THIRD SECTION

CASE OF VOROKOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

(Applications nos. 76648/12 and 9 others - see appended list)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

7 November 2017

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Vorokov and Others v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Luis López Guerra, President,
 Dmitry Dedov,
 Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 10 October 2017,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in ten applications (nos. 76648/12, 15473/13, 18775/13, 19179/13, 19237/13, 19422/13, 19541/13, 23177/13, 58441/13, and 60167/13) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by fifty-one Russian nationals. The applicants’ details appear in the Appendix.

2.  The Russian Government ("the Government") were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.

3.  On 27 August, 28 August and 1 October 2014 the applications were communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4.  Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis.

5.  Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation.

6.  On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (“the Town Court”) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,200,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,600,000 for non‑pecuniary damage.

7.  No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final but have never been executed.

8.  On different dates the Town Court granted the defendant authority’s request to extend the time-limit for appeal on the grounds that the authorities had not received a copy of the judgment in due course. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

9.  The relevant domestic law and practice governing the restoration of the time-limits for appeal is summed up in the Court’s judgment in the case of Magomedov and Others v. Russia (nos. 33636/09 and 9 others, §§ 35-43, 28 March 2017).

THE LAW

I.  JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

10.  In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of the Court, the Court decides to consider the applications in a single judgment, given their similar factual and legal background (see Kazakevich and 9 other “Army Pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos. 14290/03 and 9 others, § 15, 14 January 2010).

II.  STRIKING PARTS OF THE APPLICATIONS OUT OF THE LIST OF CASES

11.  The Court notes that in their submissions of various dates in 2015 some of the applicants’ representatives informed the Court that the applicants either did not intend to pursue their applications before the Court, or that they failed to maintain contact with the representatives concerning the proceedings before the Court.

12.  Article 37 § 1 of the Convention, in its relevant part, reads:

“1.  The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that

(a)  the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or ...

(c)  ... it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application ...”

13.  On different dates indicated in the appendix (see ”Strike out warnings” in the Appendix) the applicants were notified that the period allowed for submission of their comments and just satisfaction claims had expired and that no extension of time had been requested. The applicants’ attention was drawn to Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention, which provides that the Court may strike a case out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the applicant does not intend to pursue the application.

14.  No response has been received from the applicants, who have not contacted the Court ever since.

15.  On 28 February 2015 on of the applicants, Mr Kononov (application no. 19237/13) informed the Court that he had lost his interest in pursuing his application.

16.  The Court considers that, in these circumstances, the applicants may be regarded as no longer wishing to pursue their applications, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of the applications.

17.  In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the applications in respect of the applicants indicated in the appendix (see “Strike out” in the Appendix) out of the list.

III.  LOCUS STANDI AS REGARDS THE APPLICATIONS Nos. 18775/13, 19179/13, 19237/13 AND 58441/13

18.  The Court notes that Ms T. Kagitina, Ms R. Kolomiyets, Ms L. Lepekhina and Ms V. Petrenko expressed a wish to continue proceedings in respect of their deceased relatives.

A.  The parties’ submissions

19.  With reference to the case of Belskiy v. Russia ((dec.), no. 23593/03, 26 November 2009) the Government submitted that the relatives of the deceased applicants had neither been involved in the domestic proceedings either before or after the applicants’ death nor applied for legal succession in those proceedings. The award in the applicants’ favour was made by the domestic courts in respect of compensation for health damage which under the domestic law was of personal non-transferrable nature and did not provide for legal succession of the right to compensation. Therefore, the applicants’ relatives did not inherit the right to claim the judgment debt. Therefore, the relevant applications should be struck out of the Court’s list of cases pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention.

20.  The applicants did not comment on the Government’s submission.

B.  The Court’s assessment

21.  As to Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention, the Court notes that it has previously recognised the right of the relatives of the deceased applicants to pursue the application concerning social payments due to their close relatives but not received in their lifetimes (see Streltsov and other “Novocherkassk military pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos. 8549/06 and 86 others, § 37, 29 July 2010, and Nosov and Others v. Russia, nos. 9117/04 and 10441/04, §§ 29-30, 20 February 2014). However, unlike the Streltsov and other “Novocherkassk military pensioners” cases (cited above), the present applications concern non-pecuniary compensations for health damage, which was a sole instantaneous act closely linked to the victims. Moreover the relatives of the late applicants failed to submit any evidence in respect of the acceptance of the late applicants’ inheritance. Having regard to the above mentioned circumstances, the Court considers that there is nothing in the cases at hand to conclude that the late applicants’ relatives have standing to continue proceedings.

22.  As regards the applicants’ complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, the Court notes, that in the applications at hand the restoration of time-limit for appeal was closely related to the principle of legal certainty and of the “right to a court” (see, for instance, Sobelin and Others v. Russia, nos. 30672/03 and 11 others, § 67, 3 May 2007). However, since the restoration of the time-limit under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention are closely interrelated, and considering that it has already rejected the relatives’ standing as regards the complaint under the latter provision of the Convention (see the paragraph above), the Court does not consider it necessary to draw a distinction between two aspects of the restoration of time-limit procedure for the purposes of determination of the standing issue.

23.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms T. Kagitina, Ms R. Kolomiyets, Ms L. Lepekhina and Ms V. Petrenko do not have a legitimate interest in pursuing the proceedings before the Court in the late applicants’ stead.

24.  The Court does not consider that “respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention and the Protocols” requires the examination of these applications.

25.  In these circumstances the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the applications in part of the above mentioned applicants and concludes, under Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention, that they should be struck out of its list of cases.

IV.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

26.  The applicants complained that the unlawful extension of the time‑limit for appeal granted by the domestic courts following the defendant authority’s request had resulted in the judgments in their favour being quashed, which consequently constituted a violation of their right to a court. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:

Article 6 § 1

“1.  In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

A.  Admissibility

27.  In the case of Petrenko and Others one of the applicants, Ms Agibalova lodged her application with the Court on behalf of her late husband, Mr V. Shvetsov, who passed away before bringing his case to the Court.

28.  With reference to the case of Belskiy (cited above) the Government submitted that Ms Agibalova had neither been involved in the domestic proceedings nor applied for legal succession in those proceedings. The award in the applicants’ favour was made by the domestic courts in respect of compensation for health damage which under the domestic law was of personal non-transferrable nature and did not provide for legal succession of the right to compensation. Therefore, the applicant’s relative did not inherit the right to claim the judgment debt.

29.  The applicant did not comment on the Government’s submission.

30.  The Court considers that, assuming the proceedings fell within the civil limb of Article 6 § 1, their “civil” nature was related to the compensation for health damage of the applicant’s late husband. The applicant’s late husband’s interest in compensation, being a strictly personal one, could not have been transferred to heirs (see Gorodnichev v. Russia (dec.), no. 32275/03, 15 November 2007).

31.  The Court further notes that the applicant has never took part in domestic proceedings. Nor did she submit any evidence such as a succession certificate to confirm that she had accepted the succession or describing the contents of such a succession (see Raguzina v. Russia (dec.), no. 909/03, 7 September 2006).

32.  Regard being had to above mentioned circumstances the Court concludes that the applicant cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. It follows that the application in part of Ms Agibalova must be rejected as incompatible ratione personae under Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

33.  As regards the remainder of applications the Court notes that the applicants’ complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It also notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

34.  The Government considered that the present cases were similar to those previously examined by the Court and in which it did not find a violation of Article 6 (see, for instance, Tolstobrov v. Russia, no. 11612/05, 4 March 2010, and Protsenko v. Russia, no. 13151/04, 31 July 2008). They referred to the reasons stated by the Ministry of finance in its request for the reinstatement of the time-limit for appeal, namely that it had never been notified about the proceedings and the judgments delivered against it and was thus deprived of the possibility to lodge an appeal in due time. It is established and not disputed by the parties that a copy of the judgments had never been notified to the Ministry of finance or given to its representatives.

35.  The applicants maintained their claims.

36.  The Court reiterates that the existence of reasons capable of justifying a departure from the principle of legal certainty, even where they are established, is not in itself sufficient to conclude to the absence of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. Another important factor should be taken into account, that is the time elapsed from the moment when the person requesting the extension of the time-limits became aware that a judgment was delivered against him. Since the extension of the time-limits for appeal constitutes an interference with the principle of res judicata, a person requesting such an extension should act with sufficient diligence, that is without delay from the moment when he became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the judgment subject to appeal (Magomedov and Others, cited above, § 89, with further references).

37.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court recalls that it had already had an opportunity to examine the domestic proceedings complained of in the present case in its Magomedov and Others judgment (cited above), where it found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the domestic courts’ failure to examine when the Ministry became aware or “ought to have become aware” of the adoption of the judgments against it, in particular in view of a significant lapse of time between the delivery of those judgments and the introduction by the Ministry of its out-of-time appeals (Magomedov and Others, cited above, §§ 98-101). The Court does not see any reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.

38.  Having examined all the material before it the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

V.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION

39.  Invoking Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, cited above, the applicants further complained about violation of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions relying on the same facts. The relevant part of the aforementioned Article read as follows:

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”

40.  Having regard to its conclusion under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that there is no need to consider either the admissibility or the merits of the complaint submitted by the applicants under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Magomedov and Others, cited above, § 103, with numerous further references).

VI.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

41.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

42.  The applicants claimed full amounts awarded by the domestic courts.

43.  The Government argued that no award should be made to the applicants, since they either lost their victim status or their Convention rights had not been violated.

44.  The Court reiterates its finding that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the interference with the principle of legal certainty. As regards the applicants’ claim for pecuniary damage, the Court does not see a causal link between the violation found and the alleged pecuniary damage and rejects those claims. Moreover, it considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage which may have been suffered by the applicants.

B.  Costs and expenses

45.  Some of the applicants also claimed various amounts in respect of the costs and expenses.

46.  The Government contested that amount, stating in particular that no evidence was provided by the applicants in support of their claim.

47.  According to the case-law of the Court, an applicant can only be reimbursed for his costs and expenses in so far as their reality, necessity and reasonableness are established. In the present case, having regard to the documents before it and having regard to the findings of violations to which it has been subjected, the Court dismisses the claim for costs and expenses.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Decides to join the applications;

2.  Decides to strike the applications in part of the applicants indicated in the Appendix out of its list of cases;

3.  Declares the application in part of Ms Agibalova inadmissible;

4.  Declares the remainder of the applications admissible;

5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention;

6.  Holds that it is not necessary to consider separately the admissibility and the merits of the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;

7.  Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants;

8.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 November 2017, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Fatoş Aracı Luis López Guerra
Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX