AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF  Application No. 17004/90 by R.H. against Norway   The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 19May 1992, the following members being present:  MM. S. TRECHSEL, Acting President F. ERMACORA E. BUSUTTIL A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK A. WEITZEL J.-C. SOYER H. DANELIUS Mrs. G. H. THUNE Sir Basil HALL MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ C.L. ROZAKIS Mrs. J. LIDDY MM. L. LOUCAIDES J.-C. GEUS M.P. PELLONPÄÄ B. MARXER  Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission  Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protectionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;  Having regard to the application introduced on 11 September 1986by R.H. against Norway and registered on 9 August 1990 under file No.17004/90;  Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rulesof Procedure of the Commission;  Having deliberated;  Decides as follows: THE FACTS  The applicant is a Norwegian citizen, born in 1962. He residesat Bærum, Norway. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. GustavHøgtun, a lawyer practising in Oslo. A. The particular facts of the case as submitted by the applicant  In 1986 the applicant lived together with a young Norwegianwoman. They were not married. In June 1986 she became pregnant, theapplicant being the father. In early August they went to Israel andplanted three trees as a symbol of their wish to have the child. Themother, however, changed her mind and together with the applicant sheconsulted a clinic in order to obtain information about a possibleabortion, the applicant however being opposed to such a step.  As the mother was determined to go through with the abortion andas the foetus was now more than 12 weeks old she was called to appearbefore a board of two doctors on 1 September 1986 and state herreasons. It does not appear that any medical reasons were submitted insupport of an abortion but rather social indications seem to have beenthe reasons for the request. The request was granted on the same dayand the abortion was carried out on 5 September 1986, when the foetuswas 14 weeks and 1 day old. The actual abortion followed a routineprocedure according to which the mother received medicine whereby"birth" was provoked. The foetus would in such circumstances"suffocate" and appear in the same manner as during normal birth. Theapplicant was not entitled to participate in the above proceedings andwas not consulted or heard before the abortion was carried out.Subsequently the applicant requested the hospital to hand over to himthe remains of the foetus in order to inter them in accordance with hisJewish faith. However, his request remained unanswered.  Prior to these events, on 31 August 1986, the applicant hadapplied for an injunction (begjæring om midlertidig forføyning) inorder to prevent the mother from terminating the pregnancy. Theapplication was rejected by the City Court on 6 September, by the HighCourt on 17 September and by the Appeals Committee of the Supreme Courton 23 October 1986.  On 10 March 1987 the applicant instituted proceedings in the CityCourt of Oslo (Oslo Byrett) against the State represented by theMinistry of Social Affairs claiming vindication and damages inter aliaon the ground that the abortion allegedly had been carried out contraryto Articles 2, 3, 8 and 9 of the Convention in respect of himself andthe foetus. By judgment of 14 June 1988, which was rendered followinghearings held from 26 to 31 May 1988, the City Court dismissed some ofthe applicant's claims and for the remainder found in favour of theState. The Court did not find that any Convention rights had beenviolated.  The applicant appealed against the judgment to the High Court ofEidsivating (Eidsivating Lagmannsrett). The Court was composed of threeprofessional and four lay judges, one of whom was Director of Finances(økonomichef) at the hospital where the abortion had been carried out.Hearings were held from 30 October to 3 November 1989. The Court heardfive experts, three witnesses and the representatives of the parties.Before the High Court the applicant claimed inter alia as follows: 1) that he was entitled to receive information concerning thefoetus, 2) that he was entitled to receive information as to whether adanger to the mother's life or health was invoked as a reason for theabortion, 3) that he was entitled to be heard on the question whether or notto terminate the pregnancy, 4) that the abortion was illegal as being inhuman treatment inrespect of the foetus, 5) that he was entitled to receive the remains of the foetus afterthe abortion in order to inter them in accordance with his religion, 6) that he was entitled to have the foetus interred after theabortion, 7) that it was illegal to put the foetus to death, and 8) that the State was not entitled to allow the abortion since themother did not fulfil the requirements under Norwegian law forterminating the pregnancy after 14 weeks and 1 day.  By judgment of 17 November 1989 the High Court rejected theapplicant's claims. In respect of the Convention the High Court statedinter alia:  (translation)  "The question arises whether the Norwegian Act on Termination of Pregnancy violates Article 2 of the Convention when it allows board approved abortion on social indications in the 15th week of the pregnancy. The High Court refers as a starting point to the Supreme Court judgment in the Børre Knutsen case ... . The Supreme Court left the question open whether Article 2 of the Convention protects the unborn life at all and stated in this connection:  'In any case the provision must be regarded as not imposing any far-reaching restrictions on the legislator's right to set the conditions for abortion. The Norwegian Act, under which the woman herself makes the final decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, provided the operation can be made before the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy, is similar to the legislation of a number of other countries belonging to the same culture and which also have acceded to the European Human Rights Convention. This is hardly immaterial to the consideration of a matter of international law.'  This view on the protection of the foetus under the Convention was expressed by the Supreme Court after considering the Commission's decisions in the case of X v. the United Kingdom (No. 8416/79, Dec. 13.5.80, D.R. 19 p. 244) and the case of Brüggemann & Scheuten v. Germany (Comm. Report 12.7.77).  Thus the High Court finds that a possible protection of the foetus under Article 2 must be decided on the basis of a balance of interests to the extent that the protection is adapted to the degree of biological maturity of the foetus at every stage of its development on the one hand and the considerations which likewise speak in favour of allowing the woman to terminate a pregnancy on the other. The Supreme Court found that an abortion based solely on the woman's choice within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy was not in violation of Article 2. Having regard thereto the High Court does not find that a system, which protects a foetus in requiring a board to establish that the pregnancy, birth or care for the child might place the woman in a difficult situation of life, would be in violation of Article 2 either.  (The applicant) has submitted that the rights of the foetus were particularly strongly protected under Article 8 of the Convention due to the agreement he had with the mother not to terminate the pregnancy.  ...  This provision protects the individual's right to family life and according to the Commission's reasoning in the Brüggemann & Scheuten case this provision goes far in protecting the woman's right to abortion. The High Court therefore finds that the provision does not protect the family as such where this runs counter to the rights guaranteed to a spouse.  (The applicant) has furthermore invoked Article 3 of the Convention.  ...  The arguments in this respect are based on the assumption that a 14 week and 1 day old foetus can feel pain. The High Court finds that this cannot be decisive and recalls that it would not be contrary to Article 2 to terminate the pregnancy. Nevertheless, the High Court will not exclude that the foetus may be protected under Article 3, but this could be so only in situations which are alien to Norwegian reality. Torture requires that the evil is intended.  The abortion in this case was carried out with the use of medicine in that the mother received such medicine as provoked an abortion by strong contraction of the uterus so that the foetus dies due to lack of oxygen as the blood supply stops. The foetus will then come out in the same way as during a birth.  The method is used since it minimises the risk of complications for the mother. The process takes such a long time that it is not justifiable from a medical point of view to keep the woman under anaesthesia. Instead she receives painkillers comparable to morphine. The experts have stated that it was not possible to anaesthetise the foetus separately. The possible pain the foetus may suffer was thus based on medical grounds out of consideration for the woman. It is furthermore very doubtful whether the foetus can feel pain at all when it is 14 weeks and 1 day old. The High Court does not need to consider this since its probability is so small that Article 3 would not in any event require the legislator to have regard thereto when considering the woman's interests which are based on medical reasons. It would be a kind of pain which is experienced outside the centre of conscience known to the human brain.  (The applicant) has submitted that Article 8 has been violated since he was not considered a party during the proceedings before the board and could not have its decision tried in the courts. The High Court recalls that the Commission in the case of X v. the United Kingdom concluded that Article 8 did not protect the potential father's procedural rights.  ...  The Commission found that, when considering what rights a father had under Article 8, one should take into account the rights of the woman being the person concerned with the pregnancy and whose interests should be protected first of all. The Commission furthermore concluded that the father's right to respect for his family life did not go as far as giving him such procedural rights.  ...  Finally, (the applicant) has submitted that Article 9 has been violated since he was not given the remains of the foetus in order to inter them in accordance with his religious convictions.  ...  The right to manifest one's religion is not unlimited when it violates the rights of others. Having regard to the woman's rights under Article 8, as interpreted by the Commission in the case of X v. the United Kingdom, the High Court finds that (the applicant's) right to manifest his religion was not violated. To give the foetus to him in order to inter it could be extremely degrading to the woman who has decided to terminate a pregnancy. Such a step must accordingly depend on the woman's acceptance.  Therefore the High Court concludes that the European Convention on Human Rights was not violated."  The applicant asked for leave to appeal against the judgment tothe Supreme Court (Høyesterett). In addition to the issues consideredby the High Court the applicant also complained of the fact that theDirector of Finances at the hospital where the abortion was carried outhad participated as a lay judge. On 22 May 1990 the Appeals Committeeof the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.  B. Relevant domestic law  (translation)  Act no. 50 of 13 June 1975 on Termination of Pregnancy as amended on 16 June 1978 "Section 2. If a pregnancy leads to serious complications for a womanshe shall be offered information and advice about the assistancesociety may offer her. The woman has a right to advice in order toenable her to take the final decision.  If the woman considers, after having been offered informationetc. as mentioned and advice in accordance with Section 5, subsection2, that she nevertheless cannot go through with the pregnancy, shetakes the final decision as regards the termination of the pregnancyif this can be done before the end of the 12th week of pregnancy andserious medical reasons do not speak against it.  After the 12th week of pregnancy termination of pregancy may takeplace if a) the pregnancy, birth or care for the child may involve anunreasonable burden on the woman's physical and mental health. Regardmust be paid to whether she has a predisposition for malady; b) the pregnancy, birth or care for the child may place the womanin a difficult situation of life; c) there is a great danger that the child may contract seriousillnesses as a result of hereditary predisposition, illness orinjurious influence during pregnancy; d) ... e) ...  When considering the request for termination based on theconditions mentioned above under a)-c) regard must be paid to thewoman's entire situation, including her ability to provide care for thechild in a satisfactory way. Particular importance shall be attachedto the woman's own opinion on the situation.  The requirements for accepting termination of pregnancy mustincrease with the progress of pregnancy.  After the 18th week a pregnancy cannot be terminated, except ifthere are particularly serious reasons for such a step. If there isreason to presume that the foetus is viable, a termination of pregnancycannot be authorised. ... Section 4. A request for termination of pregnancy shall be made by thewoman herself. ... Section 5. A request for termination of pregnancy shall be submittedto a doctor. A request after the 12th week of pregnancy may also besubmitted to a board.  A woman who has requested termination of pregnancy shall beinformed by the doctor (or the board) about the nature of theintervention and its medical effects. If she so wishes, she shall alsoreceive the information and advice which is mentioned in Section 2,subsection 1. ... Section 7. If the medical intervention cannot be carried out beforethe end of the 12th week of pregnancy the doctor shall, after the womanhas received the information etc. as mentioned in Section 5, subsection2, immediately forward the request together with a written report ofthe grounds advanced by the woman and of his own observations, to theboard mentioned in subsection 2. If the request has been sent directlyto the board it shall deliberate and decide as soon as the case isready. ...  Decisions on termination of pregnancy are taken, afterconsultation with the woman, by a board composed of two doctors. Section 8. The board's decision to allow or refuse termination ofpregnancy shall be accompanied by reasons. The woman, or herrepresentative, shall be informed of the reasons for the decision...... Section 10. If the pregnancy involves an imminent risk to the life orhealth of the woman, it may be terminated regardless of therequirements set out in this Act."  COMPLAINTS  Under Article 2 of the Convention the applicant complains thatthe termination of the pregnancy involving a 14 week old foetus wasunnecessary in order to protect the mother's life or health.Furthermore, he had entered into an agreement with the mother not todeprive the unborn child of its life and he had expressly undertakento care for the child after its birth. He had vigorously protestedagainst the abortion from the time it was contemplated by the mother.  Under the circumstances which existed in this case, the applicantmaintains that the lack of protection of the unborn child underNorwegian law is unsatisfactory and constitutes a violation of Article2 of the Convention.  The applicant also complains that no measures were taken to avoidthe risk that the 14 week old foetus would feel pain during theabortion procedure. He submits that this constitutes inhuman treatmentor torture. Furthermore, his request to receive the remains of thefoetus in order that they might be buried in keeping with his religiousbeliefs was rejected. This, in his opinion, constitutes degradingtreatment. The applicant invokes Article 3 of the Convention.  The applicant further submits that he had an agreement with themother to the effect that an abortion would not be carried out and hehad made clear his willingness to assume sole responsibility for thechild after its birth. Under these circumstances, he complains thatArticle 6 has been violated as he had no right to 1) object to theproposed abortion; 2) apply to the court in order to prevent orpostpone the abortion; 3) be consulted about the proposed abortion; 4)be informed about the abortion; 5) demand that the abortion boardconsist of impartial individuals and 6) request possession of theunborn child's remains.  Under this provision the applicant also complains that one of thelay judges in the High Court was an employee at the hospital where theabortion was carried out, and that therefore his case was not heard byan impartial tribunal.  Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicant submits that heand the mother were living together as a family although they were notmarried and that he had insisted, and the mother had agreed, that noabortion would take place. Under these circumstances, so the applicantalleges, Article 8 of the Convention must ensure that a father to a 14week old foetus has a minimum of rights regarding his unborn childwhere the health of the mother is not endangered. In this case, afoetus of this age should be considered to be a part of his family.  In respect of Article 9 of the Convention the applicant submitsthat the unborn child meant something particular to him and that, atleast at the beginning, the mother shared and accepted this view. Theplanting of three trees in Israel, one for each of the parents and onefor the unborn child, illustrates this. The taking of the foetus's lifein the absence of a medical necessity was obviously not in accordancewith that concept nor was the denial of his request to be given thechild's remains in order to inter them.  Such a step would not have implied a lack of respect for thewishes of the mother. There is no evidence that the mother was askedabout her wishes regarding this matter by the doctors or any otherpersons employed by the hospital. Therefore, the applicant finds thathe was unnecessarily denied a manifestation of his conscience andreligion which for him was extremely important and vital to his healthand well-being.  In order to prevent the termination of the pregnancy, theapplicant sought the services of an attorney to intervene on hisbehalf. However, the board would not listen to any argument from theapplicant. Furthermore, the applicant's attorney filed a complaint withthe ordinary courts but these complaints were not admitted. No othereffective remedy exists in Norway. The applicant considers this to bea violation of Article 13 of the Convention.  Finally, the applicant submits that his actions were based on theconviction that the life of an unborn child should be protected and itshould not be deprived of life for non-medical reasons. Hisrelationship with the mother rested on that condition which was alsoaccepted by the mother. Furthermore, the pregnancy and birth of thechild in question was planned. It was the result of an agreementbetween two free, independent and equal persons, mature and under nopressure whatsoever. In these circumstances, the applicant complainsthat discrimination exists against him as he was completely excludedfrom any decisions made concerning the welfare of his own child. Herefers to Article 14 of the Convention.  THE LAW 1. The applicant complains that under the circumstances whichexisted in the present case the lack of protection of the life of theunborn child under Norwegian law was contrary to Article 2 (Art. 2) ofthe Convention.  The Commission accepts that the applicant, as a potential father,in the circumstances of the present case was so closely affected by thetermination of the pregnancy that he may claim to be a "victim", withinthe meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, of thelegislation complained of as applied in the present case. TheCommission also accepts that he has exhausted domestic remedies asrequired by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention for which reason theCommission must examine whether the case discloses any appearance ofa violation of Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention (cf. No. 8416/79,Dec. 13.5.80, D.R. 19 p. 244).  Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention reads:  "1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.  2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:  a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence;  b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;  c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection."  The Commission first notes that the term "everyone" is notdefined in the Convention, nor is the term "life" but it finds thatArticle 2 (Art. 2) contains two separate though interrelated basicelements. The first sentence of paragraph 1 sets forth the generalobligation that the right to life shall be protected by law. The secondsentence of paragraph 1 contains a prohibition of intentionaldeprivation of life. This prohibition is delimited by the exceptionsmentioned in the second sentence itself and in paragraph 2. TheCommission recalls that in its decision mentioned above it stated:  "All the above limitations, by their nature, concern persons already born and cannot be applied to the foetus.  Thus both the general usage of the term 'everyone' ('toute personne') in the Convention ... and the context in which this term is employed in Article 2 (Art. 2) ... tend to support the view that it does not include the unborn."  However, the Commission also recalls that the first sentence ofArticle 2 (Art. 2) imposes a broader obligation on the State than thatcontained in the second sentence. The concept that "everyone's lifeshall be protected by law" enjoins the State not only to refrain fromtaking a person's life "intentionally" but also to take appropriatesteps to safeguard life (cf. for example No. 11604/85, Dec. 10.10.86,D.R. 50 p. 259).  The Commission finds that it does not have to decide whether thefoetus may enjoy a certain protection under Article 2 (Art. 2), firstsentence as interpreted above, but it will not exclude that in certaincircumstances this may be the case notwithstanding that there is in theContracting States a considerable divergence of views on whether or towhat extent Article 2 (Art. 2) protects the unborn life.  The Austrian Constitutional Court found, for example, thatArticle 2 para. 1 (Art. 2-1), first sentence, interpreted in thecontext of Article 2 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 2-1, 2-2), did not cover theunborn life (Decision of 11 October 1974, Erk. Slg. (Collection ofDecisions) No. 7400, EuGRZ 1975, p. 74) whereas the German FederalConstitutional Court, when interpreting the provision "Everyone has aright to life" in Article 2 (2) of the Basic Law stated that"'everyone'... is 'every living human being', in other words: everyhuman individual possessing life; 'everyone' therefore includes unbornhuman beings" (judgment of 25 February 1975).  When considering the Norwegian abortion legislation in the lightof Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention the Norwegian Supreme Courtstated:  "... abortion laws must necessarily be based on a compromise between the respect for the unborn life and other essential and worthy considerations. This compromise has led the legislator to permit self-determined abortion under the circumstances defined by the Act.  Clearly, such a reconciliation of disparate considerations give rise to ethical problems, and clearly too, there will be some disagreement about the system embodied in the Act. The reactions to the Act show that many ... view it as an attack on central ethical principles. But it is equally relevant that others - also from an ethical point of view - regard the Act as having done away with an unacceptable legal situation.  It is not a matter for the courts to decide whether the solution to a difficult legislative problem which the legislator chose when adopting the Act on Termination of Pregnancy of 1978, is the best one. On this point, different opinions will be held among judges as among other members of our society. The reconciliation of conflicting interests which abortion laws require is the legislator's task and the legislator's responsibility. The legislative power is exercised by the People through the Storting. The Storting majority which adopted the Act on Termination of Pregnancy in 1978 had its mandate from the People after an election campaign in which the abortion question was again a central issue, decided moreover not to take the initiative towards any statutory amendment. Clearly, the courts must respect the solution chosen by the legislator" (cf. No. 11045/84, Dec. 8.3.85, D.R. 42 p. 247 at p. 253).  Having regard to this it is clear that national laws on abortiondiffer considerably. In these circumstances, and assuming that theConvention may be considered to have some bearing in this field, theCommission finds that in such a delicate area the Contracting Statesmust have a certain discretion.  As regards the circumstances of the present case the Commissionrecalls that the Norwegian Abortion Act itself allows self-determinedabortion within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. From the 12th weekuntil the 18th week of pregnancy a termination may be authorised by aboard of two doctors if certain conditions have been fulfilled. Afterthe 18th week a pregnancy cannot be terminated, unless there areparticularly serious reasons for such a step. However, if there isreason to presume that the foetus is viable, a termination of pregnancycannot be authorised.  Furthermore the Commission recalls that the mother, after havingreceived information and advice about the assistance society may offerher, wanted to terminate a pregnancy of 14 weeks and she appearedbefore a board of two doctors who decided, as appears from the HighCourt judgment of 17 November 1989, to authorise the abortion, havingconcluded that the pregnancy, birth or care for the child might placeher in a difficult situation of life as set out in Section 2,subsection 3 b of the Act.  As the present case shows there are different opinions as towhether such an authorisation strikes a fair balance between thelegitimate need to protect the foetus and the legitimate interests ofthe woman in question. However, having regard to what is stated aboveconcerning Norwegian legislation, its requirements for the terminationof pregnancy as well as the specific circumstances of the present case,the Commission does not find that the respondent State has gone beyondits discretion which the Commission considers it has in this sensitivearea of abortion. Accordingly, it finds that the applicant's complaintunder Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention is manifestly ill-foundedwithin the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 2. The applicant also complains that no measures were taken to avoidthe risk that the 14 week old foetus would feel pain during theabortion procedure. He submits that this constitutes inhuman treatmentor torture and invokes Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention whichreads:  "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."  The Commission has not been presented with any material whichcould substantiate the applicant's allegations of pain inflicted uponthe foetus other than what appears from the courts' judgments mentionedabove. Having regard to the abortion procedure as described therein theCommission does not find that the case discloses any appearance of aviolation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The Commission hasreached the same conclusion in respect of the applicant's complaintunder this provision that his request to receive the remains of thefoetus was rejected. It follows that this part of the application isalso manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2(Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 3. The applicant submits that he had an agreement with the motherto the effect that an abortion would not be carried out and he had madeclear his willingness to assume sole responsibility for the child afterits birth. Under these circumstances, he complains that Article 6(Art. 6) has been violated as he had no right to 1) object to theproposed abortion; 2) apply to the court in order to prevent orpostpone abortion; 3) be consulted about the proposed abortion; 4) beinformed about the abortion; 5) demand that the abortion board consistof impartial individuals and 6) request possession of the unbornchild's remains.  Under this provision the applicant also complains that one of thelay judges in the High Court was an employee at the hospital where theabortion was carried out, and that therefore his case was not heard byan impartial tribunal.  In so far as relevant Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of theConvention reads as follows:  "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by an ... impartial tribunal ..."  The Commission recalls that in order for Article 6 (Art. 6) toapply to the proceedings in question it must first ascertain whetherthere was a dispute over a "right" which can be said, at least onarguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law (cf. for exampleEur. Court H.R., Skärby judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A, no 180-B,p. 36, para. 27). It is undisputed that under Norwegian law theapplicant had no right at all to participate in the proceedingsconcerning the termination of the pregnancy. Thus he cannot claim onany arguable ground that he had a right under domestic law. It followsthat this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae withthe provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 27para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. 4. Under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention the applicant submitsthat he and the mother were living together as a family although theywere not married and that he had insisted, and the mother had agreed,that no abortion would take place. Under these circumstances, so theapplicant alleges, Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention must grant afather to a 14 week old foetus a minimum of rights regarding his unbornchild, where the health of the mother is not endangered. In this case,a foetus of this age should be considered to be a part of his family.  In respect of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention the applicantsubmits that the unborn child meant something particular to him froma religious point of view. He complains that the taking of the foetus'slife in the absence of a medical necessity and the denial of hisrequest to be given the foetus's remains in order to inter them deniedhim the right to manifest his conscience and religion.  It is true that Articles 8 and 9 (Art. 8, 9) of the Conventionguarantee the right to respect for private and family life and freedomto manifest one's religion. However, the Commission finds that anyinterpretation of the potential father's right under these provisionsin connection with an abortion which the mother intends to haveperformed on her, must first of all take into account her rights, shebeing the person primarily concerned by the pregnancy and itscontinuation or termination. The Commission therefore finds that anypossible interference which might be assumed in the circumstances ofthe present case was justified as being necessary for the protectionof the rights of another person.  It follows that this part of the application is also manifestlyill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of theConvention. 5. The applicant furthermore complains about discrimination as hewas completely excluded from any decisions made concerning the welfareof his own child. He refers to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.  The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) of theConvention has no independent existence since it has effect solely inrelation to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms safeguarded by theother substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.Furthermore, it safeguards individuals against discriminatorydifferences only if they are placed in analogous situations (cf. forexample Eur. Court H.R., Rasmussen judgment of 28 November 1984, SeriesA no. 87, pp. 12 and 13, paras. 29 and 35).  In relation to the termination of a pregnancy and the proceedingsand decisions concerning this the Commission does not find that theapplicant was placed in an analogous situation with the mother.Accordingly, there has been no discriminatory treatment within themeaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention for which reason thispart of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of theConvention. 6. The applicant finally complains, under Article 13 (Art. 13) ofthe Convention, that he had no effective remedy in Norway in respectof his opposition to the termination of the pregnancy.  The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) has beeninterpreted by the European Court of Human rights as requiring a remedyin domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as"arguable" in terms of the Convention (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R.,Boyle and Rice judgment of 21 June 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para.52). However, having regard to its above conclusions in respect of theConvention complaints submitted the Commission finds that the applicantdoes not have any arguable claims. Furthermore, the Commission recallsthat the Norwegian High Court considered all complaints which theapplicant has submitted to the Commission. In these circumstances theCommission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13)of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is alsomanifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,  DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.  Deputy Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission  (J. RAYMOND) (S. TRECHSEL)