public officials regarding his case (see paragraphs 50-52 above; contrast Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, no. 62775/14, § 133, 17 September 2020). The information provided by the applicant was therefore sufficient to enable the Court to determine the nature and scope of the complaint without recourse to any other document (for the relevant principles, see Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 24827/14, §§ 145-46, 1 June 2023). It therefore dismisses this objection by the Government as well.

  1.    Conclusion on admissibility

153.  The Court concludes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

  1.    Merits
    1.      The parties’ submissions

154.  The applicant complained that his continued detention was politically motivated and pursued an ulterior purpose within the meaning of Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, namely, to silence him and to prevent him from participating in parliamentary activities. He argued that the refusal of the domestic authorities to implement the Constitutional Court’s directions for his release and the suspension of the criminal proceedings against him after his election as an MP demonstrated that the authorities had been keeping him in detention deliberately. In his view, this was linked to his political position and his activities as a human rights lawyer involved in socially and politically sensitive cases, including those related to the Gezi Park events (see paragraph 5 above). He further argued that the statements made by public officials, including the President (see paragraphs 50-52 above), which had targeted him, labelled him a “terrorist”, and criticised the Constitutional Court, had had a decisive influence on the domestic courts’ decisions. As a result, the Court of Cassation and the State authorities had adopted a coordinated approach, publicly challenging the powers of the Constitutional Court and insisting that his conviction was final despite the binding decisions of that court in his favour. Moreover, the criminal complaint made by the Court of Cassation against the Constitutional Court judges who had voted in favour of finding a violation in his case (see paragraph 34 above), constituted an unprecedented illustration of the authorities’ determination to resist the Constitutional Court’s judgments and to ensure that he was kept in detention.

155.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that his detention pursued an ulterior purpose within the meaning of Article 18 of the Convention. Relying on the Court’s case-law, they stated that showing a violation of Article 18 had a particularly high evidential threshold and that the Convention system was based on the presumption that public authorities acted in good faith. In their view, the applicant’s reliance on statements made by politicians and public officials was not sufficient to establish bad faith or a hidden agenda on the part of the judicial authorities, particularly in the absence of manifest procedural irregularities or fabricated charges. There had been extensive public debate regarding the case, which had also included views favouring the applicant. Public discussion of the case in the media and by political activists was a normal feature of democratic societies and did not demonstrate that the domestic courts had acted under pressure or pursued an ulterior motive. The Government further maintained that the applicant had been convicted and was detained in execution of a final judgment, that his legal status had been examined in detail by the domestic courts, including the Court of Cassation, and that he had made extensive use of the available domestic remedies, including several applications to the Constitutional Court. The differing interpretations of the Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation regarding the relevant constitutional provisions reflected a legitimate legal debate between two superior courts rather than political interference.

  1.      The Court’s assessment

156.  The Court refers to the general principles set out in its judgments in Merabishvili (cited above, § 287-317), Navalnyy v. Russia ([GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, §§ 164-65, 15 November 2018), and Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2) (cited above, §§ 421-22).

157.  In the present case, the Court has concluded that, in view of the Constitutional Court’s binding judgments finding a violation of the applicant’s right to liberty and security and directing his release and the suspension of the criminal proceedings against him, the applicant’s continued detention following his election did not constitute lawful detention after conviction within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention and thus was not “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” as required by that provision (see paragraph 95 above). The Court has found that the failure to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments meant that the Turkish legal system failed to provide the applicant with a review mechanism that would lead to his release as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see paragraph 120 above). It has further concluded that the applicant’s resulting inability to sit in Parliament and the termination of his mandate was not lawful within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see paragraph 142 above). The Court finds therefore that no issue arises in the present case with respect to the plurality of purposes where a restriction is applied both for an ulterior purpose and a purpose prescribed by the Convention. However, the mere fact that the restriction of the applicant’s rights did not pursue a purpose prescribed by the Convention is not in itself a sufficient basis to conclude that Article 18 has also been violated. It remains for the Court to determine whether there is proof that the authorities’ actions were actually driven by an ulterior purpose (see, mutatis mutandis, Navalnyy, cited above, § 166; Kavala, cited above, §§ 218-19; Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), cited above, § 423; and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 68762/14 and 71200/14, § 206, 20 September 2018).

158.  The Court considers that, in the present case, proof of an ulterior purpose can be established beyond reasonable doubt by assessing the particular circumstances of the case and contextual factors (for a similar approach, see Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 74288/14 and 64568/16, § 106, 14 October 2021; Zarema Musayeva and Others v. Russia, no. 4573/22, § 87, 28 May 2024; and Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 4), cited above, § 312).

159.  The Court observes that there is no dispute between the parties that the applicant is a human-rights defender and a lawyer (see paragraph 5 above). In that regard, it reiterates that it attaches particular importance to the special role of human-rights defenders in promoting and defending human rights, including in close cooperation with the Council of Europe, and their contribution to the protection of human rights in the member States (see Aliyev, § 208, and Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev, § 107, both cited above). The Court also observes that the applicant was prosecuted and convicted in the same criminal proceedings as the applicant in Kavala and Kavala (no. 2) (both cited above, §§ 215-32, and §§ 265-79, respectively), in which it found, inter alia, a violation of Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (compare Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, nos. 65583/13 and 70106/13, § 69, 18 February 2021). His situation cannot therefore be viewed in isolation and should be placed in the context of the detention of other political opponents, human-rights defenders and journalists who have been detained and charged to a large extent with manifestly exaggerated criminal offences against the backdrop of the detention of other political opponents, human-rights defenders and journalists in the respondent State (see, mutatis mutandis, Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 269, with further references).

160.  The Court notes that, as demonstrated by the cases referred to above (see paragraphs 57 and 91 above), the applicant’s case was not the first occasion on which the authorities had declined to implement findings of a violation and orders as to redress from the Constitutional Court regarding the detention of political opponents, human-rights defenders and journalists. In Mehmet Hasan Altan and Şahin Alpay (both cited above, § 139 and § 118, respectively), in which both applicants were journalists, the Court found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on account of the Istanbul Assize Court’s refusal to implement judgments in which the Constitutional Court had found a violation of the applicants’ right to liberty and security, and their continued detention despite final and binding judgments in their favour. In the case of Kadri Enis Berberoğlu (see paragraphs 57-58 above), lodged with the Constitutional Court by an opposition MP, that court had found a fresh violation of the applicant’s right to liberty and security and of his right to stand for election because the Assize Court had failed to implement its directions.

161.  Nevertheless, while in Kadri Enis Berberoğlu the lower court had eventually implemented the Constitutional Court’s judgment and stayed the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 59 above), in the present case, in its decision of 3 January 2024 the Court of Cassation resisted the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the applicant’s second individual application, despite the finding of an additional violation of his right of individual application on account of its failure to implement the previous judgment in his favour (see paragraph 42 above). The Court observes that that decision declining to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgment for a second time was unprecedented. The failure of the Court of Cassation to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments meant that the applicant remained in detention despite his election as an MP and was therefore unable to take his seat in Parliament. Moreover, his mandate was terminated when the Court of Cassation’s decision of 3 January 2024 was read out at the National Assembly (see paragraph 47 above; contrast Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, § 137, 7 September 2023, in which the Court did not find an ulterior purpose of removing the applicant from the political scene because the authorities had not restricted his ability to run an election campaign or to carry out his parliamentary mandate, and had suspended criminal proceedings against him in order to allow him to participate properly in the parliamentary elections).

162.  The Court observes that when it dismissed the applicant’s application for his release and for the suspension of the criminal proceedings against him on account of his parliamentary immunity and, later on, when it overtly declined to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments in the applicant’s favour, the Third Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation departed from the principles which had been set by the plenary criminal divisions on the effects of the Constitutional Court judgments. The plenary criminal divisions had established that, notwithstanding the Court of Cassation’s own interpretation of the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and of the exceptions to parliamentary immunity, it was bound to follow the Constitutional Court’s judgments in which it held that that constitutional provision was not foreseeable, because those judgments were binding by virtue of Article 153 of the Constitution and constituted guidance to be followed in future cases (see paragraph 62 above). The Third Criminal Division had followed those principles in several decisions, including a decision delivered in April 2023 (see paragraph 63 above), that is, only three months before its decision of 13 July 2023, in which it dismissed the applicant’s request for recognition of his parliamentary immunity (see paragraph 14 above). Nevertheless, in the present case, the Third Criminal Division challenged the Constitutional Court’s power to deliver binding judgments on individual applications, without addressing the discrepancy between that approach and the principles which had been established by the plenary criminal divisions and in its own case-law. Both the plenary criminal divisions and, in its earlier decisions, the Third Criminal Division had acknowledged that Constitutional Court judgments were binding and had emphasised the importance of redressing violations of fundamental rights and the principle of the unity of the legal order (see paragraphs 62 and 63 above).

163.  The Court finds that the above-mentioned discrepancy in the Court of Cassation’s case-law was significantly exacerbated by the criminal complaint filed by the members of the Third Criminal Division against the Constitutional Court judges who had voted in favour of finding a violation in the applicant’s case (see paragraph 34 above). While the Court has no information as to the possible institution of criminal proceedings against the Constitutional Court judges in question, it finds that the making of that complaint is sufficient in itself to raise a question about the unity of the legal order emphasised in the Court of Cassation’s previous decisions. In that regard, the Court also points to the press statement made by the Court of Cassation two days after the filing of the criminal complaint and the criticisms raised by that court. In its press statement the Court of Cassation portrayed the Constitutional Court’s remedial directions within the individual application mechanism as a fourth-instance examination of appellate courts’ decisions which could potentially lead to chaos in the legal system (see paragraph 35 above).

164.  The Court notes those arguments advanced by the Court of Cassation with concern. It has already found that Constitutional Court judgments are binding on all State bodies, including judicial authorities by virtue of Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution and section 66 of Law no. 6216 (see paragraphs 90 and 113 above). The implementation of Constitutional Court judgments is therefore a requirement that flows from the principle of legal certainty and the rule of law (in that regard, see Kavala (no. 2), cited above, §§ 130-32). As was also pointed out by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 62 above), that requirement applies irrespective of the differences in the superior courts’ interpretation of legal provisions. Once the Constitutional Court had concluded that the applicant’s continued detention and the interference with his right to stand for election were not lawful and clearly stated the steps to be taken to remedy those violations, both the Assize Court and the Court of Cassation were bound to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments and to provide redress as directed by the Constitutional Court. In that respect, the Court reiterates that a failure to implement Constitutional Court judgments not only has serious repercussions for the individual rights of those concerned, as was the case for the applicant, but also risks damaging the rule of law and the constitutional order (see paragraphs 122-123 above). In the present case, the Court of Cassation’s refusal to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the applicant’s second application despite an additional finding of a violation of the applicant’s right of individual application – which, as noted above, was unprecedented (see paragraph 161 above) – displays a departure from those principles. The Court considers that such a departure cannot be explained solely by a difference of interpretation by the superior courts, as was claimed by the Government (see paragraph 155 above), and that it raises a question as to its purpose.

165.  In that regard, the Court also takes note of the statements made by the President of the Republic and his Chief Advisor, M.U., supporting the Court of Cassation’s stance in the applicant’s case and raising similar criticisms regarding the Constitutional Court’s findings, in particular as regards parliamentary immunity (see paragraphs 51-52 above). The Court finds that these statements, which were made after the Court of Cassation’s decisions of 13 July and 8 November 2023, are not in themselves sufficient proof that there was an ulterior purpose underlying the applicant’s continued detention (see, mutatis mutandis, Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 4), cited above, § 316). That said, it observes that those statements were made before the Court of Cassation’s decision of 3 January 2024 declining to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the applicant’s second individual application: a decision which led to the termination of the applicant’s parliamentary mandate on 30 January 2024 (see paragraphs 42, 47 and 161 above). In that regard, the Court also observes that those statements are consonant with the reasons put forward by the Court of Cassation when it declined to implement the judgments of the Constitutional Court (compare Kavala, cited above, § 229). Moreover, it cannot overlook the statements made by the President on 8 and 19 January 2024, which, in the applicant’s view, labelled him as a terrorist (see paragraph 51 above).

166.  In assessing the relevance of the statements by the President of the Republic and his adviser for the purposes of Article 18, the Court attaches importance to the concerns raised by the Venice Commission and the Commissioner of Human Rights regarding the independence and impartiality of judiciary in Türkiye (see paragraphs 65-68 above; also compare Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 273, with regard to the Court’s assessment of certain contextual circumstances indicating an environment of political and media pressure that was capable of affecting both the appearance and the reality of independence and impartiality on the part of the courts dealing with that case). It also regards the former and current Commissioners’ misgivings about the detention of human-rights defenders, including the applicant, as important. It reiterates that reports or statements by international observers, non‑governmental organisations or the media, or the decisions of other national or international courts are often taken into account, in particular, to shed light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court (see Merabishvili, cited above, § 317).

167.  In that regard, in opinion on amendments to the Constitution, adopted at its 110th plenary session (CDL-AD(2017)005), the Venice Commission expressed the view that the proposed new composition of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors was “extremely problematic”. It observed that under the new constitutional system the President was not a neutral figure but belonged to a political group (see paragraph 68 above; also see Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2), § 434, and Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 4), § 317, both cited above). In her report of 2020, the then Commissioner expressed concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary and its vulnerability to political influence, considering – with reference to the Court’s finding of an ulterior purpose in Selahattin Demirtaş (no. 2) and Kavala – that public statements by members of the executive and legislature criticising courts and commenting on ongoing cases could undermine judicial independence and influence judicial decision-making. She considered that the concerns about the authorities having the ulterior purpose of silencing human rights defenders had also applied to the other defendants in the Gezi trial, that is, the co-defendants of Mr Kavala (see paragraph 65 above). In her memorandum of 2024, the Commissioner reiterated her previous findings regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary in Türkiye and further underlined the damage caused to the rule of law by the failure to implement Constitutional Court judgments. In that regard, she pointed to the President’s statements regarding the applicant’s case, which, in her view, was exacerbated by the Court of Cassation’s stance (see paragraph 66 above).

168.  The Court finds that the above-mentioned circumstances, taken as a whole, demonstrate that the applicant’s continued detention in the absence of recognition of his parliamentary immunity – which resulted from the Court of Cassation’s refusal to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments – pursued the ulterior purpose of silencing him and stifling pluralism, and was liable to have a dissuasive effect on the work of human-rights defenders (see, mutatis mutandis, Kavala, cited above, § 232). At this point, the Court reiterates that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law (see Navalnyy, cited above, § 173). The ulterior purpose pursued in the present case is therefore of particular gravity, given the prominent role of human‑rights defenders in a pluralist democracy (see, mutatis mutandis, Kavala, cited above, § 231, and Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, § 77, 7 March 2023).

169.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

  1.       APPLICATION OF ARTICLEs 41 and 46 OF THE CONVENTION
    1.    Application of Article 41 of the Convention

170.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

171.  The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Without specifying an amount, he submitted that following the termination of his parliamentary mandate on 30 January 2024 (see paragraph 47 above), he had been deprived of the salary he had been receiving as an MP. He asked the Court to consider that aspect of the violation of his rights. The applicant did not make a specific claim in respect of pecuniary damage or costs and expenses.

172.  The Government contested the applicant’s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage, finding it excessive and incompatible with the Court’s case-law.

173.  Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 32,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. In the absence of any specific claim in respect of pecuniary damage or costs and expenses, it considers that it is not called upon to make any award to the applicant under those heads.

  1.    Application of Article 46 of the Convention

174.  The applicant applied for his immediate release and the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s judgments in his favour, including its orders as to redress. The Court will examine the applicant’s request under Article 46 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

“1.  The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

2.  The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.

...”

175.  The Court reiterates that its judgments are essentially declaratory in nature and that, in general, it is primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used in its domestic legal order in order to discharge its obligation under Article 46 of the Convention (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 312, 1 December 2020). However, in certain special circumstances the Court has found it useful to indicate to a respondent State the type of measures that might be taken to put an end to the situation – often a systemic one – which has given rise to the finding of a violation. Sometimes, the nature of the violation does not leave any choice as to the measures to be taken (see Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (infringement proceedings) [GC], no. 15172/13, § 153, 29 May 2019).

176.  In the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the continuation of the applicant’s detention on account of his conviction and the resulting effects on his parliamentary mandate would entail a prolongation of the violation of his rights as well as a breach of the obligation on the respondent State to abide by the Court’s judgment in accordance with Article 46 § 1 of the Convention. It therefore finds that the respondent State must take all necessary measures to put an end to the applicant’s detention and secure his immediate release, and allow him to take up his seat in the Parliament and perform his parliamentary functions.

177.  Furthermore, with regard to general measures, the Court emphasises that full compliance with the Constitutional Court’s judgments is essential to the rule of law (see paragraphs 122-123 above). It reiterates that the failure to implement that court’s judgments is likely to undermine the effectiveness of the individual application procedure, while compromising the constitutional order by depriving applicants of the effective application of their recognised rights (see Kavala (no. 2), cited above, § 314). It is therefore for the respondent State to take all appropriate general measures in order to provide that the judgments of the Constitutional Court are fully implemented and to prevent similar future violations.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

  1.      Declares, unanimously, the application admissible;
  2.      Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;
  3.      Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;
  4.      Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
  5.      Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
  6.      Holds, by six votes to one, that the respondent State is to take all necessary measures to put an end to the applicant’s detention and to secure his immediate release, and to allow him to take up his seat in the Parliament and perform his parliamentary functions, and that it is incumbent on the respondent State to take all appropriate general measures in order to provide for the full implementation of the judgments of the Constitutional Court and to prevent similar future violations;
  7.      Holds, by six votes to one,
    1.   that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 32,500 (thirty-two thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
    2.   that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
  8.      Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 November 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 

 Dorothee von Arnim Arnfinn Bårdsen
 Deputy Registrar President

 

 

 

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Yüksel is annexed to this judgment.

 


 

PARTLY DISSENTING, PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE YÜKSEL

I agree with the majority’s finding of a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. However, I am unable to share the majority’s view that there have been violations of Article 5 § 1 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, and of Article 18 of the Convention taken in conjunction with those provisions.

  1. AS REGARDS ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 3 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION

1.  In the present case, the applicant’s complaints under Article 5 concern whether he was entitled, under Articles 83 and 14 of the Constitution, to parliamentary immunity following his election as a member of parliament (MP) in the general elections of 14 May 2023. The interpretation of those provisions directly determines the “lawfulness” of the applicant’s continued detention following his election for the purposes of Article 5 § 1. The scope of the Court’s assessment of the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 thus covers the period from 14 May 2023, which pre-dates the Court of Cassation’s refusal to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments delivered in the applicant’s individual applications (see paragraph 84 of the present judgment). Accordingly, the reasoning under Article 5 § 1 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 goes beyond the issue of the non-implementation of the Constitutional Court’s judgments. In concluding that the applicant’s detention was unlawful, the majority endorse the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of Articles 83 and 14 of the Constitution and find that those provisions lacked the foreseeability required under the Convention (see paragraphs 92-93 of the present judgment). The decisive question in this case is whether Article 5 § 1 of the Convention requires the exception to be specified in legislation before it can be applied or whether judicial interpretation can suffice, and if the judiciary’s interpretation of this exception creates an issue of foreseeability. For the following reasons, I do not consider that Article 5 § 1 imposes such a requirement or that there has been a violation of it.

2.  As regards the constitutional framework, Article 83 § 2 of the Constitution provides for two exceptions to the general rule of parliamentary immunity enjoyed by MPs. The exception relevant to the present case provides that an MP may not benefit from immunity in respect of a criminal investigation into the “situations referred to in Article 14 of the Constitution”, if the investigation was instituted before his or her election. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits the abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms and provides, inter alia, that none of the fundamental rights in the Constitution may be exercised to undermine the unity of the nation or to extinguish the democratic and secular Republic founded on human rights. It is comparable in its function to Article 17 of the Convention.

3.  In the domestic practice, it would appear to have been undisputed until 2021 that the offences falling under this exception were to be determined by way of judicial interpretation. That year, the Constitutional Court held in Ömer Gergerlioğlu that the text of Article 14 of the Constitution was framed in terms which did not lend themselves to interpretation by the judiciary in a foreseeable manner (see paragraph 103 of that judgment). It held that, in the absence of legislation identifying the offences covered by the “situations referred to in Article 14 of the Constitution”, that exception could not be applied in a coherent and foreseeable manner.

4.  However, the Court of Cassation had already, in respect of the text of the two constitutional provisions, developed a body of case-law, pre-dating the Constitutional Court’s 2021 judgment, in which it had identified the offences capable of falling within the “situations referred to in Article 14 of the Constitution”. It had held that the legislature had not specified the offences falling within that exception, and that it therefore fell to the courts, in the exercise of their ordinary function of interpreting and applying the Constitution and the law, to do so. In this connection, the Court of Cassation had held that the exception covered the offences of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation, membership of an armed terrorist organisation, and attempting to overthrow the government by force and violence (see, for example, decision no. E. 2013/9110, K. 2013/12351 of 9 October 2013 of the Ninth Criminal Division – see also paragraphs 26-33 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Ömer Gergerlioğlu for a summary of the Court of Cassation’s case-law, which dates back to 2008, regarding offences that fall within and outside the exception).

5.  It would admittedly be preferable for the legislature to specify by law the offences falling within the exception in Article 83 § 2 of the Constitution. However, the issue in the present case concerns the applicability of a constitutional provision as things stand. In this regard, Article 83 § 2 of the Constitution refers to “situations” foreseen under Article 14, not to a list of offences, and it thus does not presuppose a legislative catalogue of offences.

6.  I would also note that in its two judgments concerning the applicant’s individual applications, the Constitutional Court did not specifically assess whether the offence of attempting to overthrow the government by force (under Article 312 of the Criminal Code) could fall within the situations referred to in Article 14, but relied on its general finding that the second exception to parliamentary immunity in Article 83 § 2 was inapplicable in the absence of legislation specifying the offences concerned. It could be said that the Constitutional Court’s interpretation has the effect of rendering Article 83 § 2 of the Constitution inoperative unless Parliament intervenes, although the wording of the relevant constitutional provisions contains no such prerequisite.

7.  While the Constitutional Court’s interpretation is one possible reading of the Constitution, I do not consider that the Convention requires such an approach.

8.  Against the background of this discrepancy between the two superior courts’ interpretation, the question before the Court is whether the interpretation followed in the applicant’s case met the standard of “lawfulness” under Article 5 § 1. According to the Court’s case-law, where deprivation of liberty is concerned it is essential that the conditions for it under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 80, ECHR 2010, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 92, 15 December 2016). However, the fact that a provision is open to more than one construction does not suffice to render it unforeseeable, the role of adjudication vested in the courts being precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain (see, mutatis mutandis, Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, §§ 125-26, 15 May 2023). Moreover, the term “law” in the Convention comprises not only statute but also the case-law of the domestic courts, and a legal basis may accordingly be found in judicial as well as in legislative sources (see, in the context of Article 5 § 1, Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, §§ 50-58, ECHR 2000-III, where the Court’s objection was to detention having no basis in either legislation or case-law). The same applies to the notion of “prescribed by law”, in which context the Court has repeatedly found that the “law” in question must be understood to include both statutory law and judge-made “law” (see, among other authorities, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, § 83, 14 September 2010; The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 47, Series A no. 30; and Casado Coca v. Spain, 24 February 1994, § 43, Series A no. 285-A). In short, it can be said that the “law” is the provision in force as the competent courts have interpreted it.

9.  It is difficult to see any case-law precluding exceptions to a general rule from being determined by way of judicial interpretation. As stated also in the judgment, what matters for the purposes of “lawfulness” is foreseeability. Having regard to the Court’s case-law, in my view, the Convention does not condition the applicability of an exception to parliamentary immunity of this kind on the legislature enumerating the offences covered by the Constitution, and judicial interpretation of that provision may suffice to satisfy the lawfulness requirement, provided that such interpretation is sufficiently foreseeable in view of the specific facts of a given case.

10.  In this connection, it may be noted that on some occasions, the Court of Cassation’s interpretation may have been unforeseeable, in particular as concerns offences relating to freedom of expression. For instance, according to the Constitutional Court, one example was the Court of Cassation’s finding that Article 14 of the Constitution covered the offence under Article 7 § 2 of the Counter-Terrorism Act (as in the case of Ömer Gergerlioğlu). However, the fact that Article 14 was interpreted extensively in a different case concerning a different offence does not render the provision itself unforeseeable.

11.  Moreover, at the time the Court of Cassation ruled on the applicant’s initial release request, the Constitutional Court had not yet specifically ruled on whether Article 312 of the Criminal Code fell within the exception provided under Article 83 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the applicant was convicted at first instance of the offence under Article 312 of the Criminal Code in April 2022 and has been detained continuously since then. It is difficult to see the basis for concluding that, when he stood for election in May 2023, the applicant was not in a position to know the Court of Cassation’s case-law according to which the relevant offence fell within the exception under Article 83 § 2.

12.  Whatever difficulties the reference to Article 14 may present at its margins, what is relevant for the purposes of the Convention is whether the application of that interpretation to the applicant’s continued detention for the relevant offence can be regarded as unforeseeable. In my view, the application of that interpretation to the applicant’s continued detention cannot be regarded as either arbitrary or unforeseeable. The present case is thus different from previous precedents such as Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye (no. 59/17, § 115, 23 April 2024) and Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, §§ 189‑96, 3 March 2020), in which the Court found that the domestic courts’ interpretation ran counter to the provisions designed to protect the applicants and negated the safeguards those provisions afforded. Here, by contrast, Article 83 § 2 itself refers to situations covered by Article 14, and the discussion is as to whether reading Article 312 of the Criminal Code into that reference applies it to the very type of offence it appears designed to cover, rather than stretching it.

13.  Lastly, since the majority’s finding under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 rests essentially on the same reasoning as that under Article 5 § 1, the considerations set out above apply equally to that complaint as well.

  1.       AS REGARDS ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

14.  That said, disagreeing with the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the constitutional provision is one thing, but non-implementation of its decisions is another. It is beyond doubt that the execution of its judgments is an indivisible component of the right of individual application and that failure to comply with them amounts to a manifest and serious violation of that right. In addition, I share the Constitutional Court’s analysis that the non-execution of its judgments is likely not only to undermine individual and societal confidence in the rule of law, but also to compromise the constitutional order, by depriving applicants of the effective enjoyment of their recognised rights.

15.  As the Court has recently emphasised, for another domestic court to call into question the powers conferred on a constitutional court to deliver final and binding judgments on individual applications runs counter to the fundamental principles of the rule of law (see Kavala v Türkiye (no. 2) [GC], no. 2170/24, § 132, 25 August 2026). Moreover, non-enforcement of the Constitutional Court’s judgments undermines not only the binding nature of those judgments, but also the ultimate purpose of the review provided for under Article 5 § 4, which is to obtain an order for release where the detention is found to be unlawful (see paragraphs 118 and 120 of the present judgment). A failure to enforce the Constitutional Court’s rulings is thus likely to undermine, more generally, the judicial protection of fundamental rights. For these reasons, I agree with the majority that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4.

  1.     AS REGARDS ARTICLE 18 OF THE CONVENTION

16.  With regard to the applicant’s complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, I disagree with the majority’s view that there has been a violation of this provision. The majority consider that proof of an ulterior purpose can be established beyond reasonable doubt in the present case (see paragraph 158 of the judgment). Having regard to the burden-of-proof requirement in establishing that the measures complained of in the present case pursued an ulterior purpose, contrary to Article 18 of the Convention, I do not perceive sufficient grounds to conclude that there has been a violation of this provision. The Court must base its decision on “evidence in the legal sense”, in accordance with the criteria laid down by it in Merabishvili v. Georgia ([GC], no. 72508/13, §§ 309-17, 28 November 2017), and its own assessment of the specific relevant facts (see Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, no. 5829/04, § 259, 31 May 2011, and Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 15172/13, § 140, 22 May 2014).

17.  In my view, the fact that there is a discrepancy between the two courts’ interpretation in the present case cannot be viewed as demonstrating that an ulterior motive was being pursued. Moreover, the Constitutional Court conducted a detailed assessment of the applicant’s complaints and found a violation of his rights protected under the Constitution and the Convention. In these circumstances, it is not possible to conclude that the entire judicial mechanism of Türkiye was acting in line with a political agenda when rejecting his request for release. Accordingly, I am also unable to agree with the majority’s findings under Article 46 of the Convention.