M c C A N N A N D O T H E R S ve r s u s T H E U N I T E D KO N G D O M
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M c C A N N A I N Í p r ot i S P O J E N É M U K R Á ¼ OV S T V U
Okrem toho na intruktáach alebo po tom, èo spozorovali podozri-
vých, sa mohlo posúdi ako nepravdepodobné, e podozriví boli pripravení
odpáli bombu, a tak zabi ve¾a civilistov, keïe McCann a Farrellová ili
smerom k hraniènej oblasti, èo by zvyovalo riziko odhalenia a zatknutia
(pozri odsek 57). Rovnako sa mohlo posúdi ako nepravdepodobné, e v
tom okamihu by dopredu nastavili vysielaè, aby boli schopní odpáli pred-
pokladanú bombu hneï, ako budú konfrontovaní (pozri odsek 115)...
In addition, at the briefings or after the suspects had been spotted, it
might have been thought unlikely that they would have been prepared to
explode the bomb, thereby killing many civilians, as Mr McCann and Ms
Farrell strolled towards the border area since this would have increased the
risk of detection and capture (see paragraph 57 above). It might also have
been thought improbable that at that point they would have set up the
transmitter in anticipation to enable them to detonate the supposed bomb
immediately if confronted (see paragraph 115 above)...
209. V tejto súvislosti je ïalej znepokojujúce, e zhodnotenie urobené
vojakom G po zbenom vonkajom preskúmaní auta, e ilo o podozrivé
auto s bombou, bolo vojakom pod¾a ich vlastných výpovedí oznámené
ako koneèná identifikácia, e existovala taká bomba (pozri odseky 48 a
5152). Pripomína sa, e vojak G síce mal skúsenosti s bombami v autách,
no vylo najavo, e nie je odborníkom na rádiovú komunikáciu ani na vý-
buniny; a e jeho zhodnotenie, e ilo o podozrivé auto s bombou, zaloe-
né na jeho poznatku, e automobilová anténa nebola na mieste, bolo
v podstate skôr správou, e bombu nemono vylúèi (pozri odsek 53).
209. It is further disquieting in this context that the assessment made
by Soldier G, after a cursory external examination of the car, that there was
a suspect car bomb was conveyed to the soldiers, according to their own
testimony, as a definite identification that there was such a bomb (see
paragraphs 48, and 5152 above). It is recalled that while Soldier G had
experience in car bombs, it transpired that he was not an expert in radio
communications or explosives; and that his assessment that there was a
suspect car bomb, based on his observation that the car aerial was out of
place, was more in the nature of a report that a bomb could not be ruled
out (see paragraph 53 above).
210. Keïe sa na alternatívne monosti a definitívne nahlásenie existen-
cie automobilovej bomby, ktorá mohla by pod¾a vykonaného zhodnotenia
odpálená stlaèením tlaèidla, dostatoène neprihliadalo, rad pracovných hy-
potéz bol oznámený vojakom A, B, C a D ako istoty, èím sa pouitie smrte¾-
nej sily stalo takmer nevyhnutným.
210. In the absence of sufficient allowances being made for alternative
possibilities, and the definite reporting of the existence of a car bomb
which, according to the assessments that had been made, could be detona-
ted at the press of a button, a series of working hypotheses were conveyed
to Soldiers A, B, C and D as certainties, thereby making the use of lethal
force almost unavoidable.
211. Neschopnos vytvori podmienky pre krajnos omylu sa vak musí
posudzova aj v kombinácii s tréningom vojakov pokraèova v stre¾be, kto-
rú u zaèali, kým podozrivý nie je màtvy. Ako uviedol koroner vo svojej zá-
vereènej reèi pred porotou na súdnom vyetrovaní, vetci tyria vojaci strie-
¾ali, aby zabili podozrivých (pozri odseky 61, 63, 80 a 120). Vojak E svedèil,
e s vojakmi sa diskutovalo o tom, e narastá monos, e budú musie
strie¾a, aby zabili, keïe bude menej èasu, keï ide o tlaèidlové zariadenie
(pozri odsek 26). Za týchto okolností boli orgány viazané povinnosou re-
pektova právo na ivot podozrivých a postupova s najväèou opatrnosou
pri hodnotení informácií, ktoré mali k dispozícií, skôr ako ich postúpili vo-
jakom, ktorých pouitie zbraní automaticky zahàòalo zastrelenie.
211. However, the failure to make provision for a margin of error must
also be considered in combination with the training of the soldiers to
continue shooting once they opened fire until the suspect was dead. As
noted by the Coroner in his summing-up to the jury at the inquest, all four
soldiers shot to kill the suspects (see paragraphs 61, 63, 80 and 120 above).
Soldier E testified that it had been discussed with the soldiers that there
was an increased chance that they would have to shoot to kill since there
would be less time where there was a button device (see paragraph 26
above). Against this background, the authorities were bound by their obli-
gation to respect the right to life of the suspects to exercise the greatest of
care in evaluating the information at their disposal before transmitting it
to soldiers whose use of firearms automatically involved shooting to kill.
212. Hoci podrobnejie preskúmanie výcviku vojakov poèas súdneho vy-
etrovania bolo znemonené verejným záujmom... nie je zrejmé, èi boli tré-
novaní alebo pouèení zhodnoti, èi pouitie zbraní s úmyslom zrani ciele
mono povoli na základe osobitných okolností, ktoré vznikli v okamihu
zatýkania.
212. Although detailed investigation at the inquest into the training
received by the soldiers was prevented by the public interest... it is not clear
whether they had been trained or instructed to assess whether the use of
firearms to wound their targets may have been warranted by the specific
circumstances that confronted them at the moment of arrest.
Ich reflexnému konaniu v tejto dôleitej súvislosti chýba stupeò opatr-
nosti pri pouívaní zbraní, ktorá sa oèakáva od personálu vykonávajúceho
zákony v demokratickej spoloènosti, a to dokonca aj keï ide o nebezpeè-
Their reflex action in this vital respect lacks the degree of caution in
the use of firearms to be expected from law enforcement personnel in a
democratic society, even when dealing with dangerous terrorist suspects,
