FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF BABYCH v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 2393/17)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 February 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Babych v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Gilberto Felici, President,
Mykola Gnatovskyy,
Vahe Grigoryan, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 2393/17) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 21 December 2016 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Igor Yuriyovych Babych (“the applicant”), who was born in 1959 and lives in Poltava, and was represented by Ms I.P. Popova, a lawyer practising in Poltava;
the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention and Article 8 of the Convention to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko from the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the observations of the Government;
the decision to reject the Government’s objection to examination of the application by a Committee;
Having deliberated in private on 22 January 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The present application concerns a ban on the applicant’s leaving the country due to his failure to repay a debt established by a court decision.
2. On 19 August 2013 the Poltava Kyivskiy District Court granted an application lodged by the State bailiff seeking to have the applicant prohibited from leaving the country until he had paid in full a debt established by a court decision.
3. On 10 December 2013 the applicant, an entrepreneur, was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of the Kharkiv Region. Following this, he unsuccessfully sought to have the travel ban lifted on numerous occasions.
4. In October 2015 the applicant officially married his long-time partner, G.N., with whom he has a son, D.B., born in 2007.
5. In March 2016 the applicant, his wife and their son obtained Romanian passports. According to the documents submitted, in August 2016 the applicant’s wife and son settled in Prague, Czech Republic.
6. According to the documents submitted by the Government, the applicant was prevented from leaving the country on several occasions in 2014-16. Nevertheless, he successfully left the country on 21 February 2016 using his Ukrainian passport, in which his name was spelled differently. Furthermore, he crossed the border with his Romanian passport on several occasions in 2016 and 2017.
7. According to the latest known information, the travel ban was still in force in 2019. In particular, on 5 December 2019 the Supreme Court ultimately rejected a request by the applicant to have the information about the ban on his travel abroad deleted from the information system of the State Border Control Service of Ukraine. The court found that the fact of declaring the applicant bankrupt could not serve a basis for deleting such information, as the enforcement proceedings against him had not been completed.
8. The applicant contended that the restriction on his right to leave Ukrainian territory had been neither justified nor necessary.
9. The Government, for their part, asserted that the restriction had been justified and well-founded. They also submitted that, having received Romanian nationality, the applicant could travel abroad with his Romanian passport.
10. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
11. The relevant principles in this case are summarised in Stetsov v. Ukraine (no. 5170/15, §§ 25-32, 11 May 2021), which concerns a similar situation.
12. In the present case, as in Stetsov (cited above), the applicant was subjected to measures that were not sufficiently justified and could not be reconsidered before the date on which the repayment of the debts would be completed. The Court therefore concludes that the Ukrainian authorities failed to fulfil their obligation under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention to ensure that any interference with a person’s right to leave their country was, from the outset and throughout its duration, justified and proportionate in the circumstances of the case. The Court notes in particular that practical effect of the ban on the applicant, who was not allowed to leave the country on several occasions (see paragraph 6 above). The mere fact that the applicant obtained nationality of another State and could occasionally leave the country could not as such be considered an effective remedy against the travel ban in question and did not bring such ban, which appears to still be in force, into compliance with the requirements of Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of this provision.
13. The applicant also complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the travel ban had interfered with the right to respect for his family life.
14. The Court reiterates that the Convention includes no right, as such, to establish one’s family life in a particular country (see, inter alia, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738/10, § 107, 3 October 2014, and Biao v. Denmark [GC], no. 38590/10, § 117, 24 May 2016).
15. From the facts set out above, it is apparent that the resettlement of the applicant’s wife and son abroad took place after the ban on the applicant’s leaving the country had existed for several years, and they must have been fully aware of the consequences of their choices. Furthermore, as he was in possession of a passport from another country, he could actually travel abroad at least as from 2016. Lastly, the applicant never alleged that his wife and son had in any way been limited in coming and staying with him in Ukraine.
16. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings above, the Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession, this complaint does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
17. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction within the set time-limit. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller Gilberto Felici
Deputy Registrar President