FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF ADAM v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
(Application no. 40846/15)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 March 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Adam v. the Republic of Moldova,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Diana Sârcu,
Sébastien Biancheri, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 40846/15) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 6 August 2015 by a Moldovan national, Mr Ion Adam (“the applicant”), who was born in 1979 and lives in Călărași, and was initially represented by Mr A. Briceac, lawyer practising in Chișinău at the time;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr D. Obadă;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 5 February 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the alleged lack of effectiveness of the investigation into acts of violence committed by a private individual against the applicant and the allegedly inadequate the compensation awarded by the domestic courts. The applicant complained of a violation of his rights under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention.
2. At the time of the events in question the applicant was a police officer. On 10 September 2013, in the exercise of his duties, the applicant ordered V.B., who was riding a motorcycle, to stop. Instead of complying, V.B. drove the motorcycle into the applicant.
3. As a result, the applicant sustained severe open head trauma, combined basilar skull and cranial vault fractures, and severe concussion. He lost the hearing in one ear and lost his sense of smell completely. He was discharged from hospital after 19 days. The medical report classified the injuries as severe and life‑threatening.
4. A criminal investigation into charges of using threats or violence against an official (Article 349 § 2 of the Criminal Code) was initiated in respect of V.B. on 19 September 2013. A month later, the case was sent for trial.
5. In the course of the judicial proceedings, the applicant lodged a civil claim against V.B., seeking compensation in the amount of 150,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) in respect of pecuniary damage and MDL 500,000 (approximately 28,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. The applicant submitted that, on 29 October 2013, he had received MDL 35,000 from V.B. and that that amount had been insufficient to compensate him for his loss of capacity to work and the cost of ongoing medical treatment.
6. On 17 July 2014 the Călărași District Court found V.B. guilty and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment, suspended on probation for a period of four years. The court ordered V.B. to pay the applicant MDL 6,000 in costs and expenses and dismissed the rest of the applicant’s civil claim as unsubstantiated. The court noted that the applicant had already received MDL 35,000 in compensation for damage sustained and that the applicant’s claims had been excessive in the light of the level of earning potential in the Republic of Moldova.
7. The applicant and the prosecutor appealed against the judgment, both arguing that the sentence had been too lenient. The applicant also complained of the inadequate level of compensation awarded for his permanent loss of hearing in one ear, complete loss of smell, constant headaches and implicit loss of capacity to work.
8. On 27 November 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, upheld the sentence imposed by the District Court and awarded the applicant MDL 60,000 (approximately EUR 2,971 at the material time) in compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and MDL 3,000 in respect of costs and expenses. The court noted that V.B. had already paid the applicant MDL 35,000 (see paragraph 5 above) and ordered him to pay the remaining difference. The court ruled that the applicant had failed to substantiate his claims in respect of pecuniary damage and informed the applicant that he should lodge his claims in that connection with the civil courts and substantiate them accordingly, once the amount of damage caused by the incident had been determined.
9. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing mainly that the amount of compensation awarded had been insufficient.
10. On 20 May 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the appellate judgment. That decision was final.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
11. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the investigation had been ineffective and, in particular, that the compensation for the damage caused to him by acts of violence committed by a private individual (V.B.) had been insufficient. The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention.
12. The Court notes that the injuries were clearly life‑threatening and had long‑term consequences for the applicant (see paragraph 3 and 7 above) and that the essential element of the complaint concerns the efficiency of the redress available at domestic level. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, the Court is not bound by the characterisation given by the applicant or a Government (see Rõigas v. Estonia, no. 49045/13, § 65, 12 September 2017). The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints should be examined from the standpoint of Article 2 of the Convention only (see, for instance, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 110-27, 20 March 2018, and Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, §§ 149‑50, 25 June 2019).
13. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies because, on the one hand, he had failed to raise his complaint concerning the leniency of the sentence with the Supreme Court of Justice and, on the other hand, he had failed to lodge a separate claim for compensation with the civil courts, as suggested by the appellate court. They also argued that the compensation awarded by the domestic courts had been sufficient, that the applicant had lost his victim status, and that his complaints were in any event manifestly ill‑founded.
14. The applicant asserted that, under domestic law, he had been precluded from lodging a separate claim with the civil courts after the criminal courts had ruled on his civil claims. He submitted that the compensation awarded in the criminal proceedings had been insufficient.
15. The Court notes that the gist of the applicant’s complaint is that the domestic proceedings did not provide him with appropriate redress in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for the injuries caused by V.B. The decisions of the domestic courts in respect of the applicant concerning non‑pecuniary damage are final. Under Article 221 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant would be precluded from lodging multiple claims in separate proceedings for compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. Moreover, in the instant case the appellate court referred to the possibility for the applicant to lodge a separate claim for compensation only of pecuniary damage once his situation had stabilised and an assessment of the relevant medical costs had been carried out (see paragraph 8 above). For those reasons, the Government’s objection of non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
16. Furthermore, the Court observes that the issue raised by the Government concerning the applicant’s victim status is closely related to the substance of the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention. The Court will therefore examine together that objection and the arguments concerning the complaint under Article 2.
17. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
18. The applicant submitted that the domestic proceedings had failed to provide him with adequate redress in respect of unlawful acts of violence committed by a private individual. He referred to the amounts previously awarded by the Court for similar violations and argued that the amount of compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage awarded to him by the domestic courts had been significantly lower.
19. The Government disagreed, arguing that the domestic investigation had been effective in so far as it had resulted in the conviction of the perpetrator and an award of damages. They submitted that the amount awarded by the domestic courts had been proportionate to the intensity and degree of the injuries sustained and had been in accordance with the domestic case‑law at the material time. The fact that, at the time of the incident, the applicant had been a police officer had implied that he had had a “greater tolerance” for criminal offences (including those committed against himself) and had thus justified a lower award of compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage than if he had been a “regular” individual.
20. The general principles concerning the conduct of an effective investigation into life‑threatening injuries under Article 2 of the Convention have been summarised in Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase (cited above, §§ 160-61 and 169).
21. The Court notes that the domestic criminal proceedings successfully identified the perpetrator and the circumstances in which the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted. They resulted in the conviction of the perpetrator and in an award of compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. The applicant did not complain about the legal classification of the acts of violence committed by V.B., nor about the leniency of the sentence imposed. For that reason, the Court will examine only whether the proceedings provided the applicant with appropriate redress and, in particular, whether the amount of compensation awarded by the domestic courts was reasonable given the circumstances of the case.
22. The Court has found in earlier cases that compensation awarded at the domestic level may still be considered adequate, even if it is lower than what the Court would have awarded, provided that the relevant decisions, which must be consonant with the legal tradition and the standard of living in the country concerned, were speedy, reasoned and executed very quickly (see Vanchev v. Bulgaria, no. 60873/09, § 36, 19 October 2017). Conversely, it has also found that an award in respect of non‑pecuniary damage which is disproportionately lower than the level of damages that the Court generally awards in comparable cases may be insufficient and manifestly unreasonable (see Scripnic v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 63789/13, §§ 46-49, 13 April 2021).
23. In the present case, while the applicant claimed EUR 28,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, he was awarded less than EUR 3,000 (see paragraph 8 above). That amount, although apparently consistent with the case‑law of the domestic courts at that time, is significantly lower than the amounts that the Court has awarded in similar cases (see, for example, Tomac v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 4936/12, § 77, 16 March 2021; Scripnic, cited above, § 55; Veronica Ciobanu v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 69829/11, § 53, 9 February 2021; and Natalia Lungu v. the Republic of Moldova [Committee], no. 68490/14, § 21, 18 January 2022). The Court is not convinced by the Government’s argument that the applicant’s status as a police officer warranted an award of lower compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for injuries sustained in the course of his duties owing to the inherent risks associated with those duties. No other reasonable justification for such a discrepancy was submitted to the Court for consideration. The Court therefore concludes that the domestic proceedings failed to provide the applicant with appropriate redress for the injuries inflicted by V.B.
24. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicant retains his victim status under Article 34 of the Convention for the purposes of his complaint under Article 2 and dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection of loss of victim status.
25. Consequently, in the present case, there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
26. The applicant claimed 9,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 1,500 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court for the submission of observations by his legal representative at the time. The applicant submitted medical reports confirming that his current condition had been caused by the head trauma sustained in 2013. He also provided a breakdown of legal services provided by his legal representative at that stage of proceedings.
27. The Government submitted that the claims were excessive and unsubstantiated. They argued that the medical reports submitted by the applicant did not establish a sufficient causal link between the injuries sustained in 2013 and the applicant’s current condition. In respect of the costs and expenses claimed by the applicant, they submitted that no award should be made in the absence of firm evidence, such as contracts or invoices.
28. The Court awards the applicant EUR 9,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
29. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 1,500 for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into Moldovan lei at the rate applicable on the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 9,000 (nine thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above‑mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 March 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President