AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                      Application No. 25701/94                    by The Former King Constantinos of Greece                    and 8 members of his family                    against Greece       The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on21 April 1998, the following members being present:           MM   S. TRECHSEL, President               J.-C. GEUS               A. WEITZEL               J.-C. SOYER               F. MARTINEZ               C.L. ROZAKIS               L. LOUCAIDES               B. MARXER               M.A. NOWICKI               B. CONFORTI               N. BRATZA               I. BÉKÉS               D. SVÁBY               G. RESS               P. LORENZEN               K. HERNDL               E.A. ALKEMA               M. VILA AMIGÓ          Mrs  M. HION          MM   R. NICOLINI               A. ARABADJIEV           Mr   M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protectionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;      Having regard to the application introduced on 21 October 1994by the Former King Constantinos of Greece and 8 members of his familyagainst Greece and registered on 17 November 1994 under fileNo. 25701/94;       Having regard to : -    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of     the Commission; -    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on     9 October 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the     applicants on 29 May 1996; -    the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 21 April 1998;      Having deliberated;      Decides as follows: THE FACTS      The application has been introduced by: 1.   the former King Constantinos of Greece (hereinafter "the formerKing"), 2.   his wife, the former Queen Anne Marie of Greece, his fivechildren: 3.   the Princess Alexia, 4.   the Princess Theodora, 5.   the Prince Pavlos, 6.   the Prince Nikolaos, and 7.   the Prince Theodoros, 8.   his sister, the Princess Irene, 9.   his aunt, the Princess Ekaterini.      The former King and his family do not possess a surname. However,on certain occasions, the name "Glucksborg" has been applied to themby the Greek State.      The first to seventh applicants live in London, the eighthapplicant lives in Madrid and the ninth applicant lives inBuckinghamshire. Before the Commission the applicants are representedby Messrs. Nathene & Co., Solicitors in London.      The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may besummarised as follows. A.   Particular circumstances of the case      In 1864 a crowned democracy was established in Greece, whenGeorge I, son of the Danish King Christian IX, was elected as King andascended the throne. The former King Constantinos of Greece is a directdescendant of King George I. He ascended the Greek throne in 1964, atthe age of twenty-four, in succession to his father King Paul I.      On 21 April 1967 there was a military coup in Greece. The formerKing remained in the country until 13 December 1967, when he left forRome.      On 15 November 1968 the military regime promulgated a newconstitution (the former had been enacted in 1952), which was amendedin 1973 when the former King was overthrown (see below). Article 21 ofthe 1968 Constitution (as amended in 1973) guaranteed the right toproperty and provided that nobody was to be deprived of property saveinsofar as such deprivation was carried out in the public interest andupon payment of full compensation, the amount of which was to bedetermined by the civil courts. However, Article 134 para. 3 of thesame Constitution provided for a unique legislative measure to beenacted, which would have the effect of confiscating the moveable andimmoveable property of the former King and the Royal family.      Between 21 April 1967 and 31 May 1973 the military dictatorshipformally maintained the crowned democracy, despite the former King'sself-imposed exile.      On 1 June 1973 the military regime purported to abolish thecrowned democracy, to declare the former King and his heirs deposed andto establish a Presidential Parliamentary Republic.      In October 1973 the military dictatorship issued a legislativedecree No. 225/1973, pursuant to Article 134 para. 3 of the 1968Constitution (as amended in 1973), whereby all moveable and immoveableproperty of the former King and Royal family was confiscated witheffect from the date of publication of the decree in the GovernmentGazette (4 October 1973), and whereby title to the confiscated propertypassed to the Greek State. Land belonging to the former King at Tatoi(Attica) and at the island of Kerkyra (Corfu), as well as land atPolidendri belonging to the former King, Princess Irene and PrincessEkaterini, were specifically mentioned as forming part of theimmoveable property being confiscated.      The above decree provided for compensation in the sum of Drs.120.000.000 to be distributed amongst the members of the Royal familywhose property was confiscated, and this sum was deposited in a bankaccount to be claimed by the Royal family. The former King's share ofthe compensation was stated to be Drs. 94.000.000 and Princess Irene'sshare Drs. 12.000.000. No compensation was provided for PrincessEkaterini. It was further provided that the compensation had to beclaimed by 31 December 1975. No part of it was ever claimed.      On 24 July 1974 the military dictatorship in Greece was replacedby a civilian Government under the leadership of Mr. Karamanlis.      By a legislative Act of 1 August 1974 ("the First ConstitutionalAct of 1974"), the Government revived the Constitution of 1952, exceptfor the provisions relating to the form of government (Article 1).      Article 10 of this Act provided that, until the National Assemblywas reconvened, legislative power vested in the Council of Ministerswas to be exercised through legislative decrees. Article 10 para. 2provided that such legislative decrees would be capable of havingretrospective effect as regards any issues arising from anyConstitutional Acts after 21 April 1967. Article 15 provided that the1968 Constitution (as amended), as well as any other Constitutional Actor act of a constitutional character passed under the militarydictatorship after 21 April 1967, was repealed.      Pursuant to Articles 1 and 10 of the First Constitutional Act of1974, the Government issued a legislative decree (No. 72/1974) whichprovided for the property of the former King and the Royal family tobe administered and managed by a seven member committee until the formof regime had been finally determined.      The above decree was implemented by three Ministerial decisions: 1.   By decision No. 18443/1509 of 1 October 1974, a seven member     committee was formed. 2.   By decision No. 21987 of 24 October 1974, it was provided that     "the delivery [of the property] of the Royal family from the     State to the committee" was to be made by 31 December 1974. 3.   By decision No. 25616 of 23 December 1974, it was provided that     the delivery of the property of the Royal family to the committee     would continue until completion, before delivery to its owners     or to a person nominated by them.      Between 1974 and 1979 all the moveable and immoveable propertyof the former King and Royal family in Greece was administered andmanaged in the name of the committee established pursuant to L.D.72/1974, on behalf of the former King and Royal family. In 1979 theproperty was delivered to them.      On 17 November 1974 there were elections to the NationalAssembly, and the Assembly was thereafter reconvened. A referendum washeld on 8 December 1974, the outcome of which was in favour of aParliamentary Republic. By Resolution D 18/18.1.1975, the NationalAssembly resolved and declared, inter alia, that democracy in Greecewas never lawfully abolished, and that the revolutionary coup of21 April 1967, as well as the situation which resulted as a consequenceup to 23 July 1974, constituted a coup d'état which aimed to encroachupon the power and the sovereign rights of the people.      In 1975 the National Assembly enacted the present Constitution,which came into force on 11 June 1975.      On 12 February 1975 all Embassies were informed by the Ministryof Foreign Affairs that "all members of the former Royal family retaintheir Greek nationality (ithageneia)" and that if there was a requestto renew the Royal passports, a joint (family) passport should beissued, in the name of "Constantinos, Former King of Greece" and incomparable form for the other members of the Royal family.      In 1981 the socialist "PA.SO.K." party under the leadership ofMr. Papandreou was elected to power in Greece. From January 1984onwards discussions were held with the former King regarding hisproperty. By 1988 an agreement in principle had been reached betweenthe Government and the former King relating to the property and taxliabilities of the Royal family. However, the agreement was neverexecuted because of the ill-health of the Prime Minister,Mr. Papandreou.      On 1 July 1983 the Danish Prime Minister's Department stated that"from King Christian IX [the former King's ancestor] onward no DanishKing or other member of the Danish Royal Family is or has been bearingthe name of 'Glucksborg' or any other surname".       The 1992 agreement      In 1990 the conservative "New Democracy" party was elected topower.      In 1992 an agreement was reached between the former King and theGreek State, in the following terms: 1.   The former King transferred an area of 200.030 square metres of     his forest at Tatoi to the Greek State for the sum of Drs.     460.000.000. 2.   The former King donated an area of 401.541,75 square metres of     his forest at Tatoi to a foundation for the benefit of the     public, namely the "Universal Hippocration Medical Foundation and     Research Centre". 3.   A foundation for the benefit of the public, namely the National     Forest of Tatoi was created, and the former King donated an area     of 37.426.000 square metres of his forest at Tatoi to the     foundation. 4.   The former King, the Royal family and the Greek State waived all     legal rights in connection with, and discontinued all pending     legal proceedings concerning the Royal family's tax liabilities. 5.   The former King and the Royal family agreed to pay to the Greek     State the sum of Drs. 817.677.937 in respect of inheritance tax,     income tax and capital taxes, together with interest and     surcharges. The payment to be made by the former King would be     set off against any sums due to the former King pursuant to the     agreement.      The agreement was contained in and evidenced by notarial deedNo. 10573/1992 of 3 June 1992. On 28 September 1992 the division ofScientific Studies (dieythinsi Epistimonikon Meleton) of the GreekParliament issued a report on a draft bill ratifying the abovementioned notarial act. The report stated inter alia that legislativedecree No. 225/1973 was repealed by legislative decree No. 72/1974 andthat the property thereby "reverted to its former ownership status".Subsequently the agreement was incorporated in and given the force oflaw by Law No. 2086/1992. It has since been implemented.      It should be noted that in Law No. 2086/1992 the name"Glucksborg" as applied to the Royal family is stated to be "devoid ofany legal foundation".       Remaining property and ownership titles      In addition to the property which was the subject of LawNo. 2086/1992, the former King, Princess Irene and Princess Ekateriniown the following property in Greece:      a)   The former King owns a further area of 41.990.000 square          metres of land and a building at Tatoi. This property was          formed during the reign of King George I (the first          applicant's grand-father), through successive purchases of          pieces of land: - By deed No. 24101/15.5.1872, King George I purchased from ScarlatosSoutzos the "Liopessi-Mahonia" estate and from Soutzos' wife theadjacent "Tatoi" estate, for a total of Drs. 300.000. - Under Law No. 599/17.2.1877, the Greek State transferred to KingGeorge I the forest known as "Bafi", of approximately 15.567.000 squaremetres. A part of approximately 1.000.000 square metres of the aboveproperty was subsequently exchanged for another property of equal area,adjacent to "Tatoi" estate and belonging to local landowners, who werepaid by King George I Drs. 3.000 to compensate for the difference invalue of the exchanged properties. - By deed No. 55489/4.4.1891, King George I purchased from AndreasSyngros a part of the "Kiourka" estate, which is adjacent to the"Tatoi" estate, for Drs. 110.000. - By certificate No. 382/20.10.1878, the mortgage registrar ofMarathonas attests that the "Keramydi" estate belongs to King GeorgeI and was devolved to him by his predecessors in title IoannisMalakindis, Dimitrios, Vassilios and Panagis Dionyssiotis, GeorgeKyriazis, George Sardelis and Stamata Sykaminioti. These persons hadacquired the property in parts through successive purchases from 1844to 1878.      By his holograph will dated 24 July 1904, King George I made the"Tatoi" estate a family trust (familia-fideicommis) in order to serveas a permanent residence of the reigning King of the Greeks. However,according to the then prevailing Byzantine-Roman Law, a family trustlasts only for four successions, which means that the trust is releasedin the fourth successor.      Following the death of King George I on 5 March 1913, Tatoidevolved to his successor, King Constantinos I, and following thelatter's deposition from the throne in 1917, to his second-born son,King Alexander. After the latter's death in 1920 Tatoi came back toKing Constantinos I who had in the meantime returned to the throne.After the latter's resignation from the throne in September 1922, Tatoicame to his first-born son and Crown Prince George II.      Then, following the abolishment of the Crown and the proclamationof the Republic by resolution of the fourth Constituent Assembly dated25 March 1924, the Greek State expropriated Tatoi by LawNo. 2312/14/20.8.1924, while the "Bafi" estate came ipso jure andwithout any compensation to the State, since it was donated by it.      Following the return of King George II to the throne, EmergencyLaw of 22 January 1936 gave Tatoi back to the King "in full ownershipand possession", with the exception of the "Bafi-Keramydi" estatewhich, in the meanwhile, had been allotted to landless refugees. Theexplanatory report of this law stated inter alia that the expropriationhad been in breach of Article 11 of the Constitution of 1911, accordingto which a compulsory expropriation must always be preceded bycompensation to the owner determined by the courts.      After the death of George II on 1st April 1947, his brother Paulcame to the throne. Legislative Decree 1136/5/11.10.1949 stated thefollowing: "The Tatoi estate, which was returned ... to the late KingGeorge II, has become the unreserved, free and exclusive property ofH.M. King Paul from his accession to the throne". Following King Paul'sdeath on 6 March 1964, the property came to his son and successorConstantinos II (the first applicant), by virtue of his father'sholograph will dated 8 December 1959.      b)   The former King and Princess Irene each own 101,5/288 of an          area of 33.600.000 square metres of land at Polidendri, and          Princess Ekaterini owns 36/288 of that area.      By virtue of deed No. 38939/1906, Hassan Efendi Leondaritis, alandowner of Larissa, transferred and sold to Crown Prince ConstantinosI the estate known as "Polidendri", for the amount of Drs. 397.500.Following the death of Constantinos I, the estate devolved to hisintestate heirs as follows: to his wife Sophia 2/8 ab indivisio, andto each of his children George II, Paul, Helen, Irene, Ekaterini andthe daughter of his predeceased son Alexander, Alexandra, 1/8 abindivisio.      By virtue of deeds Nos. 79847 of 18 February 1924 and 80452 of24 March 1924, the above co-heirs and co-owners (with the exception ofEkaterini) transferred and sold 7/8 ab indivisio of the estate toAthanassios Galeos, a captain of the merchant marine, for the amountof Drs. 4.585.000. As regards the 1/8 ab indivisio share of Ekaterini,a price of Drs. 650.000 was preliminarily agreed and the land wasleased to the new owner pending the completion of the requiredformalities, whereupon the land would be transferred to him.      By virtue of deed No. 4289 of 20 March 1925, Athanassios Galeosand other people formed the "Forest Company" (Anonimos Dasiki Etairia),to which Athanassios Galeos transferred the 7/8 ab indivisio of theestate he had acquired. This company was dissolved by resolution of itsGeneral Assembly dated 12 May 1938. By deed No. 22408 of 7 October1939, the liquidators of the company transferred and sold to CrownPrince Paul the 7/8 ab indivisio of the estate for the amount of Drs.4.000.000 which was paid with funds from the dowry of his wife,Princess Frederica. After his death, 14/32 of his share to "Polidendri"devolved to his widow, and 14/96 to each of his three children, Sophia,Constantinos (the first applicant) and Irene (the eighth applicant).In 1968 Princess Sophia declined the inheritance, and her share of theestate was added to the share of the remaining heirs pro rata. Afterthe death of Queen Frederica on 6 December 1981, and in the absence ofa will, her 49/96 ab indivisio share on "Polidendri" devolved to herchildren in equal shares, i.e. each child received 49/288 of her share.       c)   The Mon Repos estate at the island of Kerkyra      The original title on this property is minutes No. 278 of 1stJune 1864 of the Provincial Council of Kerkyra, by which the Councildecided to offer to King George I the house in which the BritishMagistrate of the Supreme Council once lived, together with thesurrounding area, situated at the place known as "Aghios Pandeleïmonof Garitza". The existing records from that time do not indicate thearea, exact location and limits of the donated estate.      Between 1870 and 1912 King George I enlarged the above estate bysuccessive purchases of certain smaller or bigger tracts of landbelonging to third parties, situated around or inside the farm. Aftertwo purchases made by George II, Mon Repos took its final shape ofapproximately 238.000 square metres.      Following the death of King George I, Mon Repos devolved toPrince Andreas, by virtue of King George's holograph will dated 24 July1904.      After the 1922 Revolution and by decision No. 1767/1923, thecompulsory expropriation of Mon Repos was proclaimed in favour of theState in order to be used as the summer residence of the reigning King.In 1931 the administrative eviction of Prince Andreas was ordered.Legal proceedings were then instituted, and by judgment No. 57/1934,the Kerkyra Court of Appeal (Efeteio) ordered the return of the Estateto Prince Andreas. Following the restoration of the crowned democracy,Emergency Law No. 514/1937 expressly provided that Mon Repos beconceded and transferred in full ownership and possession to PrinceAndreas.      By deed No. 11909/1937, Prince Andreas sold Mon Repos to KingGeorge II against a life annuity payable by yearly instalments of Drs.400.000. King George II died on 1st April 1947. His co-heirs donatedtheir shares to King George's brother, King Paul, who acquired fullownership of Mon Repos (deeds Nos. 3650/1957, 3816/1957 and 5438/1959).Following King Paul's death, and by virtue of his holograph will, MonRepos devolved to his widow Frederica (usufruct) and to his son, thefirst applicant (bare ownership). The usufruct was terminated by thedeath of Queen Frederica on 6 December 1981, and the first applicantacquired full title ownership of Mon Repos.      On or about 5 August 1994 the building of Mon Repos was brokeninto and physically entered. It is now occupied by the Municipality ofKerkyra.       Rescission of the 1992 agreement      Following the elections of autumn 1993, a Government under theleadership of Mr. Papandreou was again returned to power in Greece.This Government introduced Law No. 2215/1994 which was passed by theGreek Parliament on 16 April 1994 and became law with effect from11 May 1994. It provides as follows: 1.   Law 2086/1992 is repealed and Deed No. 10573/1992 rescinded. Any     acts carried out pursuant thereto are void and of no legal     consequence (Article 1). The acts so declared void and of no     legal consequence include the "Universal Hippocration Medical     Foundation and Research Centre" at Tatoi and the National Forest     of Tatoi. 2.   The Greek State becomes the owner of the moveable and immoveable     property of the former King, Princess Irene and Princess     Ekaterini (Article 2). 3.   Title to the property Mon Repos on the island of Kerkyra is     transferred to the Municipality of Kerkyra (Article 4 para. 2). 4.   Taxes already assessed are written off. All legal proceedings     pending before the administrative Courts or the Council of State     (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias) in respect of inheritance and other     taxes, surcharges and penalties are discontinued. Amounts paid     by the former King and other members of the Royal family in     respect of tax may be claimed back from the Greek State, but the     State may oppose any set-off of such a claim against any claim     of the State against the Royal family (Article 5 para. 1). 5.   Any agreements concerning any property of the Royal family,     except leasehold agreements, are declared void. Any leases of     land belonging to the Royal family continue as if entered into     between the lessees and the Greek State (Article 5 para. 2). 6.   Any legal proceedings brought by the former King or other members     of the Royal family before any Greek court using the designation     "King" or any other royal designation, even if combined with the     word "ex" or "former", will not be recognised (Article     6 para. 4). 7.   Preconditions are imposed for the continued recognition of the     Greek nationality of the former King and the Royal family, and     for the retention of their Greek passports:           - A declaration must be submitted to the Registrar of          Births, Marriages and Deaths (liziarxeio) of Athens to the          effect that the former King and Royal family unreservedly          respect the 1975 Constitution and accept and recognise the          Greek Republic.           - A further declaration must be submitted to the Registrar          to the effect that the former King and Royal family          unreservedly waive any claim relating to the past holding          of any office or possession of any official title.           - The former King and Royal family must register in the          Municipal Register of Citizens (mitroa arrenon i          dimotologia) under a name and a surname. The law expressly          refers to the first applicant as "Constantinos Glucksborg". 8.   Any legislative provision contrary to this legislation is     automatically repealed (Article 6 para. 5).       Legal proceedings before the Greek courts      The applicants have brought several legal proceedings before theGreek courts, concerning the titles to their estates.      The applicants have also challenged the constitutionality of LawNo. 2215/1994. Following two conflicting judgments issued by the Courtof Cassation (Areios Pagos) and the Council of State, the case wasreferred to the Special Supreme Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio).       The judgment issued by the Special Supreme Court on 25 June 1997      The Court first examined whether the applicants were entitled tobring legal proceedings before it without using a surname. The Courtmade reference to Articles 20 of the Greek Constitution and 6 para. 4of Law No. 2215/1994 and held that "the indication 'former King' ismentioned in the legal documents not as a title of nobility which isforbidden by the Constitution, but in order to define the identity ofthis litigant, who for the reasons stated earlier, has no surname ...It concerns a reference to a historic fact, which, like other elements,can indeed designate the identity of the above person, so that thisperson may enjoy judicial protection".      As regards the question of the Royal property, the Court stressedthat it "was from the beginning a political question", that theproperty rights of the applicants were linked to the form of Governmentand that "during the reign of the Royal family, the property thatbelonged to the King and the Royal family was treated like a specialgroup of property". The Court noted inter alia the following:      "When the Constitution by Article 1 defines the form of the     regime, by the same provision, which is historically interpreted,     in the framework of the political and constitutional conjuncture     ... in which it was voted, pursuant to the regulations of the     First Constitutional Act and of legislative decree No. 72/1974     that was issued on the basis of its Article 10, also solves the     issue of the Royal property. In other words, the referendum     renders irrevocable the devolvement of this property to the     State, in a way that its return by law to the former King was     contrary to the Constitution. Therefore, Article 1 of Law No.     2086/1992 ... whose regulations imply that the former Royal     property continued to belong to the deposed monarch and the     members of the former Royal family, and actually connect these     persons with the property, contravenes the Constitution."      Consequently, the Special Supreme Court, by thirteen votes tofour, held that Law No. 2215/1994 is constitutional. According to theGreek Constitution the judgments of the Special Supreme Court areirrevocable and binding on all Greek courts (Article 100 para. 4).  B.   Relevant domestic law      The domestic law relevant to the present application, other thanthe Law Nos. 2086/1992 and 2215/1994 already mentioned above, iscontained in the Greek Constitution of 1975.      Article 4 paras. 1, 2, 3 and 7      "1. All Greeks are equal before the law.      2. Greek men and women have equal rights and equal     obligations.      3. All persons possessing the qualifications for     citizenship as specified by law are Greek citizens.     Withdrawal of Greek citizenship shall be permitted only in     case of voluntary acquisition of another citizenship or of     undertaking service contrary to national interests in a     foreign country, under the conditions and procedures more     specifically provided by law. ...      7.  Titles of nobility or distinction are neither conferred     upon nor recognised in Greek citizens."      Article 5      "1.  All persons shall have the right to develop freely     their personality and to participate in the social,     economic and political life of the country, insofar as they     do not infringe upon the rights of others or violate the     Constitution and moral values.      2.  All persons living within the Greek territory shall     enjoy full protection of their life, honour and freedom,     irrespective of nationality, race or language and of     religious or political beliefs.  Exceptions shall be     permitted only in cases provided by international law."      Article 9 para. 1      "1. ... Personal and family life of the individual is     inviolable."      Article 17 paras. 1, 2 and 4      "1.  Property is protected by the State; rights deriving     therefrom, however, may not be exercised contrary to public     interest.      2.  No one shall be deprived of his property except for the     public benefit which must be duly proven, when and as     specified by law and always following full compensation     corresponding to the value of the expropriated property at     the time of the court hearing on the provisional     determination of compensation.  In cases in which a request     for the final determination of compensation is made, the     value at the time of the court hearing of the request shall     be considered.      4.  Compensation shall in all cases be determined by civil     courts. Such compensation may also be determined     provisionally by the court after hearing or summoning the     beneficiary, who may be obliged, at the discretion of the     court, to furnish a commensurate guarantee for collecting     the compensation as provided by law."      Article 20 para. 1      "1. Every person is entitled to receive legal protection by     the courts and may plead before them his views concerning     his rights or interests, as specified by law."  COMPLAINTS 1.   The applicants allege that Law No. 2215/1994 violates theirConvention rights in the following manner: a.   The applicants complain that the Law in itself and its effectsupon them constitute degrading treatment or punishment, in breach ofArticle 3 of the Convention, by reason of subjecting the continuedrecognition of their nationality and the retention of their passportsto conditions which themselves violate their rights under the GreekConstitution and the Convention. b.   The applicants next complain that the Law in providing that noaction may be brought by them before the Greek courts if they use aRoyal designation, even if coupled with the prefix "ex" or "former",violates their right of access to a court, guaranteed by Article 6para. 1 of the Convention. c.   The applicants further complain that the Law in providing thatno action may be brought by them before the Greek courts if they usea royal designation, even if coupled with the prefix "ex" or "former",and requires, as a pre-condition for continued recognition ofnationality and retention of passports, the adoption of a surname,namely that of "Glucksborg", violates their right to respect for theirprivate and family life, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. d.   The applicants also complain that the Law in denying their titleto property they own and confiscating, or authorising the confiscationof that property, violates their right to property, in breach ofArticle 1 of Protocol No. 1. e.   The applicants further complain that they have been subject todiscriminatory treatment, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention,read on its own and together with Articles 6 para. 1 and 8 of theConvention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 2.   Following the judgment issued by the Special Supreme Court, theapplicants finally complain that the latter was lacking independenceand impartiality, in breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.  PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION      The application was introduced on 21 October 1994 and registeredon 17 November 1994.      On 15 May 1995 the Commission decided to communicate theapplication to the respondent Government.      The Government's written observations were submitted on 9 October1995, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. Theapplicants replied on 29 May 1996, after two extensions of the time-limit.      On 7 September 1996 the Commission decided to adjourn theexamination of the case pending the outcome of the proceedings beforethe Special Supreme Court.      On 12 January 1998 the Commission decided to invite the partiesto an oral hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.      The hearing took place on 21 April 1998. The parties wererepresented as follows:  For the Government: Mr Vassilios Kontolaimos, Senior Adviser (Paredros), Legal AdvisoryCouncil of the State (Nomiko Symvoulio ton Kratons), Acting Agent Mrs Kyriaki Grigoriou, Legal Assistant (Dikastikos Antiprosopos), LegalAdvisory Council of the State, Acting Agent Mrs Mania Telalian, Member of the Special Legal Service (Eidiki NomikiYpiresia) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Acting Agent Mr Peter Duffy Q.C., Barrister, Counsel Professor Nicolaos Alivizatos, Counsel Professor Michail-Constantinos Stathopoulos, Counsel Mrs Maria Demitriou, Barrister, Counsel Mr Charis Pampoukis, Adviser Mr Georgios Katrougalos, Adviser Mr Elias Kastanas, Adviser Mr Petros Liacouras, Adviser Mr Dimitri Konstas, Permanent Representative of Greece to the Councilof Europe, was also present at the hearing.  For the applicants: Lord Anthony Lester Q.C., Barrister, Representative Miss Monica Carss-Frisk, Barrister, Representative Mrs Nathene Arnaoutis, Lawyer, Representative Mr John Bravos, Lawyer, Representative Professor Apostolos Georgiadis, Adviser Mrs Angeliki Georgiadis, Lawyer, Adviser      The first, second, third, fifth, sixth and eighth applicants werealso present at the hearing.  THE LAW 1.   The applicants complain that Law No. 2215/1994 which providesthat no action may be brought by them before the Greek courts if theyuse a royal designation, even if coupled with the prefix "ex" or"former", violates their right of access to a court, in breach ofArticle 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, read on its owntogether with Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, in that it isimposed for punitive political reasons and lacks an objective andreasonable justification.      The relevant part of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of theConvention provides as follows:      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...     everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent     and impartial tribunal established by law ..."      Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground     such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other     opinion, national or social origin, association with a national     minority, property, birth or other status."      The Government note that the Special Supreme Court permitted theapplicants to bring proceedings before it under the name of theirchoice. The Government state in this respect that they will not imposea specific surname to the applicants. Therefore the Government arguethat the applicants can no longer claim to be victims of a violationof the Convention within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of theConvention.      The applicants reply that it is not clear whether the validityof the relevant provisions of Law No. 2215/1994 is affected or not bythe fact that the Special Supreme Court allowed them to bring legalproceedings before it without using a surname. According to theapplicants, the judgement of the Special Supreme Court did not declarethose provisions invalid. It merely accepted the fact that theapplicants do not have a surname and that the personal particularsconcerning the former King and the other applicants mentioned in thedocuments before it were sufficient to identify them for the purposeof the proceedings before that court.      The Commission recalls its case-law according to which it fallsin the first place to the national authorities to redress any allegedviolation of the Convention (No. 10668/83, Dec. 13.5.87, D.R. 52, p.177). Thus, where the national authorities have explicitly or insubstance recognised and subsequently redressed the alleged violation,the applicant can no longer claim to be victim of a violation of theConvention (No. 12719/87, Dec. 3.5.88, D.R. 56, p. 237).      In this case, the Commission notes that the Special Supreme Courtheld that the applicants were entitled to bring legal proceedingsbefore it without using a surname: indeed, in order to determine hisprocedural identity, the first applicant had designated himself as"Constantinos, former King".      The Commission considers accordingly that the Special SupremeCourt has implicitly held that the relevant provisions of LawNo. 2215/1994 are contrary to Article 20 para. 1 of the GreekConstitution (which provides that every person is entitled to receivelegal protection by the courts) and should not therefore be applied.The Commission recalls in that respect that the judgments of theSpecial Supreme Court are irrevocable and binding on all Greek courts.      In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the allegedviolation of the Convention regarding the applicants' right of accessto a court was rectified at the domestic level. Consequently, theapplicants can no longer claim to be victims of a violation of theirrights under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.      It follows that this part of the application is inadmissiblewithin the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 2.   The applicants further complain that Law No. 2215/1994 whichrequires, as a pre-condition for continued recognition of nationalityand retention of passports, the adoption of a surname, in particularthat of "Glucksborg", constitutes a degrading treatment or punishment,in breach of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, and violates theirright to respect for their private and family life, in breach ofArticle 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, read on its own and in connectionwith Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.      Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads as follows:      "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading     treatment or punishment."      Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and     family life, his home and his correspondence.      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests     of national security, public safety or the economic well-being     of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the     rights and freedoms of others."      The Government submit that the applicants have not exhausteddomestic remedies as they have taken no legal action to redress thealleged violations of the Convention. In particular the Governmentclaim that, following the judgment of the Special Supreme Court, theapplicants may initiate any legal proceedings they deem appropriatebefore any Greek court, under whatever name they choose to use; theymay also address themselves under the same name to any competentadministrative authority.      Alternatively, the Government submit that this part of theapplication is manifestly ill-founded. The Government first stress, asa matter of historical fact, that it is not accurate to say that theapplicants have no name to relate to, given that the Royal house ofSchleswig-Holstein-Sontenburg-Glucksborg is the house of Christian IXof which the applicants are direct descendants. However, LawNo. 2215/1994 does not compel the applicants to have a specificsurname, but leaves open to the family the choice of any non-royalsurname should they wish to register in accordance with it.      In this respect, the Government argue that it is manifestlywithin the margin of appreciation of a Contracting State which hasmoved from monarchy to a presidential republic to require the formerKing and his family to register under a surname like all other citizensand to declare formally acceptance of the Constitution and thecountry's republican status. In a democratic society such a requirementdoes not constitute a lack of respect for the applicants' right toprivate and family life, nor can it be regarded as being humiliatingor degrading within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of theConvention.      The applicants stress from the outset that they have alwaysrecognised the Republic and the 1975 Constitution, and that they makeno claim to any title or privilege available to them during the timeof the crowned monarchy.      As regards domestic remedies, the applicants consider that theyare not obliged to attempt to exhaust any domestic remedies as regardstheir rights under Articles 3 and 8 (Art. 3, 8) of the Convention. Theyconsider that the judgment of the Special Supreme Court amounts to amanifest denial of justice; it is therefore evident that there is norealistic prospect of their being granted an effective remedy inrespect of their rights in the Greek courts.      The applicants further consider that the effect of LawNo. 2215/1994 is to compel them to change the names given to them atbirth and recorded in official documents, by adopting a surname whichwas never theirs. They claim that, unlike the members of some Royalhouses, they themselves and their ancestors have never possessed asurname. There is no foundation as a matter of historical fact or Greeklaw for associating the Greek Royal family with the name "Glucksborg",as the 1994 Law seeks to do. This was expressly recognised in the 1992agreement reached between the Greek State and the former King, and wasalso accepted by the Special Supreme Court in its judgment.      Furthermore, the applicants do not accept the Government'sargument that their choice of a surname under the 1994 Law is notrestricted to a specific name, given that Article 6 para. 5 of this Lawexpressly refers to the former King as "Constantinos Glucksborg".      The applicants conclude that, in any event, even if LawNo. 2215/1994 leaves it open to them to adopt another surname, this isas much an interference with their private life as the imposition ofa specific surname, involving as it does an enforced change of the nameby which they have been recognised all their lives.      The Commission does not consider that it is required to rule onthe objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies raised by theGovernment, since this part of the application can be rejected for thefollowing reason.      The Commission recalls that Article 8 (Art. 8) does not containany explicit reference to names. Nonetheless, since it constitutes ameans of personal identification and a link to a family, anindividual's name does concern his or her private and family life (seeEur. Court HR, Burghartz v. Switzerland judgment of 22 February 1994,Series A no. 280-B, p. 28, para. 24).      The Commission further recalls that in the particular sphereunder consideration the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin ofappreciation. The Commission's task is not to substitute itself for thecompetent Greek authorities in determining the most appropriate policyin regulating use of surnames in Greece, but rather to review under theConvention the decisions that these authorities take in the exerciseof their power of appreciation (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR,Stjerna v. Finland judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 299-B,p. 61, para. 39).      The Commission notes that all Greek citizens have surnames andwould therefore see no harm in obliging the applicants to have asurname too. Furthermore the Commission notes that it has beenexpressly stressed by the respondent Government that the applicants mayhave the surname of their choice. In the Commission's view thisposition is also supported by the text of Law No. 2215/1994.      In view of these circumstances the Commission finds that therequirement to have a surname does not amount to a degrading treatmentor punishment, nor does it constitute a lack of respect for theapplicants' private and family life within the meaning of theConvention.      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 2(Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 3.   The applicants next complain that Law No. 2215/1994, whichdeprives the first, eight and ninth applicants of their title to theirproperty and confiscates, or authorises the confiscation of thatproperty, violates their right to property, in breach of Article 1 ofProtocol No. 1 (P1-1), read on its own and in connection with Article14 (P1-1+14) of the Convention.      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful     enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his     possessions except in the public interest and subject to the     conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of     international law.      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair     the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary     to control the use of property in accordance with the general     interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions     or penalties."      The Government first contend that, with the exception of thefirst applicant, the rest of the applicants cannot claim to be victimsof a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).      The Government further allege that this complaint is inadmissibleratione materiae. In particular the Government note that a commonfeature all over Europe is the existence of a clear-cut distinctionbetween, on the one hand, public and, on the other, private possessionsof monarchs. Public possessions are owned by the States and their useis put at the disposal of the monarchs for the exercise of theirfunction as Heads of State. The Government submit that such properties,held under special privileges and immunities, do not come within theconcept of property or possessions protected under Article 1 ofProtocol No. 1 (P1-1). On the other hand, the private property ofEuropean monarchs has no privileges whatsoever compared with theproperty of ordinary citizens. It is acquired, used and transferred inaccordance with the common rules of domestic civil law, as applied toall transactions between private individuals. According to theGovernment, such private possessions would reasonably be protectedunder Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).      In the present case, the Government argue that the acquisitionof all three contested estates by the former Royal family did not occurin accordance with the general provisions of Greek civil law butbecause of the functions of the beneficiaries. The Government add thatthe most significant particularity of the legal status of the alleged"Royal property" of the Greek Crown lay in the fact that it had alwayshad a sui generis and quasi-public character. According to theGovernment, this is demonstrated by the fact that the property inquestion had not only been assimilated to State property for proceduralpurposes (i.e. special time-limits, award of State privileges for therecovery of debts, prohibition of provisional forced execution, etc),but it had also benefited from substantial State prerogatives (i.e.non-prescription of claims, plain prohibition of usucaption,criminalisation of trespass, etc). The Government conclude that, nomatter how each of the contested estates had been acquired, theselands, which include constitutionally protected forests, historical andarchaeological sites, were conserved in their integrality and evenexpanded only because of the privileges attached to the monarchs'public status.      The Government further contend that the complaint under Article 1of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) is in any case inadmissible ratione temporis,because any violation of this Article took place before 20 November1985, i.e. when Greece recognised the right to individual petition. Inparticular, the Government submit that the applicants' property wasexpropriated by virtue of legislative decree No. 225/1973, and hasremained expropriated by virtue of that decree and as a result of theestablishment under the 1975 Constitution of a PresidentialParliamentary Republic. The Government conclude that Law No. 2215/1994was a confirmation of the existing constitutional position as was laterdecided by the Special Supreme Court; accordingly any taking ofproperty occurred years earlier and any ownership complaint is nowinadmissible.      Alternatively, the Government argue that the applicants have notexhausted domestic remedies. In any event, the Government submit thatthe transfer of the properties in question to the Greek State satisfiedthe requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).      As regards the Government's argument that the application isinadmissible ratione materiae, the applicants reply that there ismanifestly no foundation whatever, as a matter of historical fact orGreek law, for the Government's novel argument that the property whichis the subject of their claim never belonged to the Royal family. Theapplicants stress that this argument has never been advanced by anyGovernment of Greece except in the course of the proceedings before theCommission. The fact that the Royal family has owned private propertywas consistently recognised by public authorities throughout the periodof the so-called "crowned democracy" which was established when thefirst applicant's ancestor, George I, was elected King in 1863. Suchprivate property was always recognised to be distinct from any propertythat was made available to the Royal family by virtue of theconstitutional status of the King (i.e. the Royal Palace in Athens),which is not and has never been the private property of the Royalfamily.      The applicants further submit that the fact that the Royal familyowned private property was clearly recognised even during the periodof the unconstitutional military dictatorship between 21 April 1967 and24 July 1974. The 1968 Constitution included a provision, Article 134para. 3, which provided for a unique legislative measure to be enactedto expropriate or confiscate the movable and immovable property of theformer King and his family. A legislative decree was subsequentlyissued by the dictatorship to confiscate the property of the Royalfamily. These measures would have served no purpose if the Royalproperty had always belonged to the State. After the fall of thedictatorship, a legislative decree of 1974 recognised that the propertyconfiscated by the dictatorship belonged to the Royal family. In 1979the property was delivered into the possession of the Royal family.Protocols governing the delivery of the immovable and movable propertywere duly signed by the appropriate governmental authorities and by theSpecial Committee. The status of the property was in no way affectedby the outcome of the referendum of 8 December 1974 which resulted inthe establishment of a Presidential Parliamentary Republic. The statusof the property of the Royal family simply was not in issue in thatreferendum. Nor was the status of the property affected by theenactment of the 1975 Constitution. If it had been, the State would nothave returned the property to their possession in 1979 in recognitionof their ownership of it.      Furthermore, the applicants stress that from 1974, they filed taxreturns and paid tax in respect of the property in question. Theycannot understand how lands could be properly taxable unless they wereowned by the tax-payers, nor how the Government could properly and ingood faith have demanded and accepted the payment of such taxes excepton that basis.      The applicants conclude that there is no basis in Greek law forthe notion of a connection between the constitutional role of theformer King and the status of his property. Greek civil law does notrecognise a so-called sui generis concept of ownership.      As regards the Government's argument that the application isinadmissible ratione temporis, the applicants reply that they arecomplaining about Law No. 2215/1994, which was enacted and came intoforce in 1994. In any case, legislative decree No. 225/1973 was nevera valid law, having been issued by an unconstitutional militarydictatorship in order to persecute them and inflict a personalpunishment upon them. Furthermore, the effect of this decree was todeprive the applicants of all their property, without priorcompensation determined by the courts and corresponding to the valueof the property, in other words, a general confiscation. As such, thetaking contravened not only the fundamental principles of the rule oflaw, but also all Greek Constitutions from 1827 onwards.      Even assuming that this Decree was ever valid, the applicantsargue that it was repealed after the fall of the dictatorship on24 July 1974. In this respect the applicants invoke in particularArticle 15 of the First Constitutional Act of 1974, which provided thatthe 1968 Constitution, as well as any other Constitutional Act or actof a constitutional character passed under the military dictatorshipafter 21 April 1967, was repealed.      The applicants further claim that legislative decree No. 225/1973was repealed by legislative decree No. 72/1974. In this respect theyrefer to the report issued on 28 September 1992 by the division ofScientific Studies of the Greek Parliament, which stated inter aliathat legislative decree No. 225/1973 was repealed by legislative decreeNo. 72/1974 and that the property thereby "reverted to its formerownership status".      The applicants stress that it is tantamount to bad faith for theGovernment now to argue that the Royal family did not own the propertyin question before the coming into force of Law No. 2215/1994.      As regards the Government's argument that the taking of theirproperty was justified by reasons of public interest, the applicantssubmit that nothing in the Government's case justifies the enactmentof a special measure for confiscating their property withoutcompensation. Furthermore, the applicants claim that the right toreclaim taxes paid since 1992 could not possibly constitute a faircompensation for the expropriation of all their private property. Asfor the wholly inadequate compensation offered to them in respect ofthe arbitrary and illegal confiscation of their property by thedictatorship in 1973, the applicants submit that this is in any caseof no relevance to the taking of their restored property which occurredin 1994.      The applicants conclude that the Government have failed to offerany credible or sufficient justification for the taking of theirproperty, which was motivated by political and personal antipathy,rather than by any genuine desire to serve the public interest.      The Commission must first examine whether the first, eighth andninth applicants qualify as possible victims of a violation of Article1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).      In the Commission's view, an applicant cannot claim to be thevictim of a breach of one of the rights and freedoms protected by theConvention unless there is a sufficiently direct connection between theapplicant as such and the injury he maintains he suffered as a resultof the alleged breach (No. 24581/94, Dec. 6.4.95, D.R. 81, p. 123).      In the present case the Commission notes that before theenactment of Law No. 2215/1994 the property in question was claimed bythe former King and Princesses Irene and Ekaterini. Therefore, theCommission considers that these applicants are personally affected bythe application of Law No. 2215/1994 as regards property issues, andthat they may accordingly claim to be victims of a violation of Article1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).      As regards the objection raised by the Government as to theapplicants' failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the Commissionrecalls that under the Greek Constitution the courts are obliged notto apply a law whose contents contravene the Constitution. Accordingly,the only way by which the applicants could seek judicial protection oftheir property rights was by challenging the constitutionality of LawNo. 2215/1994, which stipulated that the Greek State is the owner ofthe moveable and immoveable Royal property.      Consequently, having held that Law No. 2215/1994 is not contraryto the Constitution, the Special Supreme Court's decision rendershenceforth ineffective any further attempt of the applicants toinstitute civil or administrative proceedings in order to seek judicialprotection of their property rights. The Commission recalls in thatrespect that the judgments of the Special Supreme Court are irrevocableand binding on all Greek courts. Therefore, the Commission considersthat there is no point in pursuing such proceedings as the applicantshave no prospect of success.      It follows that the objection based on the non-exhaustion ofdomestic remedies cannot be upheld.      In the light of the parties' observations, the Commissionconsiders that this part of the application raises serious questionsof fact and law which are of such complexity that their determinationshould depend on an examination of the merits. This part of theapplication cannot, therefore, be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of theConvention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has beenestablished. 4.   Following the judgment issued by the Supreme Special Court on theconstitutionality of Law No. 2215/1994, the applicants lastly complainthat the latter Court lacked independence and impartiality, and deniedthem justice in breach of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of theConvention.      The Government affirm that the applicants have received a fairhearing before the Special Supreme Court, and consider that theapplicants have adduced no concrete evidence whatsoever to supporttheir allegations. Therefore the Government firmly reject theapplicants' criticism of the independence and impartiality of the Greekjudiciary.      The applicants contend that the Special Supreme Court renderedits judgment on wholly spurious and extra-judicial grounds, evidencinga lack of independence and a bias in favour of the Greek Government.In particular the applicants complain that the Special Supreme Courtupheld Law No. 2215/1994 as being consistent with the Constitution,despite the fact that this legislation was arbitrary and plainlymotivated by the political hostility of the Greek Government towardsthe former King and his family.      The Commission recalls that the existence of impartiality for thepurposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention must bedetermined according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of thepersonal conviction of a particular judge in a given case, and alsoaccording to an objective test, that is ascertaining whether the judgeoffered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in thisrespect (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Hauschildt v. Denmarkjudgment of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 21, para. 46).      As to the subjective test, the personal impartiality of a judgemust be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (ibid, para. 48),and no evidence has been produced in the present case which mightsuggest bias on the part of the magistrates of the Special SupremeCourt. The Commission notes moreover that the case was decided by amajority and that the opinion of the four judges who dissented isincluded in the text of the judgment.      The Commission considers therefore that the outcome of theproceedings before the Special Supreme Court is not sufficient initself to justify apprehensions as to the impartiality of this court.      As to the objective test, it must be determined whether, quiteapart from the judges' conduct, there are ascertainable facts which mayraise doubts as to their impartiality. In this respect even appearancesmay be of a certain importance (op. cit.).      However, the Commission considers that the applicants have notproduced anything to suggest that the necessary safeguards of theSpecial Supreme Court's independence and impartiality were lacking inthe present case.      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of theConvention.      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,     the complaint concerning the alleged violation of the first,     eighth and ninth applicants' right to a peaceful enjoyment of     their possessions, and also the complaint that these applicants     were discriminated against in the enjoyment of this right,      and, by a majority,      DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.           M. de SALVIA                        S. TRECHSEL         Secretary                           President      to the Commission                   of the Commission